Family Status and Subjective Well-being: Comparing Poland and Sweden

By Eva Bernhardt, Stockholm University, and Ewa Fratczak, Warsaw School of Economics

e-mail: eva.bernhardt@sociology.su.se, ewaf@sgh.waw.pl

WORK IN PROGRESS – NOT TO BE QUOTED

Paper to be presented at the session on Cultural Dimensions of demographic behaviour in industrialized societies (805, Organizer: Dirk van de Kaa). IUSSP Conference in Tours, France, July 2005

Abstract

The central research question in this paper is whether the effect of family status on the individual's subjective well-being differs in different cultural contexts – here exemplified by a society with a strong family system (Poland) and another society with a weak family system (Sweden). In order to shed some light on this issue we conduct comparative analysis of Poland and Sweden, using similar survey data from the two countries. Our results indicate that currently living in a partnership has strong positive effects in both Poland and Sweden, but stronger in the latter. Having children significantly increases well-being in Sweden, but not in Poland. No gender differences in subjective well-being were found in Poland, while Swedish men were significantly less likely than Swedish women to report high levels of happiness. We offer some tentative explanations for the apparent paradox that living with a partner and/or children is associated with less "happiness" in the Polish society with its strong family system, than in individualistic Sweden, a country with a weak family system.

Introduction

It is a plausible proposition that individuals form unions and have children because they expect that these decisions will increase their subjective well-being or "happiness". There is also extensive evidence that married people experience higher levels of happiness or subjective well-being than those not currently living with a co-residential partner. A much debated issue is whether this is due to selection of people who are innately 'happy' into marriage or other long-term relationship, or whether the state of being married (living with a partner) has a positive effect on the individual's subjective well-being. Kohler and Behrman (2003) have investigated whether children and partnerships do indeed contribute to individuals' well-being, and, if yes, how much and under what conditions, using data for identical twins in Denmark, thereby controlling for 'unobserved biological and family endowments', which, presumably, are the main factors behind the selection mechanism. They find that currently being in a partnership has large positive effects on happiness, and a first child also substantially increases well-being, while additional children have a negative effect on females, but no effect on male happiness.

We hypothesize that these effects are different in different cultural contexts, depending on, for example, the degree of overall family orientation in the society. We assume that in a strongly family-oriented society such as Poland, the effect of family status has a larger positive effect on subjective well-being than in individualistic Sweden. Reher (1998), in his analysis of family ties in Western Europe, describes the Swedes as committed to "individualism and to residential autonomy". Unlike young Poles, Swedish young adults leave the parental home early, and tend to live non-family lives (no coresidential partner or cohabiting without children) for a fairly lengthy period before settling down to more committed family lives. The percent of single-person households is also substantially higher in Sweden than the EU average, and especially compared to the countries in southern Europe, to which catholic Poland can be compared, at least on some family dimensions. There can be no doubt that Sweden must be characterized as a country with a 'weak family system', according to Reher's classification. Reher only discusses Western Europe, but we find support for the argument that Poland can be characterized as a country with a 'strong family system'.

We discuss the degree of family-orientation in the Polish and Swedish societies, respectively, and also review the literature on the value of children and of marriage (long-term partnerships), as well as the literature on the association between parental status and partner status, on the one hand, and subjective well-being on the other. After presenting the results of

our empirical analysis, we offer some possible explanations for the apparent paradox that living with a partner and/or children is associated with less "happiness" in the Polish society, with its strong family system, than in individualistic Sweden, a country with a weak family system.

Setting the scene – comparison of Poland and Sweden /demographic and economic facts /

The observed changes in family, fertility and parenthood in the last decades in Europe have changed the European family portrait and the meaning of living as a family in Europe. According to Hantrais (2005; 4), who describes living as a family in Europe today, ' it can be said that, as results of these demographic trends, for a growing numbers of Europeans, living as a family today means living in longer, thinner, more often deinstitutionalized (non-marital), non-co resident families. The basic demographic trends, the so-called key changes in family formation and structure are well-known and include: postponed parenthood, late childbearing, declining fertility, increase in decisions of individuals and couples not to have children, and increase of extramarital births. These changes result in smaller family size. The question may be posed how Poland and Sweden compare against the background of changes observed in Europe, with regard to: family formation and dissolution, fertility and parenthood. Respective information is included in Table 1a , 1b and Figures: 1a-d, 2a-d.

Marriage per 1000 population and total female first marriage rates are lower for Sweden than for Poland. At the beginning of the new millennium(years 2000-2002), these two rates in Poland were at the level recorded in Sweden in the 1970s. At the same time, mean age of women at first marriage is currently 6 years higher in Sweden than in Poland, about 30 in Sweden and 24 in Poland. As in the previous rates, the difference in occurrence of similar values is about 30 years. This means that family, or union formation process is different in the two counties. Low intensity of first marriages in Sweden can be attributed to the fact that marriage is not the prevalent form of family in Sweden. Family formation in this country is to a greater extent based on a free, consensual union, while in Poland marriage is the dominant form of relationship. The National Census of 2002 showed that only 1.8% of all families in Poland were those based on informal relationship. However, in the 1990s Poland observed decrease in first marriages intensity by approximately one-third, which is a significant change. Lower intensity of first marriages is not substituted by growth in relationships of other types, e.g. cohabitation. This situation means postponing marriage, which boosts the share of never-married persons (bachelor, spinster) in the younger generation.

Poland is among the European countries with the lowest divorce rates. The divorce rate in Sweden is 100% higher compared to Poland in the years 2000-2002. A similar situation was also observed in the past (the difference between the countries was the most visible in the 1970s). Thus, Poland and Sweden follow two diverse patterns of family/union formation and dissolution. Divergent relationships are the source (however, not the only one) of differences in extra-marital births. In 2002, the share of extra-marital births was 14.4% in Poland and 56% in Sweden, respectively (higher in Sweden by over 390%). The discrepancy between the two countries' extramarital births has been systematically widening since the 1960s (cp. Figure 2a).

Differences occur between the following:

- mean age of women at birth of first child (biological birth order) – for year 2002 average age for Sweden was at the level 28.3 years (by 3.3 years higher than in Poland) and
- mean age of women at childbearing; for year 2002, the values were, respectively: approximately. 30 years of age for Sweden and approximately 28 years for Poland.

One synthetic measure of reproduction is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), whose current values in both countries are under replacement level. Sweden's current TFR is about 1.7 and Poland's – 1.2 children. This means that the situation in Sweden is better (0.5 children's difference). In the past, the situation used to be more advantageous in Poland; before the1990s the country enjoyed TFR higher than Sweden, while starting with the 1990s, higher TFR values are observed in Sweden than in Poland (cp. Figure 2c).

Low values of TFR in Poland may be interpreted and explained in many ways. – One possible explanation exists in the still close relationship between fertility and nuptiality, whereas in Sweden unions of this type have declined over a long period of time. Sweden is characterized by an advanced process of deinstitutionalization of family life, it is a country in which marriage and parenthood are becoming disconnected to a greater extent than in the other European countries (comparative analysis on this subject is presented by: Billari,2005(a, b), Hantrais,2005, Fratczak, 2004). Thus, Poland and Sweden have different models of nuptiality, fertility and parenthood. Poland is in the group of countries in which the nuclear family based on marriage prevails[1]. The model of family in Sweden is based on a relationship different from marriage.

[1] It should be also stressed that over the past 15 years of transformation, significant changes have taken place In nuclear family model In Poland. Results of the Family Status Life Table Model estimated for Poland for the year 2002 (Fratczak, Kozłowski, 2005) indicate that the model with two children has been replaced by the model of a

Another process that shows discrepancy between Poland and Sweden is leaving parental home. This is the event regarded in demography as the main factor in transition to adulthood and very important within the context of an individual life cycle. Young people usually make this decision when they reach maturity and it is associated with leaving parental home and closely related to events in other careers, especially with continuing education, starting economic activity, or family formation. Leaving home behavior at the societal level is connected with institutional arrangements and social norms. *'Institutional setting would then interplay with social norms in shaping the transition out of parental home,…'* (Billari et all, 2001: 341).

Results from the Polish Retrospective Survey 2001[2] show that the mean ages at leaving parental home are 22 for women and 25 for men; however as many as 20% of the respondents live with their parents at the age of 35. The Survey revealed that the younger generation of Polish men and women make the decision to leave their parental homes older and older. It is especially so in the case of men, whose average age at leaving parental home has grown by 2 years over the recent two decades (Sienkiewicz, 2005). The data obtained for the Survey 2001 unequivocally indicate that the process of leaving parental home in Poland is closely related to marriage. Sixty-six per cent of the respondents mentioned marriage as the main reason for leaving parental home. An equally close relationship between these events was observed in Poland 10 years ago in *Family and Fertility Survey 1991*. The second major reason for leaving parental home was job and independent living, regarded as the synonyms of the broadly understood 'independence'. The remaining causes totaled 5% of all reasons given for the decision to leave parental home. Based on comparative analysis presented in "Leaving Home in Europe" (Billari et all, 2001: 350-360) based on the results FFS data percentage of the individuals leaving home before and at first union , and first marriage for cohort born around 1960, respectively, were for Poland and Sweden:

Before and at first union: Men Poland: 25%; 48%; Men Sweden: 71%; 23% Women Poland : 23%; ; 49%; Women Sweden – 63%; 31%.

Before and at first marriage: Men Poland: 26%; 48%; Men Sweden: 98%; 1% Women Poland : 24%; ; 49%; Women Sweden – 73%; 18%. Data evidently prove that patterns of leaving parental home are significantly different. In this respect, Poland resembles

---

nuclear family with 1 child, about 30% of nuclear families were childless. This is a significant scope of transformation of Polish family.

