

**Political Demography of South Korea: Cohort, Gender, Regionalism, and Citizens'
Movement in Election Democracy**

by

Eui Hang Shin

Department of Sociology
University of South Carolina

and

Department of Sociology

Yonsei University

Seoul, Korea

e-mail address: shin@sc.edu

The research for this paper was conducted during the 2003-2004 academic year when the author was a special exchange professor in the Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ho Young Yoon with the research project.

Political Demography of South Korea: Cohort, Gender, Regionalism, and Citizens' Movement in Election Democracy

Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that influenced the results of the April 15, 2004 general election in South Korea. A backlash after the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun by a coalition of opposition parties in the National Assembly (NA) was the single most important factor that determined the election outcomes. Generational and regional differences in the parties voters supported and the “defeat movement” of citizens’ organizations also had significant effects on the election processes. For the first time since the early 1960s a progressive party won a majority of the NA seats. Thirty-nine women members will serve in the 17th NA, the largest number ever, and the left-wing Democratic Labor Party became the third largest party by receiving 13 percent of the proportional representation votes. Generational and ideological shifts in the power elites seem to be evident in the election results. In fact, twenty-two percent of the 17th NA members are former activists of the democratization and labor movement of the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison to the previous NA, the 17th NA is expected to push the economic, political, and social reform agenda and advocate a more independent approach toward inter-Korean and Korean-U.S. relations. On the whole, the 17th NA election appears to be an election revolution and a definitive movement toward the consolidation of democracy in South Korea.

Correlates of the April 15, 2004 General Election in South Korea

Introduction

Election processes tend to reflect various dimensions of the cultural, economic, political, and social undercurrents of a society. In South Korean political history, each election has had special meaning as a touchstone of the progress South Korea has made in the course of democratization up to that particular point time. Furthermore, past elections exposed the raw characteristics of the political culture, including “the will of the people,” voters’ judgments and preferences on various issues that were not easily identified or frequently misinterpreted prior to the election process. In this context, studies of election processes and results are truly important in assessing the longitudinal trends of political development and the current conditions of democratic practice in South Korea.

In the April 15, 2004 general election of South Korea, the Our Open Party (OOP)—which was formed in November 2003 to support President Roh Moo Hyun and which had only 47 seats before the election – won 152 seats, a majority of the 299-seat, in the 17th NA. The Grand National Party (GNP), a majority party in the 16th NA, fell to 121 seats, and the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), once the second-largest party with 61 seats, won only nine seats.¹ The Democratic Labor Party (DLP) – a left-wing party that was formed about four years ago and which did not have any seats in the 16th NA – became the third-largest party by winning 10 seats, while the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) won only 4 seats.² Some analysts viewed the results of the April 15, 2004 general election as the sharpest political shift in South Korea in four decades.³ Such a view may be based on the fact that the OOP, a liberal left party “which advocates rapprochement with North Korea and greater independence from the United States,”⁴ has taken majority control of the 17th NA away from the conservative GNP. The election results mean that for the first time since 1987, after conservative parties dominated the NA for nearly forty years, a liberal party that supports the president has won majority control of the NA.

The implications of the political power shift, from “yeoso-yadae” to “yeodae-yaso,” must be analyzed in the historical context of democratization in South Korea. The shift of power appears to be a watershed in South Korean political development that may be equivalent to the transition from an authoritarian military regime to a civilian government with the election of Kim Young Sam as president in 1992, the transfer of

power from Kim Young Sam to Kim Dae Jung in 1997, and the election of Roh Moo Hyun as president in 2002. In view of the fact that a transfer of power from one party to another through a fair and clean election process is the backbone of democracy, the April 15, 2004 general election has written another chapter in the institutionalization of democratic practice in South Korea.⁵ The 17th NA will have a wider spectrum of ideological orientations in terms of party representation that would include the left-wing DLP, liberal left OOP, centrist MDP, conservative GNP, and ultra conservative ULD. Thirty-nine women, the largest ever, won seats, and they will comprise about 13 percent of the 17th NA.⁶ In addition to ideological and gender diversity, 187 out of the total 299 members of the 17th NA, about 63 percent, will be serving their first term, signifying a significant turnover of political elites. These developments may provide solid evidence that the April 15, 2004 general election was a movement toward the consolidation of democracy in South Korea.

There is some evidence, however, that suggests the April 15, 2004 general election involved factors that did not help the movement toward democratic consolidation. First of all, the election was turned into a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun after the NA passed the impeachment resolution on March 12, 2004. As a result of the general election being turned into a referendum by a coalition of opposition parties, the MDP, GNP, and ULD, debates on the merits of the campaign platforms of the major parties were largely put aside. The OOP took advantage of the opportunity and advocated that the election was all about whether voters were “in favor of” or “against” the impeachment of President Roh. By pushing the impeachment as the primary election issue, the OOP was able to avoid debate on the other important campaign issues, such as the sluggish economy, rising unemployment of young workers, stagnation in inter-Korean relations including North Korean nuclear development programs, and increasingly tense Korean-U.S. relations. It should be noted that the OOP was effective in framing the election as a simplified, emotional decision of “Whose side are you on?,” - “pro-Roh Moo Hyn” or “anti-Roh Moo Hyun.” Furthermore, regionalism, which has been one of the most persistent and profound influences on election outcomes in the past, emerged again as one of the important determinants of the 17th NA election. The fact that regional sentiments still significantly influenced the election outcomes despite the emotional manipulation of the impeachment issue dominating the campaign process suggests that the path to democratic consolidation in South Korea is still long and rough.

The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the results of the April 15, 2004 general election. I will examine (a) the changes in voter participation rates by age group, tracking polls on the popularity of each of the major parties and the factors that were correlated with the changes in each party's popularity, (b) voting patterns by region and variations in regional support by party, and (c) differences in the composition of the 16th and 17th NAs by party, gender, and terms served. I will also discuss the implications of the election results.

(Table 1 about here)

Voter Participation Rate by Age

Table 1 presents data on voter participation rates in recent elections in South Korea. The voter participation rate in the April 15, 2004 general election was 60.6 percent. The voting rate declined steadily from 84.6 percent in the 12th NA election of February 12, 1985 to 57.2 percent in the 16th NA election of April 13, 2000.⁷ The upturn of 3.4 percentage points in the voting rate between the 16th and 17th NA elections was quite interesting. The increase in the voting rates varied by geographic area. The areas where the voting rates were relatively low in 2000 (large metropolitan areas such as Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Incheon, Kwangju, Taejon, Ulsan, and Kyonggi provinces) showed increases in the voting rate in 2004 while those areas where the voting rates were relatively high in 2000 (Kangwon, Chungbuk, Chungnam, Chonnam, Kyungbuk, and Cheju provinces) experienced declines.⁸ There seems to be a convergence in voter participation rates among geographic areas in that the extent of inter-metropolitan and inter-provincial variations decreased substantially between 2000 and 2004.

What are the factors that have contributed to the increases in voter participation rates? As indicated earlier, the 17th NA election was seen largely as a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun,⁹ and thus many voters might have treated the election as if it was another presidential election. Historically, voter participation rates in the presidential elections have been substantially higher, more than ten percentage points higher, than those of the NA elections.¹⁰ Park Geun Hye, a daughter of former president Park Chung Hee and chairwoman of the GNP, spearheaded the election campaign crisscrossing the country and appealing to voters to block the OOP from becoming a super-powerful ruling party controlling more than two thirds of seats in the 17th NA. This so-called "Park wind" may have helped to raise the voters' interest in the NA election. In addition, the political gaffe caused by Chung Dong Young, Chairman of the OOP, with his remarks that elderly voters are no longer center

stage in society and should stay home on the day of election, might have aroused the interest of older voters. It was predicted that the increased voter participation rates would help the OOP more than the GNP in the election since the increase in the voting rate would most likely come from voters under age 30, who tend to have the lowest voting rate and are more likely to vote for the liberal OOP than for the conservative GNP.¹¹

(Table 2 about here)

Voter participation rates in the April 15, 2004 general election by age are 37.1, 56.9, 68.8, 82.6, and 68.7 percent for the 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and over age groups, respectively.¹² The data in Table 2 show that the voting rates of two age groups, 30-39 and 50-59, increased between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. The increases in those two age groups were responsible for the overall increase in voter participation rates between the 16th and 17th NA elections. It is interesting to note that the OOP's assertion that the 17th NA election was a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh did sufficiently motivate voters in their 30s to come to polling booth on the election day. Moreover, Chung Dong Young's remarks on the elderly did not raise the voter participation rate of the 60 and older age group. In fact, the voting rate of the 60 and older age group in the 17th NA election was even lower than that in the 16th NA election.

Preceding the April 15, 2004 general election, numerous media organizations conducted a series of public opinion polls on various issues including ideological orientation, the popularity of political parties, approval of President Roh's handling of national affairs, and opinions on the impeachment of President Roh.¹³ The results of the public opinion polls consistently showed that respondents in their 20s and 30s tended to support the OOP, gave President Roh higher marks, and opposed his impeachment. On the other hand, those in the age group 50 and older tended to support the GNP, gave President Roh lower marks than the average, and were less likely to oppose the impeachment than those in younger age groups. These variations in attitudes by age that were reported in the pre-election surveys were very much manifested in the voting behaviors of the April 15, 2004 general election.

Forty-nine percent of 20-29 year old voters supported the OOP while 51.7 percent of those in the 20-29 age group voted for the OOP in the April 15, 2004 general election.¹⁴ About 40.8 percent of 40-49 year old voters supported the OOP while 33.3 percent of

the same age group voted for the GNP.¹⁵ About 51.7 percent of 50 years and older voters supported the GNP in the April 15, 2004 general election.¹⁶ Thus, generational differences in voting behavior that have been observed in past elections impacted the outcomes of the 17th NA election, and the support of voters under 50 years of age has enabled the OOP to become a majority in the 17th NA.

