

“Ethnic Revival” among Labor Migrants in Germany? Statements, Arguments, and First Empirical Evidence

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“Although the evidence for such a return [to ethnicity] has always been lacking, the popularity of the idea has never waned” (Alba, 1990: 337)

In this article, we scrutinize the assumption of an “ethnic revival” among labor migrants in Germany by examining their identificational, cognitive, and social assimilation processes. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel, we present trend analyses of different hostland- and homeland-related indicators for the last 15 years. Results are presented separately for first and second generation migrants from Turkey, the EU, and former Yugoslavia. While not all assimilation-related indicators change a great deal over time, they show a substantial increase from the first to the second generation. With regard to the homeland-related indicators, the results do by no means suggest that migrants try to compensate their comparatively disadvantaged social status by revitalizing ethnic cultural habits or homeland-oriented identifications.

It is a well-known fact that past migrants are more popular than current ones. The European migrants who came to the US around the turn of the century as compared to the post-1965 migrants, who are often considered to be less successful in assimilating, are a case in point (for a discussion see Alba and Nee, 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997). Astonishingly, this pattern of perceptions of immigration can also be found in the so-called late immigration countries. In Germany, where one encounters substantial, permanent, and ongoing immigration of non-Germans since the period of labor recruitment beginning in the late fifties, it is a popular and little questioned assumption that migrants used to integrate more successfully than they have been doing since the early 1990s. This “phenomenon” attracts not only extensive media coverage (see “Der Spiegel”, 16/1997; “Financial Times Deutschland” 8/12/04; “Die Zeit”, 41/2004), but also considerable academic attention (see

Kecskes, 2000). While not all authors in this field actually use the term “ethnic revival”, a bulk of articles and books mostly on Turkish migrants’ integration states a growing social segregation of the foreign population in the early nineties (Leggewie, 2000:100), an increasing withdrawal of immigrants into their own ethnic group (Heitmeyer et al., 1997:164f), and a growing ethnic self-confidence of migrants and their children (Münz et al., 1997:103), to mention just a few examples.

As heterogeneous as these statements are, these authors share the assumption that ethnicity has become increasingly important for migrants’ identity, behavior, and social networks during the last decade. While there is still some disagreement on its causes and consequences, the mere fact that today, the adaptation processes of migrants living in Germany have slowed down or even reversed, seems beyond question (see Sauer, 2003:63). The evidence that is given to back this statement is often impressionistic in nature and ranges from the increasing visibility of ethnic institutions, such as mosques, social associations, and ethnic neighborhoods, to the use of headscarves among second-generation migrants, ongoing language problems among students, or close intra-ethnic contacts.

From a research perspective, however, these eclectic observations raise similar questions with regard to conceptual clarity and empirical evidence, as do most popular assertions about social trends: First of all, the meaning of the term “ethnic revival” is unclear. Students of ethnicity have repeatedly stated that it is a multi-dimensional concept (for a discussion of the concept of ethnicity see Weber, 1972:237ff; Yinger, 1985; Alba, 1990; Esser and Friedrichs, 1990; Hill and Schnell, 1990). To claim that we are witnessing an ethnic revival requires a clear specification of the dimension to which it refers. Potential angles are: a growing importance of ethnicity in terms of migrants’ self-identifications, an increasing popularity of ethnic cultural habits, and/or a more homogeneous ethnic composition of their social networks.

Another question is whether the often stated “return to ethnicity” does in fact depict a new pattern in migrants’ adaptation processes – and which groups are affected by it. The label “revival” suggests that the importance of ethnicity for migrants’ behavior, identity, and social interactions initially declined and later re-gained importance. Such a process may occur in the generational succession or within a generation during a given period of time and may be due to group composition-, period-, cohort-, or age-effects. Reference groups and time frame under consideration thus need to be specified when

stating a disruption in migrants' adaptation patterns. The same holds true for the critical "threshold value" that could be a slowdown, stagnation, or even reversal of their assimilation processes.