[2] More about 2001 Survey in next part of the paper.

the countries of Southern Europe (France, Spain) rather than Sweden (compare works: Billari et all (2001), Bernhardt et all (2005), Sienkiewicz (2005)).

The countries have different economic indicators, which can be found in Table 1b. Poland is characterized by unemployment rate four times higher than that in Sweden. This refers to both men and women. Per capita GDP is lower than the EU average and much lower than in Sweden. Poland, compared to Sweden, has very disadvantageous inequality and poverty rates. Discrepancies observed between the levels of economic development of the two countries may support the interpretation of the results of our model estimation, in particular they may be useful while interpretation and evaluation verifying hypotheses. Poland and Sweden are differing considerably in respect of the demographic, social and economic development.

Values and religion

In table 2 we present some evidence on values about family-related issues from the Polish and Swedish surveys within the European Values Study (EVS). The information is taken from the third wave of the EVS, conducted in 1999/2000 (Halman 2001). The first question in the survey lists six different areas or domains (work, family, friends, leisure, politics, and religion), and asks how the respondent would rate the importance of that particular aspect in their life on a scale from "not at all important" to "very important". In table 2, the percentage "very important" in Poland and Sweden, respectively, is reported. Swedes and Poles seem to attach the same high importance to the family, above average for the 32 countries included in the survey. This result is intriguing from the point of view that we argue that Poland has a strong family system and Sweden a weak one. Neither Poles nor Swedes attach much importance to politics, similar to most other European countries. Unlike the Poles, however, Swedes think friends and leisure are very important elements in their life (above average), while Poles attach great importance to work and religion (above average for the European countries). Thus, while sharing strong family values, Swedes and Poles seem to value differently other aspects of life, in fact to have diametrically opposing views on the importance of work, friends, leisure, and religion.

Taking a look at selected other attitudes in the EVS, focussing on family-related values, we find that Poles are more likely than Swedes to think highly of marriage - very few

think that marriage is an outdated institution[3]. Also many more Poles think that marriage, or a long-term, stable relationship, is important to be happy, and that children are necessary for a successful marriage. Poles also feel very strongly that a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily (above average for the European countries), while Swedes share this view to a much lesser extent (but still 60 % of the Swedes agreed with this statement). Only about one in four Swedes (25 %) think that a woman needs to have children in order to be fulfilled, while this view is held by 70 % of the Poles. Here again, Poles are above average for the European countries, while Swedes are below.

It is well-known that Sweden is a highly secular country, while the Catholic church has a strong hold on Polish society. This is clearly reflected in the responses to the question of how important God is in one's life. The mean score (for a scale that goes from 1 to 10) for the Poles is more than twice that of the Swedes (8.39 versus 4.1). The importance of religion in society is obviously one of the more distinct dividing lines between the two societies, and we will take this into account in our empirical analysis.

A number of questions in the survey dealt with views on gender roles; we report on four of them. Poles and Swedes are similar in their views on whether both husband and wife should contribute to household income (both countries above average for Europe). Neither do they differ very much in their attitude to the importance for paid work for women's independence: here the Poles are close to the European average, while Swedes are slightly above. This similarity no doubt reflects the fact that both Swedish and Polish women have for quite some time had a high degree of labour force participation. The more traditional Polish view on women's proper role in society, however, comes to the forefront in the two items on whether being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay, and whether women really want a home and children, rather than a job in the labour market, especially the latter one. Here Poles are way above the European average, and Swedes substantially below (74 % of the Poles think that home and children are more important to women than paid work, while this applies to only 40 % of the Swedes, compared to the European average of 63 %).

Finally, how do Swedes and Poles differ in their reported level of 'happiness' or life satisfaction? The mean score for life satisfaction, on a scale from 1 to 10, is 7.65 for Swedes and 6.37 for Poles. Thus life satisfaction in Poland is about average for Europe, while

[3] It is however noteworthy, in a country characterized by high prevalence of unmarried cohabitation, that as much as 80 % of the Swedes disagree with this statement.

Swedes, on average, are more satisfied with life than Europeans in general[4] . This corroborates the finding of Delhey (2004), in a study of life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe, who reports that there is a lower level of subjective well-being in most of the acceding countries in comparison with the EU member states, and that the Nordic countries seem to have the highest levels of life satisfaction. A similar picture is found, if instead of mean life satisfaction one looks at the percentage reporting that, all things taken together, they are very happy: this is true for 37 % among the Swedes, but only 18 % among the Poles (table 2).

Summarizing this brief review of family-related values in Poland and Sweden, it is clear that Swedes are more post-modern in their views than the Poles (Inglehart 1990), while "the family-work-religion axis is the defining axis of Poles' value system" (Giza-Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk 2004). Poles are also distinctly more traditional than the Swedes in their views of the family – family means marriage and children with two co-residential parents. Swedes, on the other hand, are more tolerant of childlessness and other family forms than the married couple with joint children. While Poles are as accepting as the Swedes of female labour force participation, in other ways they are clearly more conservative in their gender role attitudes. We agree with Giza-Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk (2004) that post-communist Poland is characterized by a mix of traditionalism and modernity. Finally, life satisfaction is at a higher level in Sweden than in Poland.

Weak or strong family system?

Both the socio-demographic facts, describing the two countries, and the evidence presented of differences in their value systems, clearly indicate that Sweden must be characterized as a society with a weak family system, giving precedence to the individual over the family group, while Poland must be described as a country with a strong family system, where the family group has priority over the individual. That the Polish family can be defined by it strong family ties is also corroborated by Stanek (2005).

[4] It should be noted, however, that some of the other Eastern European countries have even lower average life satisfaction than the Poles.

The concept of subjective well-being

Diener et al (1997) defines subjective well-being (SWB) as "a field of psychology that attempts to understand people's evaluation of their lives". According to Hird (2003) there is no agreement about what well-being is and how it can be measured. Diener et al (1999) describe subjective well-being as 'a broad category of phenomena that includes people's emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction'. The concept of subjective well-being can be described as having two main components, namely affective and cognitive (life satisfaction). The affective component can be thought of as how you *feel* about your life, while the cognitive component can be viewed as how you *think* about your life.

Hird (2003) describes a number of different scales that are commonly used to measure subjective well-being. The simplest one is called Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), and contains 5 items, which measure general life satisfaction, not satisfaction with specific domains of life, as the more sophisticated scales do. Hird argues that asking a single question about well-being, as is frequently done in social surveys, is simple and straightforward, but may be open to bias (see also Kohler and Behrman 2003).

There are different opinions among researchers on whether happiness, life satisfaction, and subjective well-being are all the same, or if they capture different dimensions, that are analytically important. Veenhoven (1997) explicitly states that they are the same and can be used interchangeably. So does Easterlin (2001, 2005), while Hird (2003) claims that the terms are *not* synonymous, but that in practice the differences may not be so important. In this paper, we will follow Veenhoven and Easterlin, and use the terms happiness, life satisfaction and subjective well-being interchangeably.

A much debated issue is whether happiness is a trait, meaning that every individual is thought to have a 'setpoint' of happiness given by genetics and personality. This claim, primarily by psychologists, is based on the fact that many studies show limited influence of objective circumstances, while other studies that find the genetic component of subjective well-being to be significant. Veenhoven (1997) and Easterlin (2005), among others, argue that happiness in itself is *not* a trait. In the formulation of Diener et al (1999) "personality predisposes people to certain affective reactions but .. current events also influence one's current levels of SWB". Long-term life circumstances can also have some

continuing influence on people's life satisfaction. Findings indicate that marriage, unemployment, heredity, and physical disability have a causal influence on levels of subjective well-being (Diener et al 1999). According to Easterlin (2005)"life events in the nonpecuniary domains, such as marriage, divorce, and serious disability, have a lasting effect on happiness, and do not simply deflect the average persons temporarily above or below a setpoint given by genetics and personality" (for evidence on the stability of life satisfaction over time, see Ehrhardt et al 2000). The gap in average happiness between those who are currently married and those who are not persists over the adult life cycle, and the overwhelming evidence suggests that the formation of unions has a lasting positive effect on happiness, while dissolution has a permanently negative effect (Easterlin 2005).

Value of children and of marriage/partnerships

To explain fertility and family behavior and the mutual relationship between behavior and subjective components, it is necessary to refer to the value norms, attitudes and behaviors. Generally, there are two known approaches in the subject literature: cross-sectional approach and dynamic approach. The more adequate is the second approach. The connection between the variety of value orientation and life course choices concerning family and fertility behaviors (and living arrangements more generally) is a crucial element of the Second Demographic Transition theories (Sukryn , Lesthaeghe, 2004; Lestheaeghe and Moors ,2002). Below is a review of selected theoretical concepts concerning mainly the value of children, and to a lesser extent, the value of marriage.

The phrase "Value of Children" (VOC) was introduced into the social and psychological literature related to fertility by Hofman and Hofman (1973). To explain cross-cultural differences in fertility behaviour and fertility intentions, the authors developed a model that took into account both the objective (economic) and subjective aspects of fertility decision based on the psychological circumstances surrounding fertility decision. In their concept, they presented psychological aspects as crucial determinants for birth of a child (children).