(Table 3 about here)

The dichotomy between voters in the two generations, “under age 50” and “50 and older,” in terms of their voting behaviors, seems to be correlated with the experience of the Korean War or the lack of it. Those who are 50 years old and older as of 2004 experienced the tragedy of the war and are likely to have more conservative ideological orientations than those of the post-Korean War generations. The younger cohorts have had the benefits of growing up with more affluent economic and social conditions as well as a more democratic political environment, especially since 1987, than the older cohorts. Thus, those two generations have drastically different collective experiences and historical memories, and it follows that they would have substantially different ideological orientations. The other side of the same coin of the age differentials in voting behavior is the change in the composition of the parliamentary membership by age. As shown in Table 3, the members of 17th NA are much younger than those of the 16th NA. The proportion of members under age 50 increased from 28 percent in the 16th NA to 43 percent in the 17th NA. This seems to suggest that there was a significant generational shift in South Korean power elites through the election process. In addition to their age, these younger members have had “field experience” in the struggles for democratization and labor, the student movement, and the movements of other progressive citizens’ organizations. Hence, the generational shift in the NA naturally involves an ideological shift as well.

Regional Variations in Voting Behavior

Previous studies on election outcomes in South Korea have documented the persistent regionalism over the past forty years.¹⁷ In past presidential and NA elections an east-west split of regional support for the major parties was observed, the Youngnam and Kangwon regions for the GNP, Honam for the MDP, and Chungchong for the ULD. The voters in the “capital region” that includes Seoul, Incheon, and Kyonggi province tended to be split between the MDP and the GNP, although the MDP fared better than the GNP in recent elections.

One important change in party politics in recent years was the departure of President

Roh Moo Hyun from the MDP in September 2003. It should be noted that Roh Moo Hyun won the MDP's nomination as the party's presidential candidate by defeating his opponents in the MDP's presidential primaries held between April and August 2002. He ran successfully in the presidential race with the help of the organizational network of the MDP. In fact, Roh Moo Hyun's regional support base in the December 19, 2002 presidential election was nearly identical to that of Kim Dae Jung in 1997. The only difference was that Roh Moo Hyun received considerably greater vote shares in the Youngnam region, his home region, than Kim Dae Jung did in 1997. Thus, President Roh's relinquishment of his membership in the MDP and the subsequent organization of the OOP by his supporters in November 2003 created new dynamics in the regional support bases of the major parties. The MDP had to go through a series of reorganizations following the creation of the OOP by the splinter group. In fact, the leadership of the MDP spearheaded the impeachment movement of President Roh in the NA to recover politically from the damage inflicted by Roh and his followers. Hence, how well the MDP would do in the Honam region, their traditional stronghold, was one of the major points of interest of the 17th NA election.

(Table 4 about here)

Table 4 presents the number of seats won by party and by region in the 17th NA election. The fact that the OOP won seats from every region except for the Kyungbuk/Taegu area allows it to claim legitimately that it has become a "national party," unlike the old images of the MDP and the GNP as "regional parties" of the Honam and Youngnam, respectively. The regional sentiments of the voters seem to be evident, however, in the fact that the GNP won 60 out of the total 68 seats in the Youngnam region while the OOP did not win any seats in the Kyungbuk/Taegu area and won only four seats in the Kyungnam/Pusan/Ulsan area.¹⁸ Furthermore, the MDP, the second largest party with 61 seats in the 16th NA, ended up winning only five seats, all from the Chonnam province which had been its traditional stronghold. Likewise, the ULD won four seats from the Chungchong region, its regional support base.

For the first time in South Korean election history the system of "one person, two votes," one vote for an election district candidate and the other vote for a party to determine the proportional representation seats, was adopted for the 17th NA. Hence, the data on the second votes for the parties provide unique opportunities for the investigation of regional variations in the popularity of each party. Although each voter may not cast their two votes independently from each other the vote on the

proportional representation seats may reveal the voter's overall relative preference of a party, less impacted by the relative merits of candidates vying for an election district seat in the NA.

(Table 5 about here)

Table 5 presents the data on vote shares of the major parties in the election district level votes and the proportional representation votes by city and province. The data show that the overall vote shares of the OOP, GNP, MDP, DLP, and ULD in the election district votes were 41.9, 37.9, 7.9, 4.3, and 2.6 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the proportional representation vote shares of the parties were 38.3, 35.8, 7.1, 13.0, and 2.8 percent, respectively. The election district vote shares of the OOP, GNP, and MDP were greater than their proportion representation vote shares, while the opposite was true for the DLP. The proportional representation vote share of the OOP varied from 67.3 percent of the Chonbuk region to 22.3 percent of the Taegu region while the corresponding share of the GNP ranged from 62.1 percent of Taegu to 1.8 percent of Kwangju. It is remarkable that the OOP received more than 30 percent of the proportional representation votes in the Pusan, Ulsan, and Kyungnam areas. In the Taegu and Kyungbuk areas the OOP's shares of the proportional representation votes were 22.3 and 23.0 percent, respectively.

(Table 6 about here)

As shown in Table 6 the standard deviations of the OOP's vote shares in both the election district and proportional representation votes were substantially smaller than those of the GNP. The coefficients of variation of the OOP were also less than one half of those of the GNP. These statistics clearly demonstrate that the vote shares of the OOP were more evenly spread among the cities and provinces than the vote shares of the GNP. The fact that the GNP received less than one percent of the election district votes in Kwangju, Chonbuk, and Chonnam while the GNP's shares of the proportional representation votes in those areas were less than four percent increased both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variations of the vote shares. The penetration of the OOP into the Youngnam region, a traditional stronghold of the GNP, helped it to claim that it was a "national party," while the failure of the GNP to generate any support whatsoever in the Honam region made it subject to possible labeling as a regional party. As mentioned earlier, the regional sentiments of voters have had significant influence on their voting behavior in that voters tend to support a party whose leader shares the same regional origin as the voters. Thus, the substantial vote shares of the OOP in the Youngnam region may have been due to, at least partially,

President's Roh's Younnam connection. Those voters in the region who have voted for the OOP and its candidates might have done so to support the president, who is from their own region. Hence, the OOP had an ideal combination of having the party's regional identification with the Honam region and the Younnam-origin president as the symbolic head of the party. On the other hand, the GNP did not have any traditional identification with the Honam region in terms of its stronghold or the regional origin of its leader. Park Geun Hye, the leader of the GNP, is from Younnam, and it might have helped the GNP to win 60 out of the 68 total seats in the region, but it did not help the GNP in the Honam region.

The data in Tables 5 and 6 also show that the DLP received fairly consistent support in terms of proportional representation vote shares among cities and provinces. In particular, the coefficient of variation of the DLP in proportional representation vote shares was the smallest among the parties. This means that the DLP's share in the proportional representation votes was more evenly spread across the geographic areas than that of any other party. This pattern of an evenly distributed support base, in addition to the fact that the party won 10 seats, seems to suggest fairly promising potential of the DLP to further expand its constituent base. On the other hand, the large values of the standard deviations and coefficients of variations in the vote shares of both the MDP and ULD signify that they fared very badly overall in the election and also became minor regional parties in terms of their limited support base.

Blacklisting of Potential Candidates and Defeat Movement by the Citizens' Alliance for the 2004 General Election

In the 2004 general election, as in the case of the 2000 general election, citizens' organizations conducted the blacklisting and defeat campaigns. In order to understand the effects of such movements on the election outcomes it would be essential to review recent history of the roles played by the civic organizations in South Korean elections.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of democratization in South Korea since the end of the military rule in 1987 has been the rapid multiplication of the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the increasing importance of the roles played by the NGOs in political processes.¹⁹ The growing interest of citizens in political and economic reforms as well as a rising distrust among citizens of politicians, political parties, and political systems in general are the underlying social forces that have led to the emergence of NGOs in the South Korean political arena.²⁰ In particular,

the weaknesses inherent in the country's authoritarian military regimes, "such as civil rights issues, corruption of power elite, and ineffectiveness of bureaucracy" gave rise to the role of NGOs.²¹

The leaders of citizens' organizations argued that the major political parties were not sufficiently reform-oriented. They asserted that political reform and transparency would have to be initiated by a citizens' movement. About three months before the April 13, 2000 general election the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE) was formed with more than 450 organizations as participating members.²² The CAGE pointed out that "one of the most effective courses of action for political reform was to replace corrupt, incompetent, opportunistic, and self-serving politicians with well-qualified fresh faces with impeccable backgrounds."²³ Subsequent activities of the CAGE included the blacklisting of politicians as unfit to be nominated by any party and organizing a "defeat movement" against candidates who were nominated by the parties despite the CAGE's objections. Of the 86 candidates who were targeted for defeat by the CAGE in the 16th NA election, 59 lost. Fifteen of the 22 "most problematic" candidates were not elected.²⁴ It would be reasonable to argue that the CAGE blacklisting and defeat campaigns had significant effects on both nomination processes of candidates by major parties, as well as on the final outcomes of the 16th NA election.²⁵ The blacklisting and defeat campaigns may be viewed as "a people's resistance movement, or a civil disobedience movement against the political party-centered election systems and undemocratic political practices that essentially have limited the participation of civil society in the election process."²⁶

On February 3, 2004, the 2004 Civil Action for the General Election (2004CAGE) was formed with 354 citizens' organizations as participating members.²⁷ It should be noted that several other citizens' alliances for the 17th NA election were formed around the time when the 2004CAGE was formally organized. These include the Citizens' Alliance for Political Reforms (CAPR), People's Coalition for the 2004 General Election ("Mulgari"), People's Action for Right Choice (PARC), and Love the Country Coalition for the General Election (LCCGE).²⁸ The citizens' movement for the 17th NA election may be categorized into five types: defeat campaign, support campaign, movement for making the various information about candidates available, voter education programs, and watchdog activities. In addition, the Federation for the Environmental Protection Movement, the Green Korea Federation, and other environmental organizations formed their own coalition for the general election and

announced a blacklist of candidates while the 48 organizations for disabled people established the “2004 Alliance of the Organizations for the Disabled” and demanded that the parties nominate the candidates they had selected.²⁹