Secondly, it is often highly unclear what kind of empirical evidence the assumption of an ethnic revival relies upon – and how reliable it is. As students of immigration and integration issues know too well, data for empirical research is not easy to find (for a summary see Diehl and Haug, 2003). Even research topics that require cross-sectional data are still unsettled. This is especially true for migrants' adaptation in areas other than their educational or labor market integration. Panel data is needed in order to explore whether the notion of a process like an "ethnic revival" is more than an intuitively compelling idea.

The aim of this article is to scrutinize the assumption of an "ethnic revival" among labor migrants in Germany, one of Europe's numerically most important immigration countries. We will assess to what extent the thesis of a stagnation or reversal of migrants' identificational, cognitive, and social assimilation processes and an increasing importance of ethnic identifications and ethnic cultural habits is empirically well-grounded or merely reflects the uneasiness of a late immigration country's majority about minorities' permanent and visible settlement.

Doing this, we will proceed in four steps. First, we present the scholarly debate about "ethnic revival" among first- and second-generation labor migrants in Germany. We critically explore what researchers understand by the idea and what kind of empirical evidence – if any – they present to support their arguments. Second, we take a look at the often more elaborated theoretical arguments and empirical findings on "ethnic revival" mostly from the US literature that have so far been widely ignored in the German debate on this topic. We identify the factors on the societal level (e.g. the role of ethnicity in public life) and on the group level (e.g. an ethnic groups' duration of stay and degree of structural assimilation) that have been considered responsible for triggering this phenomenon. Based on this, we discuss whether it is plausible to expect an "ethnic revival" among Germany's immigrants or not. Thirdly, we develop an analytical scheme for assessing this phenomenon empirically and describe the data and indicators we use in our analysis. Finally, we present trend analyses of different hostland- and homeland-related indicators as first empirical evidence about the alleged process of ethnic resurgence by using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP). Doing this, we will

tackle the conceptual and empirical flaws of existing research on this topic. The article concludes with a discussion of our findings.

Evidence for an “Ethnic Revival” in Germany - A Critical Review

The idea of an “ethnic revival” is in fact a phantom, insofar as it is widely stated, repeated, and quoted, but its origins remain obscure. Leggewie, for instance, postulates a break-off in the integration process in the early 1990s, in regard to the cultural, identificational, social, and educational assimilation, as well as an increase in labor migrants’ intentions to return to their homelands (Leggewie, 2000:99f). In particular, he claims that language skills stagnate, that migrants’ interethnic relationships wither and that their intentions to stay in Germany dwindle. Leggewie not only states a decline in the integration process, but also an increase in ethnic identifications. According to him, an “increasing share” of the immigrant population has a growing consciousness of their ethnic roots, religious beliefs, and intra-cultural social life, that finds its expression in a pervasive interest in political conflict and social processes in the homeland, and the “widespread and intensive reception” of – particularly Turkish – media (ibid.:103, own translations). As empirical evidence he uses the work of Münz et al. (1997).

Heitmeyer (1997) refers to a study by Seifert (1996) and states a decline in interethnic interactions as well. In addition, he claims that Germany’s migrants increasingly retreat into their own ethnic groups, intensify and reactivate their Islamic beliefs, and even turn to fundamentalist-Islamic groups. He argues that even third-generation migrants show an increasing distance vis-à-vis the German political system, leading to ethnic-cultural particularism, and potentially, a so-called “parallel society” (ibid.:42f; see also Heitmeyer et al., 1997).

So far, Münz et al. (1997; 1999) and Seifert (Seifert, 1992; 1995) are the only ones who try to back their arguments with own analyses of panel data. In the first mentioned study, the authors claim to find evidence for an increasing social segregation of the foreign population in Germany from the early to the mid-nineties. They state a “strong decline of interethnic friendships” and thus an increasing distance between the German and foreign population, in particular between first- and second-generation Turks and Germans (Münz et al., 1997:102, own translation). In addition, they argue that

migrants' identification with Germany and their intentions to stay in their hostland declined in the same period, and they see this as evidence for migrants' social exclusion as well as their growing ethnic self-consciousness (ibid.:102f). In an earlier study, Seifert argues that the number of Turks who feel German declined, and he concludes that the increasing number of those who do not feel German points to an increasing ethnic orientation (1992:682).