Two questions were asked in the discussion on measurement and conceptualisation "Value of children": *how much are children values?* and; *for what qualities are they valued?*. The central mediate variable at the individual level, which is subject to changes due to the socio-cultural context, is "*Value of children*." According to Hofman and Hofman, values attributed to having children of universal character, evoking motivation for becoming a parent, and constituting the integral part of the model (9 categories altogether, 1973, pp.46-

47) include: adult status and social identity; expansion of the self, ties to a larger entity, and immortality; morals (religion, altruism, common good, norms regarding sexuality, acting on impulse, virtue); primary group ties and affection; stimulation, novelty, and fun; achievement, competence, and creativity; power, influence, and ability to have an impact on things; social comparison and competition; and economic utility.

In total, there are five categories of variables that comprise the model of reproductive behavio anticipation. Values attributed to children comprise one of these categrories and are mainly perceived as benefits in psychological aspects of being a parent. The remaining four groups of variables integrally constituting the entirety of the concept are group 2, or alternative source of the value (other avenues, besides children, for fulfilling a value); group 3, or costs (to what must be lost or sacrificed to obtain a value in any particular way); group 4, or barriers (factors such as economic depression or individual poverty; and group 5, or facilitators (suh as economic prosperity, adequate housing, help with competing work and time demands, positive attitudes towards children) (1973: 63).

The conceptual model of VOC has been used in many empirical studies since the surveys conducted in the 1970s on relationships between culture, socio-ecological context, the individual value children have for their parent and generative behaviour. This approach has been conceptualized to develop an instrument for cross-cultural comparison of decisive influences on parental fertility decisions (cp. Nauck, 2001, Kohlmann, 2002).

According to Nauck (2000, p.8), '*VOC studies use the language developed by cross-cultural motivation psychology to describe their theoretical constructions and are closely linked to empirical intuitivism. These terms need to be translated into the language of social action theory'.* According to the author, the empirical analyses should consider the following differences:

- *economic – utilitarian VOC (i.e. contributions to the family economy from child , labour, household help and additional income; old-age insurance),*
- *psychological-emotional VOC (i.e. strengthening emotional group ties; expressive stimulation through interaction with children).*

Friedman, Hechter, Kanazawa (1994, 1995), based on a review of normative and standard rational choice explanations of shift in fertility behaviour, have proposed two informal models based on an uncertainty reduction value assumption. For the authors the question for instrumental model of fertility was: *Why do people in developed countries have any children at all when the prevailing constraints are inconsistent with this choice?* Their answer was*: people have children because to them the value of having children outweighs the*

value of the instrumental (time and money) resources that they give up in doing so.(1994, p. 380). It means that in the theoretical consideration they have used a non-standard value assumption – uncertainty reduction in order to explain parenthood.

The two-stage theory of value of children rests on two basic assumption of uncertainty reduction and on a subsidiary assumption of enhancement of marital stability. In fact, the theory of value of children proposed a non-instrumental motive for the decision to have children. Parents give birth to children because such decisions stabilize their relationships and reduce uncertainty related to future union maintenance. The non-instrumental arguments can be considered as opposite or supplement to rational choice theories of fertility (which were dominant for a many decades in the last century). The model has not become universal, and, its assumptions have been criticised by many authors.

According to Kohlmann (2002, p. 1 and following) model proposed by Friedman, Hechter, Kanazawa was problematic due to many reasons, including:

1. *the validity of authors' distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental motives for having children,….., the reduction of uncertainty by having children also means referring to the instrumental aspects of childbearing. In this case , the aim of having children is not economically, but psychologically , motivated.*
2. *the applicability of the model to developed societies.*

Beginning from the critique of the "Theory of the value of children", the author proposed theoretical modifications to the socio-psychological concept of the 'Value of Children'. The three aspects taken together (mentioned below) describe the dimensions of the 'Value of Children' for their parents (Kohlmann, 2002,p.9-10):

-*economic benefit and costs (economic security), defined as their ability to provide economic security for the family;*

- *psychological benefits and costs (positive affect);*

-*social benefits and costs(social status and behavioural confirmation).*

They are dependent on the individual characteristics of the parents, the socio-economic characteristics of the parents, the socio-economic characteristics of the context and institutional state regulations and therefore they led to different fertility outcomes. The psychological value consists of the ability of children to provide positive affect, and the social value consists of their capacity to provide social status and behavioural confirmation. The higher economic 'Value of Children', the higher the physical well-being of the parents and the family. The higher the psychological and the social 'Value of Children', the higher the social approval of the parents and the family.

In this conception 'Value of Children' is multidimensional: economic, social, psychological. Moreover, value is the result of interplay of individual, institutional, and contextual factors; it has multilevel dimensions. Despite many functioning concepts of "Value of Children," there is no theory integrated with fertility theories. The concept proposed by Kohlmann is hitherto the most capacious and it may be (as the author has proved) used in comparative analyses of various countries and regions characterised with different stages of development.

Speaking about the Value of Children, to a larger extent discussing the question: ***Why have children in 21st Century?*** Morgan and Berkowitz King (2001) in their paper present the new and old argument on this topic. The authors try to provide an answer to the fundamental question: why do people have children in settings where the net economic costs of children are clearly substantial? The discussion is divided in the three broad themes: *biological predisposition* (exploring the argument that evolution has selected sets of genes that predispose persons to childbearing); *environment* (*social correction* – reviewing the sociological arguments regarding the pro and anti – natalism of societal institutions, generally concerning organization of life in many spheres: work, family that is an institution with ability to encourage or discourage fertility); and *rationality of childbearing decision* (appealing to biological predispositions and the economic and non-economic values of children). All three planes are mutually interconnected.

Rational choices always took place in given cultural, social, and economic environment, which determines the cost and benefits of having children. The choices may be repeated or not. Successive decisions may be mentioned in case of successive children, which means that decision making process may be a staging process (such as the fertility process), and economic and non-economic values of child may be considered at each stage of this process. The economic values of child are described in economic theories. Examples of such studies are the works of Becker (1981) and Esterline (1976), both fairly well known among demographers. These theories may be treated as complementary. The first one assumes that preferences are fixed and exogenous, while the second takes a stand that preferences are not fixed and endogenous. Moreover Becker's theory focuses mainly on female population, (women with increasing education), while Esterlin's theory focuses mainly on male population (men with lower economic status). Therefore, how are value of child and rational choice viewed in economic theory? Becker's approach assumes investing in education, in a broader sense--in human capital by a woman. This investment results in diminishing profits obtained by women through marriage and children. That causes an increase in opportunity

cost child and finally leads to fertility decline. A decline in fertility results from the change in the shape of the utility function (inside of the marriage) for children compare to other goods. A couple's decision concerning an additional child is based on the calculation of benefits and costs. The value of child is compared to the values of other goods in maximization of utility function. When discussing costs of child, direct and indirect costs are indicated. According to Becker, the main component of the costs of child is an „indirect cost", which is mainly a cost of mother's time, considered in a situation of competition of various careers and increasing economic independence of women. In Poland , during the transition period is a lot of evidence indicating that parents have to deal with the problem of rising costs (both direct and indirect) having children (Buehler, Fratczak, 2004).

Empirical evidence related to values and disvalues of children in successive childbearing decision can be found in the work by Bulatao (1981) and Mynarska (2004). These studies are spaced over 25-year period and come from periods characterised with different levels of fertility (namely fertility transformation), but the observations are similar. Using the data from the USA, Philippines and South Korea, Bulatao (1981, p. 11) presented the consistency among countries in the reasons for desiring or not desiring additional children. The first child was desired to establish the family as an emotionally charged primary group (bringing the spouses closer, love, care, fun), and also as a continuing concern. The second child consolidates these gains, in a sense, in providing companionship for the first. Third and fourth children are desired to round out primary group and provide a balance between the sexes. When such high-parity children were wanted, it was much less for the emotional rewards of family life than for the economic rewards. According to Morgan (2001; 11) *Desire for births by higher parity women were associated with rationales that stressed the economic utility of children*.

The data concerning Poland come from the qualitative pilot survey carried out at the turn of the years 2004 and 2005 on the cultural and psychological aspects of making procreative decisions[5] (Mynarska, 2004). The objective was to answer the following question: Which factors play a role in making decision concerning having (or not having) children, and in what way do these factors operate? The preliminary conclusions drawn from the survey were following:

[5] *The survey is a part of the international project "Cultural and psychological aspects of fertility decision-making: capital cities in Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary" conducted by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Germany.*

1. The relation between cultural and psychological aspects and economical ones, is not only of complex character, but may also vary in respect to planning the first and second child;

2. Systemic and economic transformations (although more often perceived as limiting procreative plans) have brought forth factors facilitating parenthood;

3. Influence of the family situation on a decision of having children is very strong.

4. Differences exist in the process of making decision concerning the first and second child:

- the first child - deciding influence of psychological (including cultural) factors, sometimes even to the point of negating economic factors,
- the second child (and successive ones) and dominating influence of economical factors.

It is worth noting that in the situation of low fertility, particularly in regard to the CEE countries, the environment in which decisions concerning parenthood are made, i.e. existing social institutions, and the category of social capital, have and will continue to have increased importance. In the social capital theory, (Coleman: 1988, 1990; Astone et al.1999, Schoen et all 1997) the stress is placed on the role of family behaviours, the role of a child (children), the role of environment in the generation of social capital and investing in social capital. The findings of the studies on the significance and role of social capital in Poland (based on the social network) in the intention of having a successive child, indicate univocally the significant positive influence of social capital, in a wider sense family and non-family environment, on the intention of having a second child (Buehler, Frątczak, 2004).