The 2004CAGE announced the first list of candidates deemed unfit to run in the 17th NA election. The first list included 68, 66 on the initial list plus two added later, incumbents or former members of the 16th NA.³⁰ The 2004CAGE announced the second blacklist of candidates on February 10, 2004, and the list included 41 candidates who had not served in the 16th NA. The 2004CAGE provided general evaluation criteria and specific reasons for blacklisting each of the candidates. The general evaluation criteria included six items: “corruption,” “violation of election laws,” “behaviors against civil rights and destruction of democratic and constitutional orders,” “unsatisfactory legislative activities and anti-parliamentary and anti-voters behaviors,” “ethical qualities toward the reform oriented legislation and policies,” and “comprehensive approach and cross-evaluation.”³¹

On April 6, 2004, the 2004CAGE announced a “defeat list” of candidates, a total 208 that included 100 candidates nominated by the GNP, 52 for the MDP, 21 for the ULD, and 10 for the OOP.³² The defeat list included 108 candidates who were selected on the basis of the aforementioned evaluation criteria as well as all of the 135 members of the 16th NA who voted for the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun on March 12, 2004.³³ Gisik Kim, secretary general of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and executive director of the 2004CAGE, indicated that the 2004CAGE decided to include all of the 16th NA members who voted for the impeachment because their decision was against the will of the people and was an act that jeopardized the constitutional order.³⁴

(Table 7 about here)

Table 7 shows the election outcomes for the candidates who were on the 2004CAGE’s defeat list. As shown in Table 6, 129 (62.6 percent) of the total 206 who were on the defeat list and actually ran in the April 15, 2004 general election lost the election.³⁵ The 2004CAGE declared that its defeat movement was successful by citing the fact that nearly two thirds of those who were on its list were defeated. It is questionable, however, whether those on the defeat list lost the election primarily due to the 2004CAGE’s defeat campaign. In view of the fact that the 17th NA election was turned into a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh, voters may have been

influenced more by the impeachment issue than the defeat movement per se.³⁶ Thus, it is important to analyze the effects of the backlash against the impeachment of President Roh on the outcomes of the 17th NA election. The following section presents detailed accounts of the resolution for the impeachment by the NA, the public backlash, and the citizens' movement against the impeachment.

Impeachment of President Roh by the NA and Its Backlash

In terms of political reality, President Kim Dae Jung's party, the MDP, was a minority party in the NA. In order to overcome the possible disadvantages of the "yeoso-yadae" (the governing party being a minority and the opposition party being a majority in the NA), Kim Dae Jung wanted to appeal to the people directly and dubbed his administration "people's government." Roh Moo Hyun inherited the same problem of being a president whose party is a minority in the NA. Roh Moo Hyun has identified his administration as the "participatory government." With the split of the MDP in September 2003³⁷ and the establishment of a new party, the OOP, by the faction of Roh Moo Hyun supporters within the MDP, President Roh has had to deal with not one but two opposition parties, the GNP and MDP. Confronted with opposition to his political agenda, Roh Moo Hyun had to re-identify his presidency. It is not surprising that he decided to take such a drastic measure as calling a national referendum on his presidency. On October 10, 2003, Roh Moo Hyun announced that he would call for a vote of confidence on his presidency.³⁸ It was a calculated move on his part in that, given the party composition of the NA, the legislation of his administration's policy proposals would likely be blocked by the opposition parties in the NA. Being a president of a new and small splinter party, one of the ways of nullifying the power of the majority party in the NA would be by obtaining a vote of confidence, giving him the people's mandate.

In order to mobilize the people's support of his administration, Roh Moo Hyun has articulated the need for political reforms. Especially, he emphasized the corruption problems of the political establishment, including the political parties that had raised a large amount of illegal campaign funds for the 2002 presidential election. In a newspaper interview, Roh Moo Hyun indicated that he would resign if the amount of his campaign funds were more than one tenth of those of his primary opponent, Lee Hoi Chang.³⁹ Subsequently, information on the amount of illegal presidential campaign funds revealed that Roh Moo Hyun indeed collected more than one tenth of Lee Hoi Chang's illegal campaign funds in the last presidential election. His remarks on the

illegal campaign funds became a part of the basis of the impeachment of Roh Moo Hyun by the NA. On March 12, 2004, the NA passed the motion to impeach President Roh Moo Hyun by a vote of 193-2.⁴⁰

The GNP, MDP, and ULD joined together in passing the impeachment resolution while the OOP, the governing party, attempted to physically block the NA from convening but failed and did not participate in the impeachment vote. The NA forwarded its impeachment resolution to the Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court was required to rule on the case within 180 days.⁴¹ It would require two thirds of the votes of the nine judges for the NA's impeachment resolution to be upheld. If the Constitutional Court rules in favor of the impeachment, a special election will be held within 90 days from the day of the ruling.⁴²

The motion for the impeachment of President Roh, initiated by the MDP, cited three grounds. First, in a press conference, Roh Moo Hyun made remarks that he supported the OOP, and that people who would vote for the MDP in the April 15 General Election would be wasting their vote and would only help GNP to maintain the majority in the NA.⁴³ The MDP asserted that President Roh violated the election law that stipulated government officials' neutrality in elections.⁴⁴ Secondly, the MDP and GNP argued that Roh Moo Hyun was involved in raising illegal campaign funds for the 2002 presidential election with his close aides and confidants, and that he had reneged on an earlier vow to resign if the amount of his illegal campaign funds exceeded one tenth of the rival GNP's during the presidential election.⁴⁵ The prosecution reported that Roh Moo Hyun's campaign collected nearly 11 billion won (\$9.4 million) from large corporations, and the GNP took 84 billion (\$72.0 million).⁴⁶ Thirdly, the MDP and GNP also argued that Roh Moo Hyun had neglected his constitutional duties to protect the rights of the people to pursue their happiness and welfare by his mishandling of the national economy.⁴⁷

The constitution stipulates that the president may be impeached when the president violates the constitution or laws while carrying out his duties. It is controversial whether or not any of the charges filed in the impeachment motion is a serious violation of the constitution or laws, thus constituting sufficient grounds for impeachment. Some experts on the constitution indicated that "Roh Moo Hyun's involvement in raising illegal campaign funds has yet to be proven, and the opposition's accusation of his misgovernment may not be a sufficient allegation for impeachment because it does

not involve any violation of the constitution or law.”⁴⁸ The National Election Commission (NEC) decided that President Roh violated the election law on the government official’s neutrality in elections and requested him to remain neutral. Some legal scholars have indicated that the NEC is only a quasi-judicial organization, however, meaning its decision cannot be final. It is a court of law that decides whether an act is in violation of the law.⁴⁹

It should be noted that Chough Soon Young, head of the MDP, asked President Roh to apologize for his remarks in support of the OOP and asserted that the MDP would file a motion of impeachment if Roh Moo Hyun refused. In fact, Roh Moo Hyun was given an ultimatum by the MDP and GNP for a public apology, but he declined to offer an apology in his nationally televised press conference on March 11, 2004, one day before the NA’s scheduled vote on the impeachment motion.⁵⁰ The fact that the MDP insisted that Roh Moo Hyun apologize, and that it would withdraw its impeachment motion if he complied with their demand, seemed to be an example of Confucian-style politics. It showed that from the perspective of the opposition parties, an apology could outweigh impeachable charges of violation of the constitution or laws by the president. That may have been based on the consideration that if Roh Moo Hyun offered an apology on not being neutral in the NA election by publicly speaking out that he supported the OOP, then his honor and authority as president would have been tainted, and it follows that if his honor were to be compromised, he would not be able to carry out his duties effectively.⁵¹

President Roh refused to offer an apology in his nationally televised press conference on March 11, 2004, and the three opposition parties, the GNP, MDP, and ULD, joined together and voted on the impeachment motion the next day. President Roh, the OOP and the opposition parties, the MDP, GNP, and ULD, all appeared to have played political brinkmanship. Roh Moo Hyun, as he did on October 10, 2003, by announcing his plan to call for a national referendum for a vote of confidence on his presidency, decided to go “all in,” where the stake is impeachment and an end of his tenure as president after only 13 months in the office. It is possible that Roh Moo Hyun and his political strategists weighed the pros and cons of offering an apology as demanded by the opposition parties and avoiding the impeachment process, but decided against it in the belief that the possible benefits of keeping his presidency if the Constitutional Court does not uphold the NA’s vote on impeachment would be worth the risk.

His approach in dealing with adversarial situations since his election as president has been “all or nothing.” As a president of the governing party with less than 25 percent of the seats in the NA, he has decided to make a direct appeal to the people and take a chance with the Constitutional Court, rather than become an ineffective president by negotiating with the opposition parties and compromising his political principles. In fact, one of the most frequently cited old political clichés is that “the will of the common people is the will of heaven.” In this context, President Roh has used political populism in order to overcome the disadvantages of being a president whose party is a small minority in the NA. To Roh Moo Hyun, by risking his presidency, he may be able to generate support from people and divide the population into two primary groups, “Pro-Roh Moo Hyun” and “Anti-Roh Moo Hyun.”⁵²

In Confucian culture, everlasting loyalty to a monarch is one of the essential values that is expected from his subordinates, as filial piety is the utmost value in the relationship between children and parents. In traditional Korea, a king and a queen were usually referred to as the father and the mother of the nation, “gookbu” and “gookmo,” respectively. This tradition had continued to the time of President Syngman Rhee, when Rhee was called the father of the nation. Despite authoritarian rule, incompetent governing, and widespread corruption during his tenure as president, Syngman Rhee stayed in power for more than 12 years. The mentality of people then was that children should not dissolve a father-child relationship even if the father had made mistakes. Although the public image of Roh Moo Hyun may be drastically different from Syngman Rhee’s, and more than forty years have passed since then, a significant portion of the tradition may still be intact in the minds of the people.