Other authors state a similar phenomenon, but base their argument solely on cross-sectional data. Mehrländer, Ascheberg, and Ueltzhöffer use cross-sectional data from surveys that were conducted in 1980, 1985, and 1995 and argue that a small group of migrants live without any contacts to Germans, and that this groups' desire to have such contacts is lower today than it was 10 years ago (Mehrländer et al., 1996:312). The authors also see a process of "disintegration", by which they mean that there is a growing tendency among a small portion of the foreign population to retreat into their own ethnic group, instead of integrating into German society (ibid.:317). In Switzerland, the phenomenon of an ethnicization-process is stated by Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., whose analyses rely on cross-sectional data, too (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., 2001).

This brief overview shows that the popular thesis of an "ethnic revival" in the sense of an *increasing* tendency of migrants to retreat into and identify with their own ethnic group has in fact a very narrow empirical basis. In addition, the most often-quoted study by Münz et al. raises several questions. First of all, it remains unclear which groups the authors actually look at. They claim to construct two "longitudinal cohorts" and compare several indicators for these cohorts' assimilation at two periods of time. While the authors assert to do a longitudinal analysis, it is not obvious if they actually do so, given the fact that the cohort size *increased* between their observation points (ibid.:86)¹.

¹ In the first edition of their book, they look at their first cohort in 1984 and 1989, and at their second cohort in 1990 and 1994; in the second edition, they compare the same first cohort with a second cohort in 1993 and 1997. They restrict their analyses to those second-generation migrants (born or visiting school in Germany) who are younger than 26 (Münz et al. 1997: 186) and present data separately for female, Turkish, and second-generation migrants (ibid.: 101).

Secondly, one might doubt whether their substantial results show in fact a trend or are more or less accidental in the sense of being highly dependent on their selection of only two observation points for each “cohort”. In the second edition of their findings, they compare two different points in time and find different results, i.g. an increase, instead of a decrease in interethnic contacts. They comment that their older findings, which have been the basis for statements with far reaching political implications, show that the period of alienation seems to have been “overcome” (Münz et al, 1999:114), without considering the possibility that it never existed. Thirdly, one might criticize that while the SOEP does contain a broad range of indicators on migrants’ cognitive, social, and identificational assimilation, Münz et al. only look at interethnic friendships, German language skills, the intention to stay in Germany, and self-identification as German. But the conclusions of the authors and those who refer to this study about an increasing ethnic particularism go far beyond that. Even if one assumes that empirical findings show that migrants’ language skills declined, that they have fewer German friends, and that they identify less with Germany than they used to, this does not imply an “ethnic revival”. Migrants can, for instance, feel excluded in their hostland without necessarily feeling more attracted to their homeland or their ethnic enclave, a condition that has often been labeled as marginalization (see Esser, 1980:225). Münz et al. do not present any data on the development of migrants’ cultural or religious habits and activities over time or on their identifications with their ethnic group.

Other empirical studies raise questions as well. The finding of Mehrländer et al., that today, those migrants who do not have any social contacts with Germans are less interested in having such contacts than they used to, could just be an artifact. Given a general increase in interethnic interaction – probably due to better opportunities for interethnic interaction – those migrants who are still without any contacts can in fact be assumed to show a negative selectivity with regard to their interest in interethnic contacts.

In Switzerland, Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. (2001) put forward the “re-ethnicization” thesis. The authors state that structurally disadvantaged second-generation immigrants experience higher levels of

anomie². Based on this, they claim to show that individual anomie leads to a re-ethnicization process, as a form of individual adaptation (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., 2001:384). This finding is backed by multivariate analyses of data for 1997 that yield positive and statistically significant effects of “anomie” for dependent variables such as perception of discrimination, motivation for segregation, and – partially – remigration intention (ibid.:383). The authors equate these findings with a re-ethnicization process. However, the mere fact that structurally less assimilated migrants feel more often discriminated against and are less assimilated socially must not be misperceived as evidence for a re-ethnicization process caused by disadvantage and anomie.