The concept of the Second Demographic Transformation (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa. 1986) describes the basic changes in family formation, union dissolution and patterns of family reconstitution in Western societies since World War II. Alongside marriage emerged an alternative form of family in the form of cohabitation. Their development, particularly in Scandinavian countries, was quite fast. According to Lesthaeghe, (1998: 6), the observed trends have been explained in three ways: The theory of increased female economic autonomy (Becker 1981); the theory of relative economic deprivation (Esterlin 1976); and the theory of ideational shift (Inglehart, 1990, Lesthaeghe, Surkyn, 1988). It seems rational to complement this group with a fourth one, the sociological theory of marriage presented in the works of Oppenheimer (1988; 1994), which includes the critique of economic theories. Each of these four groups of theories perceives value of marriage in a slightly different way.

As Moors (1998 : 3) observes rightly, comparing Becker's and Esterlin's models, Esterlin's model predicts postponement of family transitions because of relative deprivation and refers to postponement processes, whereas Becker's rational choice model basically predicts

childlessness. It is a quite important comparison that allows viewing Becker's and Esterlin's theories as partially compatible and to some extent useful for interpretation of the observed changes, mainly in Poland, due to the ongoing transformation process, and to a lesser extent also in Sweden.

To end with, we want to quote very interesting and important results of studies presented by Abela (2003). Author in his paper examines family values and attitudes towards social policy among representative citizens from 12 EU members states and candidate (current members) countries. Analysis of the marriage values in the 12 countries based on the result of EVS 1999/2000 using the factor analysis permitted to the author identifies three basic orientations for a successful marriage (Abela, 2003: 23, 24) *These consists of: an interpersonal bond between partners (which is characterized by spending time together, discussing mutual problems, showing respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, faithfulness, sharing household chores, enjoying happy sexual relationships and having children, ect.); cultural homogeneity (refers to partners common social background, sharing religious beliefs and agreement on politics) and situational conditions (include living apart from in-laws, having happy sexual relations, an adequate income, and good housing , ect.). In most of the examined countries two last orientations , ie. Common cultural background and situational conditions are of secondary importance, but the first place is reserved to interpersonal relationships between partners as have primary importance.*

The culture shift towards post-materialism observable in the public spheres of the advanced industrial societies (Inglehardt, 1990, 1997) seems to have its counterpart in the private and intimate sphere of marriage and family. In most European countries , post-materialism and its post-traditional component are most evident in the changing values of marriage and the family. The silent revolution is embedded in the transformation of the meaning of marriage, where intimate interpersonal relationships have come to have pride of place, despite the observed large differences in values and practices of different generations.

Abela's paper in the very interesting way stressed the opinion, that social policy should be used to change social values and raises a question: how public welfare is an expression of social values? It is a very interesting approach to the analysis of the connections among: social policy, welfare system and value system.

Recapitulating the review on concepts concerning value of children and value of marriage, we may conclude the following:

1. In regard to both the value of children and value of marriage, we can distinguish a plane of economic and non-economic concepts of values,
2. Within the range of non-economic values, the social (including sociological) and psychological aspects should be distinguished,
3. Within the range of non-economic values, the growing significance of the relationship between the value of child/children, value of marriage and social policy in a broad sense should be taken under consideration. Such conclusion indicate *inter alia* the findings of the Abela's (2003) studies.

We may come up with the hypothesis that the roles of these two planes of perception of values of children and value of marriage, i.e., economic and non-economic, are different in Poland and in Sweden. In Poland, on the present stage, economic orientation is dominant over non-economic factors, mainly due to multidimensional transformation processes. Different perception of values attributed to a child and marriage may differentiate evaluation of subjective well-being between countries under comparative analysis.

Marital status and subjective well-being

There is a long-standing interest in the relationship between marital status and 'happiness' or subjective well-being (for a review of the literature up to around 1990, see Coombs 1991). Married men and women are consistently found to be happier, to live longer and to be more emotionally and physically healthy than the unmarried. This is also the argument put forward by Waite and Gallagher (2000) in a more recent study. Coombs (1991) finds little support for the selection hypothesis, which explains the relationship in terms of the higher likelihood of 'happy' people to enter marriage. He argues that the continuous companionship with a partner, provided by marriage or a stable, long-term relationship, 'protects' the individuals from loneliness and depression, and makes them more able to cope with stress, demanding work situations and other strains of daily life. Waite and Gallagher (2000) put forward similar arguments when they explain why married people are happier, healthier and better off financially. Marital status is one of the most powerful predictors of happiness, and married men and women consistently report less depression, less anxiety as well as other types of psychological distress than do those who are not married. In their view, the selection of healthy and happy people into marriage cannot explain the big advantage that married people have over those single, divorced or widowed.

There are, however, a number of studies from the 1990s or the first years of the 21st century that provide convincing evidence for a social selection effect (Mastekaasa 1992, Stutzer and Frey 2003, Bernhardt and Moors 2003). Unlike most of the earlier studies, which used data from the United States, Mastekaasa studies the situation in Norway , Stutzer and Frey have data for Germany, and Bernhardt and Moors (2003) analyze the effect of general life satisfaction on the transition to marriage among cohabiting couples in Sweden. Diener et al (1999), conclude that longitudinal evidence shows that happy and well-adjusted people are more likely to marry (and to stay married) than other people, but that the selection effect does not appear to be very strong.

In the view of Kohler and Behrman (2003), researchers who argue that social selection effects due to unobserved biological and family endowments are irrelevant have a weak or nonexistent empirical basis for their claim. They control for the endowment effects by analyzing data for identical twins in Denmark, and they find clear evidence for causal contributions of fertility and marriage to individuals' subjective well-being. Stack and Eshleman (1998), in their study of 17 industrialized countries, also find evidence for social causation, by including two intervening processes, namely the promotion of financial satisfaction and the improvement of health. They conclude that a partner (and even more a spouse) provides emotional support, promotes more healthy behaviours of the partner, and contributes to household income. All of these factors tend to increase the overall 'happiness' of the individual.

We agree with Mastekaasa (1992), Stack and Eshleman (1998), and Stutzer and Frey (2003) that the two processes of social selection and social protection are not mutually exclusive, but are likely to operate, if not simultaneously, so one after another. In cross-sectional analysis of marital or family status and some measure of 'happiness' or life satisfaction, such as the one reported on in this paper, one observes the net result of these two processes: first the (positive) selection of happy individuals into stable relationships, and then the positive effect of actually living in such relationships. There is clearly no consensus on which one of these two forces is the most important in shaping the well-established association between family status and overall life satisfaction, and we are not able settle this controversy in the current paper.

There is, moreover, one more important process to take into account in this context, and that is the (negative) selection of individuals <u>out of</u> marriage (or long-term co-

residential relationships). Stutzer and Frey (2003), in their study of longitudinal data from Germany, find evidence of such an effect: people who get divorced were not only less happy during marriage, but also less happy before they got married. While the positive selection into marriage is not likely to be decisively different in different cultural contexts, the effect of negative selection out of marriage can be expected to differ according to the degree of social acceptance of divorce and separation in different societies (see Stack and Eshleman 1998 for evidence of such a country-specific effect). This is, however, contrary to what Diener et al (2000) found in a cross-cultural study, which showed that married people were happier than divorced, separated, or single people living alone, regardless of the divorce rate and the level of individualism in a nation.

The concept of goals has also proven valuable in understanding subjective well-being. Research has shown that the type of goals one has, the structure of one's goals, the success with which one is able to attain one's goals, and the rate of progress toward one's goals can all potentially influence one's emotions and life satisfaction (Diener et al 2000). It is important that the goals are appropriate in the context of the individual's life. Clearly, an important component of the context is the culture in which the individual is a part, and commitment to goals is most likely to promote happiness when the goals are valued by the culture or subculture to which the individual belongs.

Since strong versus weak family system must be regarded as an essential component of one's culture, we hypothesize that fulfilling the culturally valued goal of forming and belonging to a conjugal family ought to be more important, and therefore more conducive to happiness, in Poland, characterized by strong family ties, than in individualistic Sweden.

Data and methods

In this paper we conduct comparative analysis of Poland and Sweden, taking advantage similar survey data from the two countries. Since the Swedish survey was a survey of young adults (22-34 years of age), the analysis for both countries will be limited to this age group[6].Thus we had 2469 respondents from the Swedish survey, and 1,249 from the Polish

[6] The Swedish survey comprised four separate single year age groups (cohorts), namely 22, 26, 30 and 34 at the time of the survey. While the Polish survey included a much wider age range, 18-54 years, the current analysis for the Polish sample is based on respondents from age 20 to age 36.

one, or a total of 3718 respondents. Both surveys contained an identical question with the wording: "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in general right now?". The answers to this question provide information on what Hird (2003) calls the cognitive component of subjective well-being. This is our dependent variable in the comparative study of the relationship between family status and life satisfaction among young adults in the two countries. Our main explanatory variables, in addition to nation (Polish=0, Swedish=1), are partner and parental status. Partner status is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the respondent currently lives in a cohabiting or married relationship or not. The parental status variable distinguishes between those childless, on the one hand, and those with at least one child, on the other. The analysis also controls for age, gender, educational level, and religiosity.

The Swedish survey, *Family and Working Life in the 21st century*, was conducted in 2003 by Statistics Sweden, on behalf of Eva Bernhardt, who received financial support from The Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsradet). This was the second round of a panel study of young adults, more specifically the birth cohorts of 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980. For the first survey in 1999, a nationally representative sample of 3,408 individuals with Swedish born parents was asked to fill in a mail questionnaire with questions about their plans, expectations and attitudes regarding family and working life. Factual information about their current situation and background characteristics was also included. The response rate was 67 percent; 2,273 respondents returned their questionnaires. For the 2003 survey, the response rate for those who participated in the first round of the survey in 1999 was 78 percent. Information about the respondents' education was taken from registers.