(Figure 1 about here)

The opposition parties, the GNP, MDP, and ULD, who voted for an unprecedented impeachment of the president, have experienced serious public backlash. First of all, an overwhelming majority of the people disapproved of the NA’s passage of the impeachment motion. According to a survey by Hankook Ilbo, immediately following the vote by the NA on March 12, 2004, 72.8 percent of respondents indicated the impeachment was “wrong” or “very wrong.” Secondly, the popularity of the OOP, the governing party, rose sharply after the impeachment vote. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion supporting the OOP increased from 32.4 percent on March 12 to 46.8 percent on March 17, 2004, a 14.4 percentage point rise in only five days. On the

other hand, the popularity of the MDP, who initiated the impeachment motion in the NA, decreased from 6.8 percent on March 12 to 4.1 percent on March 17, while the proportion of GNP supporters increased from 15.8 to 18.4 percent during the five-day period.

Thirdly, immediately following the action by the NA on March 12, young people began a series of candlelight vigils in protest of the passage of the impeachment motion by the NA. On March 13, 2004, more than 550 progressive citizens' organizations formed an alliance to oppose the impeachment.⁵³ The citizens' alliance that organized the candlelight rallies against the impeachment argued that the NA's passage of the impeachment motion was essentially a parliamentary coup that attempted to oust a president who was democratically elected by the people. The candlelight rallies against the impeachment at Kwangwhamoon, the same site where anti-American candlelight vigils were held for nearly one month leading up to the presidential election on December 19, 2002, was a dejavu in many respects. The movement against impeachment has turned the 4.15 General Election into the people's judgment on the NA's action versus the prevention of the OOP from becoming a super majority party in the NA.

As in the case of the two middle school girls killed by an armored vehicle driven by two American soldiers, an alliance of citizens' organizations was formed to protest the NA's action on the impeachment. More than 550 citizens' organizations participated in forming the Pan-Korea Action Council for Nullifying Impeachment and Ending Corrupt Politics (PKAC) immediately after passage of the impeachment motion in the NA.⁵⁴ On March 20, 2004, PKAC called for the "Meeting of One Million Citizens to Void the Impeachment and to Protect Democracy." Nearly 300,000 citizens participated in the candlelight rally at Kwangwhamoon in Seoul alone, and rallies in other major cities attracted about 50,000 additional participants.⁵⁵

The National Police Agency (NPA) announced that the candlelight rallies violated the laws on assembly and demonstration (Article 10) that prohibit any outdoor assembly or demonstration before dusk and after sunset. On March 15, 2004, the NPA indicated that it would arrest the key organizers of PKAC's candlelight rallies.⁵⁶ The PKAC argued that its rallies are cultural functions and thus not one of the types of assemblies that are defined in the assembly and demonstration laws. In Article 13 of the Assembly and Demonstration Law, "academic meetings, artistic performances, athletic

events, religious worship services, social and recreational activities, and marriage and funeral services” are exempted from the application of Article 10. In fact, PKAC included performances by singers, bands, and entertainers in their rallies, in addition to the speeches by speakers on the issue of the impeachment, in order to make their gatherings appear as cultural events. The NPA indicated, however, that its investigation of PKAC’s candlelight rallies revealed that the rallies could not be categorized as “cultural functions” and that they were clearly in violation of the laws. Goh Kun, prime minister and interim president, also stated that PKAC should stop the anti-impeachment candlelight rallies. The prosecutor’s office requested warrants to arrest the key organizers of PKAC’s rallies, but a judge at the Seoul Central District Court declined to issue the warrants on four PKAC officers.⁵⁷ The judge pointed out that the prosecution did not provide compelling arguments about the likelihood of PKAC officers failing to appear in court as asked by the prosecution.⁵⁸ PKAC indicated that the four officers would appear in the prosecutor’s office on March 30, 2004.

On March 27, 2004, PKAC held its last candlelight rally with the title of “3.27 Candlelight Rally to Protect Democracy, to Void Impeachment, and to Put Corrupt Politicians on Trial,” and more than 35,000 citizens participated in Seoul.⁵⁹ The next day, on March 28, 2004, the People’s Action for Right Choice (PARC), a coalition of 80 conservative citizens’ organizations, held a street rally in support of the impeachment of Roh Moo Hyun, and about 2,000 citizens participated in the rally.⁶⁰ The PKAC leadership decided not to hold any more anti-impeachment rallies after March 27, 2004, since the election laws prohibit any assemblies of voters that may be deemed as support of a candidate or party during the official election campaign period. The official campaign period for the April 15 General Election would start on April 2, 2004, giving just 13 days for parties and candidates to campaign.

As mentioned earlier, the public backlash against the NA’s passage of the impeachment motion helped the OOP’s popularity to rise sharply. More importantly, however, the impeachment became the central issue of the 4.15 General Election. The OOP took advantage of the opportunity, and advocated that the 4.15 General Election be all about “in favor of or against the impeachment.” In other words, the OOP insisted that the 4.15 General Election ought to be a trial of those parties and lawmakers who voted to impeach President Roh. The OOP argued that the opposition parties, the GNP, MDP, and ULD, put their political interests above and beyond the commitment to democracy,

by impeaching a president who was elected by the people through a democratic election. By framing the impeachment as the main campaign issue, the OOP was able to avoid any negative effects on the government party's standing in the election due to the sluggish economy, high unemployment rate of young workers, and ineffectiveness of Roh Moo Hyun as a political leader. The OOP appealed to voters that they should vote for the OOP in the 4.15 General Election if they believed that the impeachment is wrong. The OOP pushed the argument that voting for the OOP essentially meant opposition to the impeachment of and support of Roh Moo Hyun, who has championed political and social reforms and who has been on the side of the people rather than the side of the establishment and those who resist reform. Overall, the impeachment issue turned the political dynamics completely around, and provided another great opportunity for Roh Moo Hyun to utilize his populist political philosophy to reverse the political momentum in his favor.

In light of the serious backlash against the NA's action on impeachment of Roh Moo Hyun, the opposition parties attempted to put forward a set of political agendas as campaign issues. Both the GNP and MDP argued that making the OOP a majority party in the NA would be detrimental to the democratic development of South Korea, in that Roh Moo Hyun and his government party would dominate in making decisions on the direction of South Korea's future without any checks and balances. They also argued (especially members of the GNP and ULD), that the radically progressive political orientation of Roh Moo Hyun and his party might cause serious ideological conflicts between social classes. This could cause the country to move left, which would make the society undemocratic and unstable.

On the other hand, the MDP decided to present itself to the people as the party that would keep the political philosophy of Kim Dae Jung alive. Choo Mi Ae, co-chair of the MDP's 4.15 General Election Committee, decided to show that the MDP regretted initiating the impeachment in the NA, and asked for forgiveness from the voters. She took the Buddhist tradition of showing remorse for one's unacceptable, unwise, and ignorant behaviors by doing the "sambo-ilbae" (bow once after every three steps) for nearly 13 kilometers in Kwangju City, eventually arriving at the cemetery where those who were killed in the "5.18 Citizens' Democratic Revolt" of 1980 were buried.⁶¹ Her action attempted to re-ignite the support of voters in a region that had been a stronghold of the MDP before the split with the supporters of Roh Moo Hyun. Her "sambo-ilbae" also embodied the Confucian tradition that wrongdoings should be publicly

acknowledged, and that remorse should be demonstrated with actions. Once again, her behavior was based on the premise that political mistakes committed by politicians and parties can be forgiven if proper humility and regrets are demonstrated by the parties involved.

In any case, the leaders of the opposition parties, the MDP, GNP, and ULD, who spearheaded the impeachment movement in the NA were defeated in the election.⁶² As indicated earlier, the 2004CAGE had two separate lists of candidates who were targeted for defeat: one list had 108 candidates who were selected on the basis of the six criteria for candidate's records and the other list had 135 who participated in the impeachment voting.⁶³ Of the 108, two did not run in the election, and 35 of the 135 were also on the first list. Eighty-two of the 108 candidates on the first list lost in the 17th NA election. Forty-three of the 51 candidates on the first list who ran in the Seoul-Incheon-Kyonggi region failed to win in the election. But all ten GNP candidates who were on the first list and ran in the Youngnam region won the election. Thus, the defeat movement had little effect on the election outcomes for the GNP candidates in the Youngnam region. This goes to show once again the effects of regional sentiments, especially the loyalty of Youngnam voters toward the GNP, on voting behavior. Twenty-six who were on the first list but won in the election included 14 for the GNP, 8 for the OOP, one for the MDP, two for the ULD, and one for the NI21.