The Polish survey, *The evaluation of changes in attitudes and reproductive behaviours of young and middle generations of female and male Poles and their influence on the process of family, union, household formation and dissolution*, was undertaken by the Institute of Statistics and Demography, in co-operation with the Central Statistical Office.[7] The survey was based on a random sample of Poland's inhabitants aged 18-54 in the fourth

[7] Research Project was sponsored partly by The State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN)) Grant No. 1 H02F 00419. The Grant is realised by a research team including Professor Janina Jóźwiak (Warsaw School of Economics) – the project manager, Professor Janusz Balicki (Cardinal S.Wyszyński University in Warsaw) Professor Ewa Frątczak (Warsaw School of Economics) – the project leaders and two other team members: Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska, M.Sc. (Warsaw School Economics) and Kazimierz Latuch, M.Sc. (Central Statistical Office). It occurred, that the funds provided by the KBN were insufficient to realise the survey and therefore the researchers took the trouble to find some sponsors. The study was sponsored by the following institutions: Narodowy Bank Polski, Credit Bank.SA w Warszawie, Bank – PKO BP. SA, ING Nationale Nederlanden Polska, Powszechny Fundusz Emerytalny.

quarter of 2001[8]. Assessment of the results' quality presented in the mentioned publication showed that the results from the survey are representative for Poland's population aged 18-54. The sample consists of 3348 respondents, including 1724 women and 1624 men aged 18 –54. The Polish will in this paper be referred to as the Polish Retrospective Survey 2001. The questionnaire used consisted of three parts: part A – general characteristics of a household, household's members and economic activity of household's members; part B: Family, occupational , educational, migratory biography and social networks; part C: Norms, values , attitudes and behaviours.

Since the life satisfaction question is an ordinal variable, where the actual values of the variable are irrelevant except that larger values are assumed to correspond to "higher" outcomes, it is appropriate to run ordered logit[9] with life satisfaction as the dependent variable (Agresti 1996, Borooah 2001). In the Polish survey the scale went from 1 to 10 (very dissatisfied to very satisfied), while the Swedish survey employed a more limited range from 1 to 5. Moreover, in both surveys the distribution of the responses is highly skewed towards the high end, and it is recommended that each category of the ordinal scale used for ordered logit should comprise at least 5 % of the sample. We therefore ended up with a four category variable (dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, rather satisfied, and very satisfied).

Results

Our main explanatory variables in the ordered logit analysis of subjective well-being in Sweden and Poland are 'currently in a partnership' and 'children'. 'Living in a partnership' includes both marital and non-marital unions, and it should of course be

[8] Full information of the survey, the sampling scheme, assessment of the results' quality, principles of editing data sets, organisation of data bases with specification of variables, as well as the structure and questionnaires used in the survey can be found in E.Fratczak, M. Peczkowski *"The evaluation of changes in attitudes and reproductive behaviours of young and middle generations of female and male poles and their influence on the process of family and household formation and dissolution",* SAS USER'S GUIDE, Warsaw School of Economic, SAS - Institute Polska, Warsaw 2002.

[9] Suppose, that variable Y_i is the dependent variable , associated with the outcomes is ordinal: "stronger " outcomes are associated with higher values of variable. However, the ordinal nature of the outcomes has no implications for differences in the strength of the outcomes. For example the outcome associated with $Y_i = 2$ is not twice as strong as that associated with $Y_i = 1$. Consequently, the actual values taken by an ordinal dependent variable are irrelevant, as long as higher values correspond to stronger outcomes. In our analysis the dependent variable Y "well-being" (life satisfaction) has four categories: dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, rather satisfied, and very satisfied. The outcomes are clearly ordered. The most commonly used and appropriate methods for estimating models with more than two outcomes, when the dependent variable associated with the outcomes is both discrete and ordinal, are those of ordered logit and ordered probit (V.K.Borooah, op. cit., p. 6 and A. Agresti, 1996).

remembered that in Sweden the overwhelming majority of unions in this age range are non-marital , while in Poland it is the reverse are marital, i.e. supposedly more committed. 'Having children' is a simple dichotomous variable: yes or no, but in earlier analysis we have used a three-category variable: no children, one child, and two or more. The big impact is from the first child, so we condensed the child variable. We have also looked at possible differences if the first child is a boy or girl (see Kohler and Behrman 2003), but could not find any evidence that this mattered.

Answers to the question on whether religion is important in one's life were given in three categories: very important, rather important, and of little or no importance. Here the distinction seemed to be between 'very important' and the rest, so we condensed the religiosity variable to two: very important, and not very important. For educational level we originally had four categories: basic, secondary, lower post-secondary and upper-postsecondary, but since we found little significant differences between the two in the middle we condensed to three categories.

Table 3 gives percentage distributions of the variables, and we notice that young adult Swedes are more likely to live in partnerships than young Poles. Moreover, there is a considerably bigger gender gap in Poland than in Sweden, so that the percentage of partnered women is almost the same in Poland and Sweden, while many more Swedish men in this age range are living in unions than is the case among young Polish men. Young Poles, especially women, are on the other hand much more likely than young adults in Sweden to have children. The range goes from only a little more than 30 % among Swedish men, who are parents, to over 60 % among Polish women. The differences are of course also striking with regard to importance of religion: only about 4 % of young adults in Sweden say religion is very important in their lives, while this is true for 27 % of young Poles. Finally, the educational level among young adults in Sweden is higher than for young Poles.

Turning now to the results of the ordered logit analysis in Table 4, the dummy variable for nation in the pooled regression (Sweden vs. Poland) shows that young Swedes are significantly more 'happy' than young adults in Poland. This confirms the figures from the EVS survey (Halman 2001) as well as what Delhy (2004) found in his recent review of life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe. There is a distinct difference in the average level of 'happiness' in the two countries. However, our interest is in the relative impact of living in a partnership and having children. Does living with a partner and/or having children make young adults in strongly family-oriented Poland more happy than in individualistic Sweden?

We find that this is not the case, rather the reverse. We present in Table 4 the separate runs for Sweden and Poland, but we have also tested whether there are significant interactions with the nation variable in the pooled regression. In fact, all the variables in the regression interact with 'nation', except importance of religion! So even if the effect of being religious appears to be stronger in Sweden, when we look at the separate runs for Poland and Sweden, the positive effect of attaching great importance to religion in one's life is not significantly different in the two countries.

Currently living in partnership has a strong positive effect on life satisfaction in both countries, and the effect is significantly *stronger* in Sweden than in Poland. Having children (at least one child) makes young Swedes more satisfied with life, but does not seem to bring a higher life satisfaction in Poland. Higher education has a positive effect on subjective well-being in both countries, but more so in Poland than in Sweden, while increasing age makes young Poles less 'happy', but there is no age effect in Sweden.

So in summary, we find, like many researchers before, that living with a partner has a strong positive effect on subjective well-being. Contrary to our expectations, however, young adults in individualistic Sweden seem to gain more from this life transition, than young Poles. Likewise, we are somewhat surprised that becoming a parent increases life satisfaction in Sweden, but not in Poland. Moreover, there is a gender difference in life satisfaction in Sweden (women being happier than men), but not in Poland.

In addition to analyzing the national differentials in life satisfaction, we investigated whether the gender pattern is different in the two countries (Table 5). As in Table 4, we present the results of separate runs for men and women in Poland and Sweden, respectively, but also report on significant interactions with gender. Currently living in a partnership has the greatest importance for Swedish women and the lowest for Polish men (in fact, there is no significant effect of living in a co-residential union for Polish men). There is a weakly significant ($p=0.12$) interaction between gender and partnered life in Sweden, but no significant effect in Poland. Swedish women seem to gain more happiness than Swedish men from the transition from single to partnered life.

The same is true for having children: Swedish men with children are not happier than Swedish men without children (when one controls for living in a partnership), but the transition to motherhood increases subjective well-being for Swedish women. There is a significant gender difference in the effect of parenthood in Sweden, but no such difference in Poland. Religiosity increases life satisfaction in Sweden, but to the same extent for men and

women. In Poland, on the other hand, religious women gain a lot less happiness than religious men. Finally, with regard to education, getting a university degree has a strong positive effect on the happiness of Swedish women, but not on Swedish men. In Poland, there are strong positive effects of education on life satisfaction, but they do not differ between men and women.

Discussion

We think it is a paradox that living with a partner and/or children has a greater impact on subjective well-being among young adults in Sweden than in Poland, given that Poland is a society with a strong family system and Sweden is the reverse. It was contrary to our expectations, and we would like to offer two possible explanations for this, which do not necessarily exclude each other.

First of all, we saw in the section on socio-demographic facts that young adults in Sweden move from the parental home quite early, in fact, most of them leave home in a narrow age range between 18 and 21/22 (for an analysis of routes out of the parental home in Sweden, see Bernhardt et al 2005). The situation is quite the reverse in Poland, where young adults tend to stay with their parents until they form their first union (usually a marriage).

Although the late nest-leaving in Poland may have partly economic reasons, it is nevertheless a fact that young Poles usually move from one family context to the next when they start their partnered (married) life. Young adults in Sweden, on the other hand, not only move from the parental home in their late teens or early twenties, but they tend to move for other reasons than to start living with a partner. Only roughly a quarter of young adults, who left home in the late 1980s or 1990s, did so in order to begin a co-residential relationship with a partner. In fact, almost half left to pursue higher studies and the rest to some form of 'non-family living' (Bernhardt et al 2005). This means that when young Swedes start their partnered life, they move from a non-family context (which usually means living by themselves) to a family context, meaning in most cases a cohabitation, as very few Swedes get married directly, without previous cohabitation.