Emergence of Women Power

The 17th NA will have the most female members in the history of the Korean parliament. Sixty-six women were included in the total 1,175 candidates who completed the required registration with the NEC by April 2, 2004 for the 246 election district seats.⁶⁴ In addition, ninety-one of the total 190 candidates for 56 proportional representation seats were women.⁶⁵ In fact, the GNP, OOP, MDP, and DLP slated a woman at the top of their candidate lists, and these parties placed female and male candidates on their party's slate in an alternating order. Thus, about one half of the proportional representation nominees of the major parties were women.⁶⁶ Ten of 66 women candidates who ran for the election district seats won while 29 women won the proportional representation seats in the 17th NA. Thus, 39 of the total 299, about 13 percent, in the 17th NA will be female members. This is quite remarkable in view of the fact that only 16 of the total 273 members in the 16th NA were women. Furthermore, 33 women ran for the election district seats in the 16th NA, and five of them won. In addition, eleven women won the proportional representation seats, and

thus a total of 16 women served in the 16th NA. In fact, with regard to the proportion of female members serving in the parliament, South Korea was ranked 103rd out of 181 countries on the basis of the proportion of female members in the 16th NA (5.8 percent). With nearly 13 percent of the 17th NA being female, South Korea would fare better than some other Asian countries including Singapore (11.8 percent), Mongolia (10.5), Indonesia (8.0), Japan (7.3).⁶⁷

In terms of the party affiliation of women members of the 17th NA, 18 belong to the OOP, 15 to the GNP, four to the DLP, and two to the MDP. The female members of the 17th NA are expected to play much more important roles than what they did in the 16th NA on the basis of their sheer number. Immediately before the official campaign period of the April 15, 2004 general election the GNP and MDP picked Park Geun Hye and Chu Mi Ae, respectively, to lead their party's election campaign. Such moves came with the realization that the popularities of both parties were declining sharply following the passage of the motion on the impeachment of President Roh on March 12, 2004. It is interesting to note that the two major parties, the largest and the second largest parties in the NA at the time, each decided to select a woman to lead their party in the time of crisis for the party. This may have been due to the consideration that these women leaders had quite clean political reputations and favorable images to the public. In particular, Park Geun Hye performed quite effectively in leading the campaign activities for her party. Public opinion surveys conducted before and after the general election showed that Park Geun Hye indeed turned the fate of the GNP around in that the popularity of the GNP started to rise immediately following the election of Park as the head of the party on March 23, 2004.⁶⁸ Her popularity rating in the surveys was consistently higher than that of the GNP. With the last minute recovery and election outcomes that were better than expected for the GNP, Park Geun Hye's stature in the party has been solidified, and she has become a bona fide contender for the GNP's presidential candidacy in 2007.

On the other hand, Choo Mi Ae, who led the MDP's election campaign, failed to overcome the backlash against the MDP's involvement in the impeachment resolution by the 16th NA, despite her untiring effort. As an incumbent she even lost her re-election in the election district race with a third place finish. In view of the MDP's popularity as shown in the results of the 17th NA election, her political future may be in jeopardy, at least temporarily. Nevertheless, other women politicians have handled their tasks very effectively as spokespersons, speech givers to a national television

audience, and candidates in critical election districts running against veteran opponents in the election campaign processes. Therefore, it is expected that those women members in the 17th NA will play important leadership roles in their respective parties.

Having a fairly significant presence of women members in the 17th NA is expected to impact the legislative processes in positive directions. First of all, many proposals linked to women's rights issues either formally reviewed or in the process of being prepared for legislation by the 16th NA will have another life in the 17th NA. Secondly, those proposals associated with women's issues may generate bipartisan support of women members of the NA. Such co-operation between parties on the legislative processes would be most welcome in light of the long history of partisan strife that has consumed the parliament over the years. Thirdly, the female members of the 17th NA have diverse and impressive professional career backgrounds, and their legislative activities may raise the bar for the entire membership of the NA. In this context, the success of the women members in the 17th NA may open up political opportunities further for the next generation of women in South Korea.

(Tables 8 and 9 about here)

Declining Significance of Incumbency

One hundred eighty-seven of the total 299 members (62.5 percent) of the 17th NA will be serving their first term.⁶⁹ In fact, only 89 of the 273 members (32.6 percent) of the 16th NA were re-elected for the 17th NA.⁷⁰ The proportion of incumbents who were re-elected for the 17th NA is substantially lower than those for the 16th (52.0 percent) and 15th (44.3percent) NA.⁷¹ The proportion of the 17th NA members who were re-elected from the 16th NA is only 29.7 percent, and 210 out of the total 299 (70.3 percent) did not serve in the 16th NA.

Table 8 shows the distribution of the 17th NA members by number of terms they will be serving. As shown in Table 9 the proportion of new members varies by party. The proportions of first term members are 71.0 and 51.2 percent for the OOP and GNP, respectively. All ten members of the DLP are new members, while three of the nine MDP members and two of the four ULD members are new. The fact that less than one third of the 17th NA members are incumbents suggests that an "election revolution" has taken place in South Korean politics through the April 15, 2004 general election.⁷² It is an election revolution for several reasons. First of all, the re-election rate of 32.6 percent is extremely low in comparison to those that have been observed in the other

countries in the recent years. For example, in the House of Representatives election of the United States in 2000, 97.8 percent of the incumbents were re-elected.⁷³ The re-election rates of incumbents of the House of Representatives have been higher than 90 percent since 1974, except for 1992 when the re-election rate was 88.3 percent.⁷⁴ The high turnover of incumbents was expected in view of the fact that the April 15, 2004 general election was viewed as a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh, where opinion polls showed that more than 70 percent of the voters were against the impeachment resolution by the 16th NA on March 12, 2004.⁷⁵

Secondly, the selection system of each party's nominees has become much more transparent and democratic than the procedures used in the past. Each of the major parties recruited prominent individuals outside the party to serve on the party's candidate nomination committee along with party members selected by the party's leadership in an effort to minimize the influence of the party boss. The open screening system of candidates in determining their party's nominees included the local district level party primaries (in which the local delegates of the party decided the party's nominee), public debates and public opinion polls conducted at election districts on applicants who were vying for party's nomination. Such an improved nomination system adopted by the most major parties produced a fairly substantial loss of incumbents in the nomination process. For example, about 46.8 percent of the GNP's nominees for the election district race were not incumbents.⁷⁶ Although the major parties did not formally institutionalize the party primaries to determine their nominees, the systems they used for the 17th NA election were a great improvement over the traditional hand picking of nominees by the party's boss in the "Three Kim Era."

Thirdly, the incumbents lost the great advantages they had due to the abolishment of the parties' local branch organizations at the election district level, because of the changes in political party laws. The abolishment of the parties' local branches came about because maintaining the local offices required a substantial amount of funds and, in the process of raising the funds, the chairs of the local branches got involved in illegal fund raising activities and peddling political influences. The incumbents no longer had the advantages of utilizing the organizational networks in the election district maintained by the party's support system. Thus, the "playing field" became more level than before with the abolishment of the party's local branches. Finally, the NEC banned "many of Korea's long standing election practices" that would include "providing meals and entertainment to woo voters."⁷⁷ The NEC indicated that anyone who receives such

favours would be punished with fines worth 50 times the value of the gifts.⁷⁸ The NEC also promised that anyone who reports the incidents of providing gifts in exchange for votes would receive rewards up to 50 million Won (about \$45,000).⁷⁹ In addition, the NEC required each candidate to submit detailed information about the candidate's backgrounds including education and career, personal assets, income tax returns and amount of the property taxes paid, military service records, and criminal records.⁸⁰ The NEC posted the information about the candidates on the NEC Website, and voters had easy access to the information about each and every candidate who was in the race for a seat in the 17th NA. These new regulations about the election campaigns and party organizations shifted the essential elements of the election campaign from the party's local organizational networks and campaign chest to the relative strength of candidate's reputation, credentials, and records. On the whole, the democratization of the parties' candidate nomination procedures, reforms of the party organizational structures and changes of the election campaign laws made it possible to produce the election revolution, which, in turn, pushed South Korea to move towards democratic maturity.⁸¹

Discussion

One of the most persistent patterns of political behavior of both political and civil society in South Korea has been the importance placed on the ethical and moral characteristics of the political leaders. Such a tendency may reflect Confucian cultural values that have influenced nearly all aspects of the behavior of individuals as well as behavior at the organizational level. Confucian thought states that "Only those who are well-cultivated (*xiushen*) would be able to keep their families in order (*qijia*), and those who are capable of keeping their families in order would be able to govern the state well (*zhiguo*), and only when states are well-governed will there be peace under heaven (*pingtianxia*)"⁸² Such an emphasis on the ethical and moral character of political leaders may have led to the acceptance of and reliance on "the rule of man," provided that "the man" is a good man on all grounds. Reliance on "the rule of man" would be incompatible with "the rule of law," one of the fundamental principles of democratic values.

The emphasis on the moral character of the political elites and the reliance on the rule of man have been persistently practiced throughout the history of South Korean political development. A case in point is the more or less sentimental and favorable memories that people still have about President Park Chung Hee despite his authoritarian rule and

oppressive approach toward even such basic democratic values as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to vote, representative democracy, and separation of powers of among three branches of the government. The fact that Lee Hoi Chang's presidential bid was essentially derailed by allegations of draft dodging with respect to his two sons in the 1997 presidential election bespeaks the importance of moral character that is expected from a political leader. In the general election of April 15, 2004 citizens' organizations and the media questioned the moral character of the co-chair of the GNP's election coordination committee on the basis of the alleged underpayment of taxes on the properties he owned and the sources of the funds for the purchase of several apartments and commercial buildings.

During the era of the "three Kims," Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil, support for a political party was determined primarily by people's liking of the party leader as a person, not necessarily by the party's policy agenda. Although it is natural that the popularity of a party leader is directly linked to the popularity of the party, the important issue here is the degree to which the images of the party boss determines the party's political fate including election outcomes. The campaign process of the April 15, 2004 NA election is no exception. The popularity of a political party was largely determined by the public image of the party leader, and thus if the party leader's popularity dropped for any reason the party was not hesitant in replacing its boss. The GNP elected Park Geun Hye as chairwomen of the party in March 2004 to spearhead its campaign for the 4.15 general election. Also, Choo Mi Ae was appointed by the MDP's Central Committee to be in charge of the NA election just two weeks before the 4.15 general election. On the other hand, in order to avoid the backlash of Chairman Chung Dong Young's major political gaffe in the campaign Chung was forced to resign from his position as well as from being a candidate for the proportional representation seat.⁸³

Traditionally, as indicated earlier, the image of the party leader tended to determine largely the party's popularity, and thus the party's head was directly involved in campaigning for the party's candidates at election district level. All of the leaders of a major party had to make stump meeting appearances at as many election districts as the schedule allowed each day during the official campaign period. The underlying premise was that voters would cast their ballots not only on the basis of the election district level candidates' qualifications and characters but also the image of the party leader. The stump meetings where only the district level candidates appeared might

not attract a large number of voters, and thus the appearance of the party leader was in great demand during the official campaign period. One of the most serious consequences of the heavy emphasis on the image of party's leader in the election campaign process was that the differences in the campaign platforms of the parties did not play an important role in voters' decisions or election outcomes. On the whole, the Confucian tradition that emphasizes "the rule of man" over "the rule of law" may not be conducive to realizing the democratic ideals in South Korea.

The less than absolute reliance on "the rule of law" in South Korean political practice may have come about from the patterns of economic, political, and social changes in the 1970s and 1980s. Previous studies have noted that the economic and sociopolitical change in South Korea are characterized by "the compressed" nature of development and modernization. It follows that the rapid economic development initiated and pushed effectively by the developmental state has not been accompanied by concomitant changes in political and social structures. One of the significant consequences of the compressed economic development has been that the level of government expenditures on the public welfare programs is substantially lower than that expected from the other economic indicators. Analogous to this, it may be reasonable to suggest that political and legal provisions may have lagged behind the rapid economic and industrial development since the early 1970s. The division of the Korean peninsula and the continuing confrontation between two ideologically opposite states has been one important factor that may have caused the "political lag." Continuing concerns about North Korean threats have hampered changes to existing laws including the National Security Laws and election laws and slowed the movement toward the adoption of liberal and democratic laws. As a result of "the legal lag" individuals and organizations have developed a perspective that some of the "bad laws" may be violated as long as the violation may come in the process of promoting, in their judgment, a societal good. The activities of radical student groups, labor unions, and other interest groups in the recent years may be good examples of the manifestation of such belief. Even the activities of citizens' organizations, especially blacklisting and organizing defeat movements against candidates who are deemed not to be qualified on the basis of the organizations' evaluation of the candidates' backgrounds were litigated in the past and the court[s?] ruled that some of NGOs' blackballing violated existing election laws. In light of the positive functions of the NGOs' election-related activities for the enhancement of the participatory democracy it may not be easy to settle the issue one way or the other at the present time. On the whole, it would be fair to say that the

organized activities of NGOs have pushed the political society (both the government and political parties) and economic society (business corporations, especially the chaebol groups) to reform their organizational structures and practices. Although the political and economic societies have shown a resistance to change and transparency, without the aggressive and organized activities of NGOs it might have taken even longer to realize the extent of democratization that has been accomplished up to this point in time.

There are several important factors, which are correlated with the April 15, 2004 general election, that should be investigated and corrected for further development of the election systems in South Korea. First of all, the decision on reapportionment was dragged on up until the point about five weeks before the 17th NA election.⁸⁴ The delay was primarily due to the conflict of interest among the parties in that each party attempted to protect its incumbents' election districts in the reapportionment. The reapportionment involved an increase of 16 election districts, from 227 to 243. Also, the number of the proportional representation seats increased by 10, from 46 to 56. The total number of seats of the 17th NA became the same as it was for the 15th NA, 299.⁸⁵ Needless to say, re-districting decisions should be strictly based on pre-determined criteria, and reapportionment should be completed sufficiently prior to the day of election. Given the past history of delay in making decisions on reapportionment issues by the political parties, a set of new guidelines including a mandated timetable should be adopted by the 17th NA.

Secondly, violations of the election laws were serious problems of the 17th NA election. Despite the reports that the April 15, 2004 general election was the cleanest ever, the NEC reported more than 5,800 violations of the election laws by April 15, 2004.⁸⁶ The number of violations of the election laws in the 16th NA election of 2000 was 3,017.⁸⁷ The increase in the number of election law violations may have been primarily due to stricter enforcement of the laws in the 17th NA election than in previous elections. In any case, more than 70 members of the 17th NA are under investigation by the prosecution for election law violations, and the prosecution has submitted arrest warrants on four members who were elected for the 17th NA before the formal opening of the session.⁸⁸ The new laws on political funds calls for a nullification of an election win when the winner receives a sentence of a fine in an amount of one million won (about \$8,400) or more for the violation of the laws or when their spouses or campaign workers are sentenced over three million won of fines for the violations.⁸⁹ Ten members of the 16th NA lost their seats for receiving sentences more serious than fines

of 100 million won, and it has been pointed out that substantially more than 10 members of the 17th NA would lose their seats, with special elections to be held to fill those vacant seats before the end of the year. Hence, there may be another round of elections of the 17th NA seats and the outcomes may have a bearing on whether or not the OOP will be able to hold on to the majority party status in the 17th NA.

From the NA election of April 15, 2004 we can find some evidence that South Korean election culture has changed into a more democratic and transparent system. First of all, the traditional style of selecting of party nominees in which the party boss had absolute power is almost gone. The major parties have adopted more open and transparent nomination procedures that include inviting nonparty members who are prominent figures in different professional fields to serve on the party's nomination committee, having open debates among applicants for party nominations, holding quasi-primaries to determine the party nominees at the election district level by the delegates of the party members of the district, and soliciting the nomination of the proportional representation candidates electronically via the Internet.

Secondly, the parliamentary election of April 15, 2004 appears to have been the cleanest election ever in the history of South Korean elections. The NEC publicized the new election laws by placing the advertisements in the major television networks as well as the major daily newspapers. Thirdly, the new election law abolished the system of joint sessions of candidates' campaign speeches at the election district level. In the past, candidates had to spend a substantial amount of money recruiting their supporters to attend the joint sessions where the size of each candidate's supporters in the crowd was regarded as "a show of force." In addition, there was an important change in the party law that did away with the parties' branch offices at the election district level. These changes in the election and party laws were conducive in turning the most recent parliamentary election into a watershed in the political development in South Korea.

The rift between the young and old and between the Youngnam and Honam regions were also observed in voting behavior in the April 15, 2004 general election. Voters in their 20s and 30s as well as those in Honam, Chungchong, and the capital city region were largely responsible for the OOP becoming the majority party in the 17th NA. On the other hand, the GNP changed from a majority to a minority party in the NA. The GNP fared better than what was projected, however, primarily due to the strong support of voters in the Youngnam which had been a stronghold of the GNP over the past 30

years. The strong showing of the OOP in the Taejon and Chungchong regions, winning 19 out of the total 24 seats, has turned the ULD, which had enjoyed the support of the region over the years, into a party with four members in the 17th NA. The success of the OOP in the Taejon and Chungchong regions may be linked to Roh Moo Hyun's campaign promise that he would move the administrative capital from Seoul to Chungchong region. The persistent regional sentiments that have been manifested in voting behavior may reveal, once again, that regionalism is so pervasive in the South Korean political culture that it still tends to outweigh voters' adherence to liberal democratic values and ideals.


On the other hand, there were some positive outcomes in the NA election of April 15, 2004. First of all, voters took the need to reform the NA seriously and replaced the incumbents with new members. Less than one third of the 16th NA members will be serving in the 17th NA. Also, the proportion of female members in the 17th NA will be about 13 percent. The primary reason for the substantial increase in the number of women in the NA was the change in the party law that encourages the political parties to nominate candidates for the proportional representation seats without any prejudice against women. As discussed earlier, all major parties have complied with the new guidelines and slated female and male candidates in alternating rank orders. This goes to show that legal provisions are essential for immediate improvement in the political representation of minority groups, in this case women.

Another important political development that emerged in the NA election of April 15, 2004 was the DLP winning 10 seats, two from the election districts and eight from proportional representation. It is remarkable that a party that was formed only four years ago, in January 2000, and did not have any seats in the 16th NA, won more seats than such well-established parties as the MDP and ULD. The DLP benefited from the new election law that provides the system of "one person two votes," one vote for an election district candidate and another vote for a party to determine the distribution of the proportional representation seats. Although the DLP won only two district level seats it received 13.0 percent of the party votes for the proportional representation seats. Apparently, many voters voted for either the OOP candidate or the GNP candidate for an election district seat but voted for the DLP for the proportional representation seat. In fact, the DLP's share of the proportional representation votes ranged from 10.5 to 21.9 percent in the 16 cities and provinces. This goes to show that the DLP has a nationwide support base, unlike the MDP (7.2 percent) and ULD (3 percent), whose

support bases are fairly limited to Honam and Chungchong, respectively.