What does this mean in terms of the relationship between family status and subjective well-being? When we contrast those currently in a partnership to those who do not have a co-residential partner, we are comparing, in the Polish case, those living in their family of destination with those living in their family of origin. In the Swedish case, we are comparing those living in a co-residential relationship with those living by themselves, with

all the wonderful freedom and independence of such a situation, but also with all the (potential) loneliness and lack of daily social contacts with people that are close to you, and who are, in one way or another, part of one's family. Indeed, Reher (1998) has described loneliness as one of the most important social problems in weak-family societies. Other analysis of the Swedish survey data has also shown that young adults in Sweden both expect and experience a substantial increase in 'general well-being' when they move from un-partnered to partnered life (Bernhardt and Tsuya 2002).

One possible interpretation of our unexpected result that currently living with a partner and/or having children – especially the former - is connected with greater subjective well-being in individualistic Sweden than in strongly family-oriented Poland, is then precisely that the contrast between un-partnered and partnered life is so much greater in Sweden. Young Swedes escape the loneliness of single life when they start living with a partner, while young adults in Poland simply exchange one set of family members (parents, siblings) for another (spouse or partner and possibly children).

A second possible explanation for our findings is the negative selection of people out of marriage or cohabitation. Although Diener et al (1998) did not find any effect of the national divorce rate on life satisfaction in different countries, we would argue that in the Swedish contemporary context it is, if not mandatory so at least socially expected, to break up a co-residential relationship that one partner (or both) does not find satisfactory. Therefore, those currently in a partnership tend to consist of people who are reasonably 'happy', since the unhappy or unsatisfied ones have already left. In Poland, on the other hand, divorce is still socially stigmatized, and those currently in a partnership will contain also people with low subjective well-being, who in the Swedish context already would have left their partner.

These possible two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but may very well be at work simultaneously. One might hypothesize that the effect of the negative selection out of marriage (or cohabitation) is more important in older age groups. The differences that we find in the young adult ages are more likely to be due to the first explanation, namely that people in individualistic Sweden experience a greater contrast between single life and partnered life, in terms of feelings of loneliness and social context, and therefore gain more from forming co-residential relationships.

Finally, we do not find it likely that the positive selection into marriage or cohabitation (what Kohler and Behrman call 'the effect of unobserved endowments') is very different in Poland and Sweden. Therefore, we would tentatively conclude that the difference

that we find in the impact of family status on subjective well-being between the two countries is due to the causal influences of living with a partner rather than living alone. In an individualistic country with a weak family system the gain in subjective well-being from moving from single to partnered life is greater since the contrast between the two states is more pronounced, at least in these young adult ages. The long-term consequences of life events such as marriage or start of cohabitation on individual happiness appear more pronounced in Sweden than in Poland, because the actual circumstances of *unpartnered life* in Sweden are so much less conducive to personal happiness. In that sense, a marriage or other co-residential relationship brings more happiness in individualistic Sweden with a weak family system than in strongly family-oriented Poland.

In conclusion, it seems that in a strong family system individuals get substantial 'social protection', emotional support etc from other family members than those of the conjugal family: parents, brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, uncles, grandparents, nephews, nieces etc, while in a weak family system the individual is much more dependent on members of the conjugal family. Living by oneself, outside a conjugal family situation, therefore puts the individual in a potentially vulnerable situation: the autonomy of the young adult, having left the parental home, and often having limited contact with its members, as well as with the larger kin group, has its price. It is this aspect of the society with a weak family system, where the individual takes precedence over the family group, that shows up in our findings that young Swedes gain more happiness from partnering than young adults in Poland, while our expectation that fulfilling the cultural norm of family formation ought to have a more markedly positive effect in Poland than in Sweden, where the family ties are so much weaker, was refuted.

References

Abela A.M., 2003, Family Values and Social Policy in Europe. Cross National Research Papers 6(5); pp.16-28.

Agresti, A., 1996, *An Introduction to Categorical Data analysis*. New York: John Wiley

Argyle, M., 2001, *The Psychology of Happiness*. London:Routledge (SUB)

Astone N.M., C.A.Nathanson, R.Schoen, Y.J.Kim, 1999, *Family Demography, Social Theory and Investment in Social Capita.* Population and Development Review No.25(1), pp. 1 -31.

Axinn W.G., J.S.Barber, 2001, *Mass Education and Fertility Transition*. American Sociological Review , Vol. 66, pp. 481 – 505.

Bachrach Ch., M.J.Hindin, E.Thomson, 2000, *The Changing Shape of Ties That Bind: An Overview and Synthesis.* (In:) Waite L., (ed.), The Ties That Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation. Aldine de Gruyter, New York, pp. 3 – 18.

Becker, G.S., 1981, *A treatise of the family.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Beets, G.C., A.C.,Liefbroer, J.Gierveld, 1999, *Changes in Fertility Values and Behaviour*: A Life Course Perspective. In: R.Leete (Ed.) *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Bernhardt E., G. Moors , 2003, *The impact of attitudes on the transition to marriage among cohabiting couples in Sweden.* Paper presented at the PAA in Minneapolis, May 1-3, 2003.

Bernhardt E., N. Tsuya, 2002, *Single versus married life: Perceived advantages and disadvantage among young adults in Japan and Sweden*. Manuscript.

Bernhardt E., M. Gahler, F. Goldscheider, 2005, *Childhood family structure and routes out of the parental home in Sweden.* Acta Sociologica.

Billari F.C., 2005a., *Partnership, Childbearing and Parenting: Trends of the 1990s. In : The New Demographic Regime. Population* Challenges and Policy Responses edited by: M.Macura, A.L.MacDonald, W.Haug, UN, ECE, UNFPA, New York and Geneva, 2005, pp.63-94.

Billari F.C., 2005b., *The Transition to Parenthood in European Societies , paper presented at the European Population Conference 2005* " Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 7-8 April 2005.

Billari F.C., D. Philipov, P. Baizán, 2001, *Leaving home in Europe: the experience of cohorts born around 1960*, International Journal of Population Geography, Volume 7 (5): 339-356.

Borooah, V.K. 2001. *Logit and probit ordered and multinomial models*. Sage University Paper No. 138.

Browning G., A. Halcli, F.Webster (eds.), 2000, *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*. Sage Publications, London.

Bühler, Ch.; Fratczak, E., 2004, *Social capital and fertility intentions: the case of Poland*. MPIDR Working Paper, WP-2004-012, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research; http://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2004-012.pdf

Bulatao R.A., 1981, *Values and Disvalues of Children in Sucessive Childbearing Decisions*, Demography, No. 18, pp. 1 – 25.

Coleman, J.S. , 1990, *Foundations of Social Theory*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Coleman, J.S. , 1988, *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital*, American Journal of Sociology , No. 94, Suppl, p. 95-120.

Coombs R., 1991, *Marital status and Personal Well-being*. A Literature Review. *Family Relations* 40(1): 97-102.

Davis K., 1987, *Low Fertility in Evolutionary Perspective*. Population and Development Review, N.12, pp. 48 – 68.

De Moor R., (ed.), 1995, *Values in Western Societies*, Tilburg University Press

Delhey J., 2004. *Life Satisfaction in an Enlarged Europe*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Diener, E. et al., 1997, *Recent Findings on Subjective Well-being*. Indian Journal of Clinical Psychology, March 1997.

Diener, E. et al., 1999, *Subjective Well-being. Three decades of progress*. Psychological Bulletin 125: 276-203.

Diener, E. et al., 2000, *Similarity of the relations between marital status and subjective well-being across cultures*. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology 31(4): 419-436.

Dugger R.H., 2004, *The Value of a Child – Assuring Sustainable Economic Growth and Job Creation*, 2004 Leadership Conference National Conference of Higher Education Loans Programs, Miami, Florida, January 9, 2004.

Easterlin, R.A. 1976, *The Conflict between Aspirations and Resources.* Population and Development Review, Vol.2/3: 417 – 426.