The emergence of the DLP in the formal representative politics has several important implications. First, there may be a sizable number of voters who may have a progressive ideological orientation and who have actually manifested their ideological preference in voting behavior by supporting the DLP. On the one hand, the acceptance level of political progressivism by the voters has increased in the recent years, and many voters may have become discontent with the established parties. In view of the problems of the South Korean economy, including a high unemployment rate, especially among young workers, and increasing cleavages between social classes, those who are working class and feel alienated from the establishment have found a political party that appears to represent their causes. Second, the DLP's presence in the NA may mean that the progressive political agenda will be debated more than ever before. The DLP's campaign promises included the legislation of a full-employment policy, abolition of the National Security Laws, withdrawal of the USFK by 2012, withdrawal of South Korean troops from Iraq, legislation of a "wealth tax," ending the import of new weaponry, stopping the privatization of electric, rail, gas and other public utility industries, lowering the voting age from 20 to 18, and other measures. The DLP is likely to initiate debates on these issues, and thus the NA may become a political arena where each piece of legislation is deliberated in the formal parliamentary institution. Such progressive labor unions as the National Teachers Labor Union, National Public Servants Union, National Farmers Alliance, and others may attempt to utilize the DLP as their formal representative in the institutionalized political process. The possible reliance on the DLP by the progressive labor unions and other citizens' organizations may impact the protest and struggle culture of civil society in South Korea. Such a development would be a positive shift toward the consolidation of democracy in South Korea

Figure 1. Tracking Polls on popularity of Major Parties, 14 February 2004 - 10 April 2004



Source : Donga Ilbo, April 16, A3

Table 1. Voter Participation Rates in the Recent Elections, South Korea, 1997-2004

City /Province	15 th Presidential Election 1997.12.18	2 nd Local Elections ¹ 1998. 6. 4.	16 th National Assembly Election 2000. 4. 13	3 rd Local Elections ¹ 2002. 6. 13	16 th Presidential Election 2002. 12. 19	17 th National Assembly Election 2004. 4. 15
Total	80.7	52.7	57.2	48.8	70.8	60.6
Seoul	80.5	46.9	54.3	45.7	71.4	62.2
Pusan	78.9	46.7	55.4	41.8	71.2	61.9
Taegu	78.9	46.8	53.5	41.5	71.1	59.3
Incheon	80.0	43.2	53.4	39.4	67.8	57.4
Kwangju	89.9	45.1	54.0	42.4	78.1	60.2
Taejon	78.6	44.5	53.3	42.3	67.6	58.9
Ulsan	81.1	57.6	59.1	52.3	70.0	62.0
Kyonggi	80.6	50.0	54.9	44.6	69.6	59.7
Kangwon	78.5	64.3	62.9	59.0	68.4	59.7
Chungbuk	79.3	61.0	60.8	55.8	68.0	58.2
Chungnam	77.0	59.5	60.1	56.1	66.0	56.0
Chonbuk	85.5	57.8	60.6	54.7	74.6	61.2
Chonnam	87.3	68.2	66.8	65.6	76.4	63.4
Kyungbuk	79.2	64.9	64.6	60.4	71.6	61.5
Kyungman	80.3	61.1	60.6	56.2	72.4	62.3
Cheju	77.1	73.7	67.2	68.9	68.6	61.1

1. Local elections include 1) city, district and county council election 2) Provincial Assembly 3) Provincial Governor Election and Elections are held nationally at the same date

Source : <http://www.home.nec.go.kr:7070/TUUL>

Table 5. Shares of vote for Election District and Proportional Representation Seats by Party and City/Province, South Korea, April 15, 2004

City/Province	Vote Shares for Election District and Proportional Representation by Party											
	OOP		GNP		DLP		MDP		ULD			
	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District
Total	38.3	41.9	35.8	37.9	13.0	4.3	7.1	7.9	2.8	2.6		
Seoul	37.7	42.8	36.7	41.3	12.6	3.4	8.4	9.8	2.8	0.7	>	
Pusan	33.7	38.9	49.4	52.5	12.0	2.9	1.9	0.8	0.7	0.3	>	
Taegu	22.3	26.7	62.1	62.4	11.6	2.5	1.1	1.8	0.8	0.5	>	
Incheon	39.5	44.7	34.6	38.9	15.3	7.4	5.4	5.2	0.8	0.6	>	
Kwangju	51.6	54.0	1.8	0.1	13.1	5.6	31.1	36.4	0.8	0.4	>	
Taejon	43.8	45.8	24.3	22.4	11.8	1.5	3.1	3.3	14.5	22.1		
Ulsan	31.2	28.1	36.4	36.3	21.9	18.0	1.5	0.6	0.8	0.8	>	
Kyonggi	40.2	45.7	35.4	40.7	13.5	4.1	6.1	6.7	2.0	0.7	>	

Kangwon	38.1	38.8	40.6	43.3	12.8	4.2	3.5	6.4	1.3	0.2
Chungbuk	44.7	50.5	30.3	32.6	13.1	3.3	2.2	1.0	6.3	9.2
Chungnam	38.0	38.9	21.1	15.8	10.5	2.2	2.8	3.6	23.8	33.7
Chonbuk	67.3	64.6	3.4	0.1	11.1	4.6	13.6	18.7	1.0	0.1
Chonnam	46.7	46.9	2.9	0.8	11.2	2.6	33.8	38.4	1.0	0.6
Kyungbuk	23.0	25.8	58.3	54.6	12.0	3.4	1.4	0.4	1.2	0.6
Kyungnam	31.7	34.4	47.3	47.7	15.8	8.4	1.4	0.6	0.8	0.6
Cheju	46.0	49.4	30.8	40.2	14.1	3.4	5.1	3.8	1.1	0.6

Source : Chosun Ilbo, April 17, 2004, A6

**Table 6. Standard Deviation and the Coefficient of Variation
of the Vote Shares for Election District and Proportional Representation Candidates by Party**

	OOP		GNP		DLP		MDP		ULD	
	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District	Represent	District
	Range									
Minimum	22.30	25.80	1.80	.10	10.50	1.50	1.10	.40	.70	.10
Maximum	67.30	64.60	62.10	62.40	21.90	18.00	33.80	38.40	23.80	33.70
Std. ¹⁾	10.95	10.39	18.31	19.78	2.729	3.96	10.22	12.17	6.41	9.63
Coefficient of Variation ¹⁾	0.28	0.25	0.57	0.60	0.21	0.82	1.34	1.42	1.72	2.15

Source: See Table 5.

1) Rounded at hundredth

**Table 2. Age-specific Voter Participation Rates
in the 16th and 17th National Assembly Elections**

Age Group	16 th NA Election (April 13, 2000)	17 th NA Election (April 15, 2004)
20-29	36.8 %	37.1
30-39	50.6	56.9
40-49	66.8	68.8
50-59	77.6	82.6
60+	75.2	68.7

Sources : Hankyoreh, April 14, 2004, p.1.

Chosun Ilbo, <http://www.chosun.com/w2ldata/html/news/200404/200404200303.html>

Table 3. Age Composition of the 16th and 17th NA Members

Age Group	16 th NA		17 th NA	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
30-39	13	4.8	23	7.7
40-49	65	23.8	106	35.5
50-59	106	38.8	121	40.5
60+	89	32.6	49	16.4
Total	273	100.0	299	100.0

Source: JoongAng Ilbo, April 17, 2004, p. 9.

Table 4. The Results of the April 15, 2004 General Election by City/Province

City/Province	Number of the NA Election District Seats Won by Party								
	GNP	MDP	OOP	ULD	NI21	DLP	IND		
Seoul	16		32						
Incheon	3		9						
Kyonggi	14		35						
Kangwon	6		2						
Chungbuk			8						
Chungnam/Taejon	1		11	4					
Kyungbuk/Taegu	26							1	
Kyungman/Pusan/Ulsan	34		4		1	2			
Chonbuk			11						
Chonnam/Kwangju		5	14						1
Cheju			3						
Total	100	5	129	4	1	2			2

Source : Munhwa Ilbo, April 16, 2004, 3p

Table 7. Election Outcomes of the Candidates Who were Blacklisted by the Citizens' Alliance for the 2004 General Election by City and Province

City/Province	Total Number of Candidates	Number of Blacklisted Candidates	Number of Blacklisted Candidates who were defeated in the Election
Seoul	249	41	31
Incheon	58	10	6
Kyonggi	228	41	27
Kangwon	37	7	5
Chungbuk	36	8	7
Chungnam	56	10	7
Taejon	32	2	2
Kyungbuk	69	17	8
Kyungnam	74	16	9
Pusan	84	12	2
Taegu	63	10	2
Ulsan	27	5	2
Chonbuk	54	6	6
Chonnam	56	14	9
Kwangju	34	5	4
Cheju	11	2	2

Total	1168	206 ①	129 ②
Percent (②/①) * 100) = 62.6%			

Source: <http://www.redcard2004.net/candidate/search6.php>

**Table 8. Composition of National Assembly (14th – 17th)
by Terms Served**

Terms Served	14 th		15 th		16 th		17 th	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
1	156	45.61	159	47.46	111	40.66	187	62.54
2	90	26.32	72	21.49	82	30.04	53	17.73
3	46	13.45	52	15.52	34	12.45	42	14.05
4	29	8.48	26	7.76	25	9.16	9	3.01
5	9	2.63	15	4.48	14	5.13	7	2.34
6	6	1.75	4	1.19	5	1.83	1	0.33
7	3	0.88	5	1.49	0	0.00	0	0.00
8	2	0.58	1	0.30	1	0.37	0	0.00
9	1	0.29	1	0.30	1	0.37	0	0.00
Total	299		299		273		299	

Source: Hankook Ilbo, “Generational Shift,” March 5, 2004, P.A4
Chosun Ilb, “Rejuvenated 17th NA,” April 17, 2004, p.A7.

Table 9. Composition of the 17th National Assembly by Terms Served and Party

Terms Served	Party					
	OOP	GNP	MDP	DLP	ULD	Others
1	108	62	3	10	2	2

2	25	25	3		
3	13	27	1	1	
4	3	3	2	1	
5	2	4			1
6	1				
Total	152	121	9	10	3

Source: Chosun Ilbo, "Rejuvenated 17th NA," April 17, 2004, p.A7.

Endnotes

- ¹ Brooke, James. 2004. "South Korea's Impeached President Gains Support in Vote," *New York Times*, April 16, 2004, Retrieved on April 16, 2004 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/16/international/asia/16KORE.html?pag>.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Faiola, Anthony. 2004. "Korean Vote Shifts Power in Assembly: Turnover May Aid Impeached President," *Washington Post*, April 16, 2004, p.A14, Retrieved on April 16, 2004 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A16061-2004Apr15?language=p>.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Rowan, Bernard. 2004. "Election Extend Democracy in Korea," *The Korea Times*, April 23, 2004, Retrieved on May 17, 2004 from <http://times.hankooki.com/cgi-bin/hkiprn.cgi?pa=/lpage/nation/200404...>
- ⁶ Shin, Bo Young. 2004. "A Strong 'Woman Wind' with 13% of the 17th NA," *Munwha Ilbo*, April 16, 2004, p.4.
- ⁷ Retrieved on May 21, 2004 from <http://www.home.nec.go.kr:7070/TUPO?electcode=019960411&sidcode=>.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Faiola, p.A14.
- ¹⁰ <http://www.home.nec.go.rr:7070/TUUL>.
- ¹¹ Kim, Suk Ki. 2004. "The Voting Rate of 60.6 Percent Influenced the Election Outcomes," *Munwha Ilbo*, April 16, 2004, p.2.
- ¹² These specific voter participation rates are preliminary estimates made by the Korean Broadcasting Company (KBS) on the basis of exit polls. The post-election survey for the NEC by the Korea Social Science Data Center NEC[?] revealed much higher voter participation rates: 62.3 percent for the 20-29 age group, 75.3 for the 30-39 age group, 86.8 for the 40-49 age group, and 88.7 for the 50 and older age group. The final estimates by the NEC will be available in July 2004.
- ¹³ Please see the special reports about the public opinion survey results at the following Websites: <http://hani.co.kr>; <http://chosun.com>; <http://donga.com>; <http://joins.com>; <http://gallup.co.kr>.
- ¹⁴ Kim, Suk Ki, 2004, p.2.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Cho, K.S. 2000. *Regional Voting and Rational Voters*. Seoul: Nanam (In Korean); Lee, Hong Yung. 2003. "South Korea in 2002." *Asian Survey* 43: 64-77; Shin, Eui Hang. 1999. "Social Change, *Political Elections, and the Middle Class in Korea*." *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 17: 28-60. Shin, Eui Hang. 2001. Political Demography of Korea: Political Effects of Changes in Population Composition and Distribution." *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 19: 171-204. Yea, Sallie. 1994. "Regionalism and Political-Economic Differentiation in Korean Development: Power Maintenance and the State as Hegemonic Power Bloc." *Korea Journal* 34: 5-29.
- ¹⁸ The OOP won two of the four seats in the Youngnam region from the two districts of Kimhae, the home town of President Roh Moo Hyun.
- ¹⁹ Kim, Hyuck Rae. 2000. "The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of

Nongovernmental Organizations on South Korea.” *The Pacific Review* 13 (4), p.595; Wein, Roland. 2000. “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government: Puppets or a New Political Force.” In *The Two Koreas in 2000: Sustaining Recovery and Seeking Reconciliation*, edited by Korea Economic Institute of America (KEIA). Washington, D.C.: KEIA; Shin, Eui Hang. 2003. “The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in South Korea: The Case of the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election.” *Asian Survey* 43 (4), p.698.

²⁰ Shin, p.699.

²¹ Shin, p.701.

²² Shin, p.703.

²³ Shin, p.702.

²⁴ Kim, Hong Nack. 2000. “The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea.” *Asian Survey* 40 (6), pp.904-909.

²⁵ Shin, p.712.

²⁶ Shin, p.712.

²⁷ <http://www.redcard2004.net/redcard/join-2004.html>.

²⁸ The progressive citizens’ organizations participated in the formation of the CAPR and “Mulgari” while the members of the PARC and LCCGE were conservative citizens’ organizations.

<http://www.mulgari.com/info.html>; <http://www.winvoting.com/image/main/organi.gif>; <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-00340000/2004/04/p0034000002004040111>; <http://www.independent.co.kr/news/print.html?id=3893>.

²⁹ http://news.naver.com/news_print.php?office=ohmynews&article_id=42117.

³⁰ http://www.redcard2004.net/contents/nakchun_listl.html.

³¹ Ibid.

³² <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-00340000/2004/04/p.00340000020040610>.

³³ Ibid. Of the 108, 35 are also included in 135 who voted for the impeachment motion.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ <http://www.redcard2004.net/candidate/search6.php>.

³⁶ Bang, Seung Bae. 2004. “The 2004 CAGE says ‘There Will Be No Defeat Movement in the Next Election’” *Munwha Ilbo*, April 16, 2004, p.31.

³⁷ Ahn, J.S., and S.K. Cho. 2004. “Carrying Out Reforms and Securing Power for Growth with a Deep Breath: An Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration’s First Year,” *Hankyoreh*, February 23, 2004, p.5.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Kwak, S.J. 2004. “NA Impeaches President,” *The Korea Times*, March 12, 2004, Retrieved on April 4, 2004 from http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?terms=%22impeachment.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Byun, Duk-kun. 2004. “Election Law Violation to Dominate Impeachment,” *The Korea Times*, March 12, 2004, Retrieved on April 4, 2004 from

[Http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?terms=%22impeachment](http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?terms=%22impeachment).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ahn and Cho, p.5; Fallis, 2004, Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.; Byun, 2004.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “Roh’s Presidency Suspended: Country Looks for Cure to National Division,” *The Korea Times*, March 12, 2004, Retrieved on April 7, 2004, from http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?terms=%22impeachment...

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Joongang Ilbo, March 12, p.3.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Yoo, Dong-ho. 2004. “It’s All About April Elections,” *The Korea Times*, March 12, 2004, Retrieved on April 7, 2004, from http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?terms=%22impeachment...

⁵³ http://www.anti312.net/board/view.php?anti312notice&article_id...

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ <http://tan.hani.co.kr/section-003500000/2004/03/p003500000200403212242485.html>. Retrieved on April 9, 2004;

⁵⁶ <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-005000000/2004/03/005000000200403151957798.html>. Retrieved on March 16, 2004.

⁵⁷ Hwang, J.B., and J.Y. Chun. 2004. “A Judge Declines to Issue Arrest Warrants of Four Leaders of the Candlelight Demonstration,” *Hankyoreh*, March 26, 2004, Retrieved from on April 9, 2004 from <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-003500000/2004/03/00350000020040326023001.html>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ <http://tan.hani.co.kr/section-003500000/2004/03/p0035000002004032716...>

⁶⁰ <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-003500000/2004/03/003500000200403271031194.html>.

⁶¹ <http://www.donga.com/fbin/news?f=print&n=20040405050377>

⁶² Those leaders include Chough Soon Young, chairman of the MDP, Yoo Young Tae, whip of the MDP, Hong Sa Duk, the majority whip of GNP, and Kim Jong Pil, head of the ULD. For a detailed account of this issue please see Ahn, S.C. 2004. “Most of the Leaders who were behind the Impeachment Fell,” *Hankyoreh*, April 16, 2004, p.2.

⁶³ The six criteria considered with respect to the past records of candidates were: “the violation of election laws,” “corruptive behaviors,” “behaviors that deemed against the civil rights and destructive of democratic orders,” “lack of diligent legislative activities and behaviors that deemed to be anti-parliamentary system and anti-voters,” “opposition to the reform oriented legislations and policies,” “ethical qualities and competence,” and “comprehensive approach and cross evaluation of the characteristics of the candidates.”; <http://www.hani.co.kr/section-003400000/2004/04/00340000020040406103001.html>.

⁶⁴ Park, D.S. 2004. “The General Election Competition Ratio Is 4.8 to 1,” *Chosun Ilbo*, April 2, 2004, p.1.

⁶⁵ Lee, M.G. 2004. “General Election D-12, An Analysis of Proportional Representation Candidates,” *Donga Ilbo*, April 2, 2004, Retrieved on April 11, 2004 from <http://www.donga.com/fbin/news?f=print&n=200404020337>.

⁶⁶ The new election law required that each party nominate women for at least 50 percent of its proportional representation candidates. This law has not been enforced by the

NEC, and thus some parties including the ULD did not comply.

⁶⁷ Yoon, Y.C. 2004. "Choice 4.15, 39 Women Members—'Women's Wind Era' in Yeoido," *Donga Ilbo*, April 16, p.7.

⁶⁸ Shin, Chang Woon. 2004. "Shaken by the 'Impeachment Wind'—Swayed by the 'Elderly Wind,'" *Joongang Ilbo*, April 16, 2004, p.7.

⁶⁹ Kwon, K.B. 2004. "Rejuvenated 17th NA," *Chosun Ilbo*, April 17, 2004, P. A7.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Park, song-wu. 2004. "Nation Experiences Election Revolution," *Korea Times*, April 16, 2004, p.4.

⁷³ U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2003. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 247.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Shin, Chang Woon. 2004. "The Impeachment Resolution is Wrong, 76%," *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 13, 2004, p.1.

⁷⁶ Ku, Y.S. 2004. "GNP Nominees for Election Districts," *Ohmynews*, March 15, 2004, Retrieved on March 16, 2004 from: http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_print.asp?menu=c10300&no.

⁷⁷ Park, Song-wu, 2004, p.4.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Hwang, Balbina. 2004. "The Election in South Korea: A Victory for the Electoral Process," Heritage Foundation WebMemo #484, April 19, 2004, Retrieved on April 20, 2004 from [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asiandthe Pacific/wm484.cfm?renderfon](http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiandthePacific/wm484.cfm?renderfon).

⁸² You, Jong-Keun. 1998. "Values, Culture, and Democracy in Korea." Retrieved on April 3, 2004 from http://www.odep.org/conference/program/participants/You_Jong_Keun.

⁸³ *Korea Herald*, April 12, 2004, p.2.

⁸⁴ Shin, Yong Ho. 2004. "An Increase of 16 Election District Seats in the Reapportionment," *Joongang Ilbo*, March 10, 2004, p.2.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Kim, S.T. 2004. "Nearly 60 Candidates Are Charged by the Prosecution," *Joongang Ilbo*, April 15, 2004, p.1.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Park, M.H. 2004. "NEC investigates 10 NA Members for the Political Funds Law Violations," *Donga Ilbo*, June 4, 2004, p.1.

⁸⁹ Ibid.; Kim, Rahn. 2004. "53 Election Winners Face Annulment," *The Korea Times*, April 17, 2004, p.1.