Easterlin, R.A., 2001, *Income and happiness: Towards a unified theory*. *Economic Journal* 111 (473) : 465-484.
Easterlin, R.A., 2005, *Explaining happiness*. Manuscript (kolla om ref OK)
Ehrhardt, J. et al., 2000, *Stability of life-satisfaction over time*. Journal of Happiness Studies 1(2): 47-74.
European Values Study 1999/2000 – *A Third Wave: Data*, Documentation and Database on CD-ROM by Ruud Luijkx, Evelyn Brislinger and Wolfgang Zenk-Möltgen htpp://www.za.unikoeln.de/data/add_studies/kat50/EVS_1999_2000/ZA_Information_52_2003.pdf
Fawcett, J.T., 1988, *The Value of Children and the Transition to Parenthood*. Marriage and Family Review, Vol 12 (3-4), pp.11-34
Frątczak E., 2004 , *Very low fertility: the patterns and their implications; regional and country differentials*, The European Population Paper Series No.21, The European Population Committee, Council Europe,2004
:http://www.coe.int/t/e/social%5Fcohesion/population/Low%20fertility%20Fratcak%20final.pdf
Fratczak, E., J. Balicki, 2003, *Values and norms related to contraception, fertility and family.* The case of Poland Paper presented to the Population Association of America's Annual Meeting, May 1-3, 2003, Minneapolis.
Frątczak E., W.Kozłowski, 2005, *Family Status Life Tables. Poland 1988/1989, 1994/1995, 2002*. SGH. Warsaw.
Friedman D., M. Hechter, M.Kamazowa , 1994, *Theories of the Value of Children*. Demography, Vol. 31, No.3, pp.375 – 401.
Friedman D., M. Hechter, M.Kamazowa, 1999, *Theories of the Value of Children*: A New Approach in: Leete R. (eds.), 1999, Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change, Oxford University Press, pp.19 – 50.
Giddens A.,2000, *The Third Way and Its Critics*. Blackwell Publishers,Oxford, UK.
Giza-Poleszczuk A., J.Poleszczuk 2004. *Partnerships, marriage and children – cultural differentiation of attitudes.* In Jasinska-Kanina, A. and M. Marody (eds.): Poles Among Europeans. Warsaw.
Halman L., 2001, *The European Values Study: A Third Wave. Source book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study Survey,* Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
Hammel E.A., 1990, *A Theory of Culture for Demography*. Population and Development Review, Vol. 16, No.3, pp. 455 – 485.
Hantrais L., 2005, *Living as a Family in Europe.* Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2005 Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 7-8 April 2005.
Hird S. 2003, *What is Wellbeing?* A Brief Review of Current Literature and Concepts. NHS Health Scotland , April 2003.
Hird S., *Individual Wellbeing*. A report for the Scottish Executive and Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics. NHS Health Scotland , August 2003.
Hird, S., 2003, *What is Well-being?* A brief review of current literature and concepts. Supporting document - scales. NHS Health Scotland.
Hoffman, L. W., M.L.Hoffman, ,1973, *The Value of Children to Parents*. In: J.T. Fawcett (ed.) Psycholgical Perspectives on Population. New York: Basic Books.
Huiniuk J., 2003, *Qualitative Implications of Demographic Change for Individuals and Society*. Paper presented at the EuroConference "Implications of Family and Fertility Change for Individuals, Families and Society: The Second Demographic Transition in Europe", Spa, Belgium, 19-24 June 2003. in industrial societies. Population and Development Review 20 (3): 293-342.
Inglehart R., 1977, *The Silent Revolution*: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Inglehart R., 1990, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Inglehart R., 1997, *Modernization and Postmodernisation*. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies . Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Inglehart R., W.E.Baker, 2000, *Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values*. American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, pp. 19 – 51.
Jasinska-Kanina A., M.Marody (eds.), 2004, *Poles Among Europeans*. Warsaw.
Kohler H.P. , I.R.Behrman, 2003, *Partner + Children = Happiness? An Assessment of the Effect of Fertility and Partnerships on Subjective Well-Being in Danisch Twins*. Unpublished paper.
Kohler, H-P and J. Behrman 2003. *Partner+Children=Happiness? An Assessment of the Effect of Fertility and Partnerships on Subjective Well-being in Danish Twins*. Manuscript.
Kohlmann A., 2002*, Fertility Intentions in Cross-Cultural View: The Value of Children Reconsidered.* MPI Working Paper WP-2002-002.
Lee G.R., K.Seccombe, C.L.Shehan, 1991, *Marital Status and Personal Happiness*: An Analysis of Trend Data. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol.53, No.4, pp.839-844.
Leete R. (eds.), 1999, *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Leete Richard (ed.), 1999, *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change*. Oxford University Press, New York.
Lesthaeghe R.(ed.), 2002, *Meaning and Choice: Value Orientation and Life Course Decision*. NIDI, The Hague; CBGS, Brussels.
Lesthaeghe R., 1998, *On Theory Development: Applications to the Study of Family Formation*. Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 1 -14.
Lesthaeghe R., G.Moors, 1995, *Living Arrangements and Parenthood: Do Values Matter?* (in:) De Moor R., (ed.), 1995, Values in Western Societies, Tilburg University Press, pp.217 – 250.
Lesthaeghe R., G.Moors, 2002, *Life Course Transition and Value Orientation: Selection and Adaptation* . (In:) Lesthaeghe R.(ed.), Meaning and Choice: Value Orientation and Life Course Decision. NIDI, The Hague; CBGS, Brussels, pp.1- 44.
Lesthaeghe R., J.Surkyn, 1988, *Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change*. Population and Development Review, Vol. Issue 1, pp.1-45.
Liefbroer, A.C., E. Frątczak, 1996, *The family formation process in Poland during the early years of the socio-economic transition: evidence from the Polish Family and Fertility Survey 1991*, Studia Demograficzne 1-2 (123-124): 39-55.
Mastekaasa A.,1992, *Marriage and Psychological Well-being: Some evidence on selection into marriage.* Journal of Marriage and the Family 54(4): 901-911.
McLanahan S., J.Adams, 1987, *Partnerhood and Psychological Well-Being*. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.13, pp. 237-257.
Miller W.B., D.J.Pasta, 1994, *The Psychology of Child Timing: A Measurement Instrument and Model.* Journal of Applied Social Psychology, No.24, pp.218 – 250.
Miller W.B., D.J.Pasta, 1995, *Behavioural Intentions: Which Ones Predict Fertility Behaviour in Married Couples?*. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, No. 25, pp.530 – 555.
Moors G., 1997, *The Dynamic s of Value-Based Selection and Values Adaptation*. Wit an Application to the Process of Family Formation, IPD – Working Paper, No. 1997 – 4, Brussels.
Moors G., 1998, *The Valued Child. The Effect of Values on the Transition to Matherhood* (unpublished manuscript).
Moors G., 2000, *Values and Living Arrangements*: *A Recursive Relationship.* (In:) Waite L., (ed.), The Ties That Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation. Aldine de Gruyter, New York, pp. 212 – 225.
Morgan, P.S., King, R.B. (2001). *Why Have Children in the 21st Century? Biological Predisposition, Social Coercion, Rational Choice.* European Journal of Population, *17, pp.3-20.*
Mynarska M., 2004, *Kulturowe i psychologiczne aspekty podejmowania decyzji prokreacyjnych*. *(Cultural and psychological aspects of fertility choices)*, ISID, SGH, Warsaw, unpublished materials.
Nauck, B. (2000). *The changing Value of Children – a Special Action Theory of Fertility Behavior and Ingtergenerational Relationships in Cross-cultural Comparison*. Paper presented at the workshop *„Low fertility, families and public policies"* European Observatory on Family Matters, Sevilla, September 15-16, 2000.
Oppenheimer V.K., 1988, *A Theory of Marriage Timing*. American Journal of Sociology, No. 94, pp. 563 – 591.
Oppenheimer, V.K., 1994. *Women's rising employment and the future of the family in industrial societies.* Population and Development Review , Vol.20: 293 – 342.
Ornacka K., I.Szczepaniak-Wiecha, 2005, *The Contemporary Family in Poland: New Trends and Phenomena.* Journal of Family and Economic Issue, Vol. 26(2): 195 – 224.
Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour in Low-Fertility Countries. Population Division UN, New York, 2002.
Philipov D., 2005, *Portrait of the Family in Europe, paper presented at the European Population Conference 2005* " Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion, Council of Europe", Strasbourg, 7-8 April 2005.
Philipov D.,2001, *Low Fertility in Central and Eastern Europe: Culture or Economy?* Paper presented at the IUSSP Seminar on "InternationalPespectives on Low Fertility : trends, theories and policies", Tokyo, March 21 – 23.
Reher, D.S., *Family Ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts*, Population and Development Review 24(2), June 1998.
Rokeach M., 1979, *Understanding Human Values. Individual and Societal*. The Free Press, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London.
Schoen R., Y.J.Kim, C.A.Nathanson, J.Fields, N.M.Astone, 1997, *Why Do Americans Want Children?*. Population and Development Review, Vol.23 (2), pp. 333 – 358.
Shields M., M.Wooden, 2003, *Marriage, Children and Subjective Well-being.* Paper presented to the Australian Institute of Family Studies Conference, Melbourne.
Sienkiewicz K., 2005, *Leaving the Parental Home in Poland.* Paper presented at the 76th Session "Transition to Adulthood in Developed Countries", PAA Annual Meeting Philadelphia, March 31-April 2.

Sobotka T., 2004, *Postponement of Childbearing and Low Fertility in Europe.* Population Studies RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

Stack S.,J.R. Eshleman, 1998, *Marital Status and Happiness*: A 17-Nation Study. Journal of Marriage and the Family. Vol. 60, No.2, pp.527 – 536.

Stack S., J.R. Eshleman 1998. *Marital Status and Happiness*: A 17-Nation Study. *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 60(2): 527-536.

Stanek, M., 2005, *The family in Poland – strong ties*. Personal communication from the author.

Stutzer, A. and B. Frey 2003. *Does marriage make people happy or do happy people get married?* Working Paper 143 (http://www.iew.unizh.ch)

Surkyn J., Ron Lesthaeghe, *Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update*; in Special Collections: Contemporary Research on European Fertility: Perspectives and Developments, SPECIAL COLLECTION 3 - ARTICLE 3. http://www.demographic-research.org

Thomson E., 1997, *Couple Childbearing Desires, Intentions and Births*. Demography, Vol.34, Issue 3, pp. 343 – 354.

Thomson E., 2002, *Motherhood, Fatherhood and Family Values.* (In:) Lesthaeghe R.(ed.), Meaning and Choice: Value Orientation and Life Course Decision. NIDI, The Hague; CBGS, Brussels, pp. 251 – 271.

Trzcinski E., 2005, *Introduction to the Symposium: Changing Fortunes—Economic Transitions, the European Union and Families in Poland*. Journal of Family and Economic, Issues, Vol. 26(2): 185-194.

Van de Kaa, Dirk *The Second Demographic Transition Revisited: Theories and Expectations*, in Beets et al (eds): Population and Family in the Low Countries 1993: Late Fertility and Other Current Issues, NIDI/CBGS 1995.

Van der Kaa (1987). *Europe's Second Demographic Transition*. Population Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 1.

Veenhoven R., 1997, *Advances in understanding happiness*. www.eur.nl/fsw/personeel/soc/veenhoven/Publ 1990s/97c-txte.rtf

Waite L., (ed.), 2000, *The Ties That Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.

Waite L., M. Gallagher, 2000, *The Case for Marriage. Why Married People are Happier, Healthier and Better Off Financially*. New York: Doubleday

Table 1a. Poland and Sweden – selected comparative demographic rates

Crude marriage rate: marriages per 1000 population											
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	8,2	6,4	8,6	9,7	8,6	7,2	6,7	5,4	5,5	5,0	5,0
Sweden	6,7	7,8	5,4	5,4	4,5	4,6	4,7	3,8	4,5	4,0	4,3
Total female first marriage rate (below age 50)											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	...	...	0,91	0,93	0,90	0,89	0,91	0,67	0,63	0,57	0,57
Sweden	0,95	0,95	0,62	0,63	0,53	0,53	0,55	0,44	0,53	0,47	0,49
Mean age of women at first marriage (below age 50)											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	...	...	22,8	22,8	22,7	22,7	22,6	23,1	23,9	24,1	24,4
Sweden	24,0	23,6	23,9	24,8	26,0	27,2	27,5	28,7	30,2	29,9	30,1
Crude divorce rate: divorces per 1000 population											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	0,5	0,7	1,1	1,2	1,1	1,3	1,1	1,0	1,1	1,2	1,2
Sweden	1,2	1,2	1,6	3,1	2,4	2,4	2,3	2,6	2,4	2,4	2,4
Extra-marital births, per 100 births											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	4,5	4,5	5,0	4,7	4,8	5,0	6,2	9,5	12,1	13,1	14,4
Sweden	11,3	13,8	18,6	32,8	39,7	46,4	47,0	53,0	55,3	55,5	56,0
Total period fertility rate											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	2,98	2,69	2,26	2,26	2,26	2,32	2,05	1,62	1,34	1,29	1,24
Sweden	2,20	2,42	1,92	1,77	1,68	1,74	2,13	1,73	1,54	1,57	1,65
Mean age of women at birth of first child (biological birth-order)											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	25,0	23,5	22,8	23,0	23,4	23,5	23,3	23,8	24,5	24,8	25,0
Sweden	25,5	25,2	25,9	24,4	25,3	26,1	26,3	27,2	27,9	28,2	28,3
Mean age of women at childbearing											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	27,6	27,3	27,0	26,8	26,5	26,4	26,2	26,9	27,4	27,6	27,8
Sweden	27,5	27,2	27,0	26,7	27,6	28,4	28,6	29,2	29,9	30,0	30,1
Net reproduction rate											
Country	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Poland	1,34	1,15	1,01	1,06	1,07	1,10	0,97	0,77	0,64	0,62	0,59
Sweden	1,04	1,15	0,92	0,85	0,81	0,84	1,03	0,84	0,75	0,76	0,80

Source: Recent Demographic Development in Europe 2003., Council of Europe Publishing , Strasbourg, 2003.

Table 1b. Poland and Sweden – selected comparative economic rates

Rates, Indicators	**EU (25 countries)**	*Poland*	**Sweden**
Employment and GDP, 2004			
Female employment rate	55.1	46.0	71.5
Male employment rate	70.9	56.5	74.2
Female unemployment rate	10.0	20.0	5.2
Female unemployment rate	8.3	18.6	6.0
GGP per capita in purchasing power standards	100	46.0	115.3
Inequality and poverty, 2000			
Inequality of income distribution *		4.7	3.3
At risk poverty rates before social transfers **		30.0	19.0
At risk poverty rates after social transfers ***		16.0	11.0

*The ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income(top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income(lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income.
**At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers - total - The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income, before social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income(after social transfers). Retirement and survivor's pensions are counted as income before transfers and not as social transfers.
***At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers - total - The share of persons with anequivalised disposable income, after social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Retirement and survivor's pensions are counted as income before transfers and not as social transfers.
Source: Eurostat (2004). Structural indicators retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/, Cytowane za E.Trzciński, 2005, Table 2 and Table 3, p. 189, 190.

Table 2. Values in Sweden and Poland according to 2000/2001 European Value Survey

Importance in life (% very important)		
Work	Sweden	54.4
	Poland	78.0
Family	Sweden	89.4
	Poland	91.8
Friends	Sweden	70.7
	Poland	27.4
Leisure	Sweden	54.2
	Poland	24.8
Politics	Sweden	11.5
	Poland	6.9
Religion	Sweden	10.7
	Poland	44.7

Happiness (% very happy)	
Sweden	36.7
Poland	17.6

Life satisfaction (mean score)	
Sweden	7.65
Poland	6.37

Importance of God (mean score)	
Sweden	4.10
Poland	8.39

Importance of children for successful marriage (% very)	
Sweden	58.9
Poland	73.3

Child needs two parents (% agree)	
Sweden	60.1
Poland	96.9

Women need children (% agree)	
Sweden	24.8
Poland	69.6

Housewife as fulfilling as paid work (% agree)	
Sweden	50.6
Poland	60.5

Marriage outdated (% agree)	
Sweden	20.4
Poland	9.3

Job best for women's independence (% agree)	
Sweden	83.6
Poland	76.0

Marriage necessary for happiness (% agree)	
Sweden	41.6
Poland	71.9

Both partners should contribute income (% agree)	
Sweden	89.2
Poland	87.1

Job OK., but most women really want home and children (% agree)	
Sweden	40.4
Poland	74.2

Table 3. Description of variables for ordered logit analysis						
	Swedish men	**Swedish women**	**All Swedes**	**Polish men**	**Polish women**	**All Poles**
Life satisfaction						
Dissatisfied	7,06	5,76	6,33	16,75	15,28	16,00
Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	21,93	17,57	19,49	22,91	26,50	24,75
Rather satisfied	49,54	45,70	47,39	34,87	30,41	32,58
Very satisfied	21,47	30,98	26,80	25,47	27,80	26,67
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1076	1372	2448	585	615	1200
Age						
20-24	28,27	28,99	28,68	35,26	32,25	33,71
25-28	23,39	23,43	23,41	23,51	25,74	24,66
29-32	23,11	24,37	23,82	20,03	20,62	20,34
33-36	25,23	23,21	24,10	21,19	21,40	21,30
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1086	1383	2469	604	645	1249
Sex						
Male	—	—	43,99	—	—	48,36
Female	—	—	56,01	—	—	51,64
N	—	—	2469	—	—	1249
Currently in partnership						
No	41,70	33,43	37,06	53,31	35,50	44,12
Yes	58,30	66,57	62,94	46,69	64,50	55,88
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1084	1382	2466	604	645	1249
Children						
No	68,42	58,50	62,86	59,60	39,07	49,00
Yes	31,58	41,50	37,14	40,40	60,93	51,00
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1086	1383	2469	604	645	1249
Importance of religion						
Not very important	96,11	95,63	95,84	79,30	67,39	73,16
Very important	3,89	4,37	4,16	20,70	32,61	26,84
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1080	1374	2454	604	644	1248
Educational level						
Basic	5,90	3,70	4,67	12,09	9,46	10,73
Secondary+lower post-s.	75,28	71,92	73,40	78,64	77,83	78,22
Upper post-secondary	18,82	24,38	21,93	9,27	12,71	11,05
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
N	1084	1378	2462	604	645	1249

Table 4. Ordered logit analysis of subjective well-being in Poland and Sweden. Odds ratios					
		Sweden		**Poland**	
Sweden vs. Poland (pooled regression)		1.634**			
Age	20-24	1		1	
	25-28	0.987		0.820	
	29-32	1.045		0.638	**
	33-36	0.836		0.531	**
Sex	Male	1		1	
	Female	1.339	**	0.882	
Currently in a partnership	No	1		1	
	Yes	2.354	**	1.817	**
Children	No	1		1	
	Yes	1.429	**	0.955	
Religion	Not very important	1		1	
	Very important	2.073	**	1.474	**
Educational level	Basic	1		1	
	Secondary	1.595	*	2.158	**
	Post-secondary	1.674	*	2.732	**

Table 5. Ordered logit analysis of subjective well-being, separately by nation and gender									
	Swedish men		**Swedish women**		**Polish men**		**Polish women**		
Age									
20-24	1		1		1		1		
25-28	0.990		0.956		0.654	^	0.991		
29-32	1.169		0.938		0.526	**	0.795		
33-36	0.975		0.728	^	0.500	**	0.569	*	
Currently in partnership									
No	1		1		1		1		
Yes	2.266	**	2.455	**	1.542		1.863	**	
Children									
No	1		1		1		1		
Yes	1.146		1.674	**	1.366		0.748		
Importance of religion									
Not very important	1		1		1		1		
Very important	2.948	**	1.659	*	2.250	**	1.082		
Educational level									
Basic	1		1		1		1		
Secondary+lower post-s.	1.324		1.946	*	2.479	**	1.779	*	
Upper post-secondary	1.091		2.406	**	4.358	**	1.758	^	

Figure 1a.



Figure 1b.



Figure 1c.



Figure 1d.



Figure 2a.



Figure 2b.



Figure 2c.



Figure 2d.