This brief overview shows that convincing empirical evidence for a “return to ethnicity” among labor migrants is still lacking. In the next section, we will demonstrate that in terms of the factors known to further the salience of ethnic ties and identifications, this is not too much of a surprise.

Explaining “Ethnic Revival”: Findings from the US and their Relevance for Germany

The argument that a “return to ethnicity” is taking place among migrants is not new. In a classical immigration country like the US, the idea is a tradition almost as old as assimilation theory. The belief that assimilation is the final stage of immigration and of interethnic contact has been contested on different grounds and most critics share the assumption that ethnic retention or revival are more likely than a steady weakening of ethnic ties and identities. Three lines of argument are particularly relevant for our discussion of an “ethnic revival” in Germany. There is, first, the assumption that ethnicity does not lose its importance due to its ongoing importance in the social structure of the US. This assumption has, secondly, been challenged by the contemporary proponents of the assimilation model. They have reformulated its classic version and acknowledge the ongoing or even increasing importance of ethnic identities, but argue that what might phenotypically look like an ethnic resurgence is, in fact, the very result of a successful structural assimilation. A third line of argument is more social-psychological in nature. It states that a maintenance or strengthening of ethnic attachments can be a cure against anomie and alienation many groups encounter when they are forced

² The authors do not give any information about how they operationalize anomie in their analysis.

to identify with an “unqualified Gesellschaft” (Yinger, 1994 :46)³. All arguments refer primarily to immigrants of European ancestry.

Competition and the Ongoing Importance of Ethnicity

The 1950s and 1960s were the birth period of canonical studies on migrants’ adaptation processes. Assimilation was considered to be the most likely endpoint of immigration and interethnic interaction (Park, 1950:150f). This view was contested in the 70s and 80s, when research on migrants’ integration focused instead on ethnic resurgence and the ongoing importance of ethnicity. Glazer and Moynihan, for instance, discuss whether there is a “resurgence of ethnicity” (Glazer and Moynihan, 1992 [1970]:xxxix) and stress that the prominence of ethnicity has increased since religious and occupational identities weakened. Ethnic groups often share common economic and political interests due to an ethnic division of labor and due to the fact that in New York - the focus of their study - economic and political resources are still distributed along ethnic lines. State action thus has very often ethnic implications so that ethnicity “[...] is a real and felt basis of political and social action” (ibid.:xxxviii). According to Glazer, this leads to an increase in ethnic groups’ self-confidence and militancy (Glazer, 1954:130; see also Glazer, 1978). While Glazer and Moynihan assume that ethnicity is a trait that was transplanted to the hostland and lives on in a form that is shaped by its structural conditions (see Alba, 1990:19; Gans, 1979:3), other authors stress that ethnicity takes on a completely new form and is often fundamentally (re-)constructed in the hostland (Yancey et al., 1976:392; for another example see Patterson, 1975:305).

³ Yinger (1994) presents a slightly different summary of the debate on ethnic revival. As we do, he differentiates between a line of argument that emphasises the ongoing importance of ethnicity in the competition for resources and power, and one that puts its importance as a means against anomie and alienation into focus. As a third line of argument, he refers to people’s primordialist attachment to their ethnic belongings. Since it is hard to find any specified mechanisms behind this argument that would help explain variance in the strength of ethnic attachments, and due the problems that arise once one wants to explain ethnic resurgence in the second-generation, we do not discuss this argument any further. For a discussion of the idea of an ethnic revival, see also Alba (1990: 28f).

Bell makes a similar argument. He differentiates between instrumental groups and expressive groups that combine shared interest with emotional relationships. In modern societies and in a globalized world, people have an increasing desire to belong to small and locally based groups. At the same time, more and more spheres of life are subject to political decisions (1975:171). Both processes lead to an increasing salience of ethnic belonging. This process is furthered by the fact that class loyalties weaken with the transition to a post-industrial society (Bell, 1985).

According to these authors, the ongoing importance of ethnicity is regarded to be a result of a certain set of structural conditions, most importantly an ethnic division of labor, the organization of the political sphere along ethnic lines in a city such as New York in the 70s, and the absence of strong cross-cutting cleavages (see also Neckel, 1995).

Ethnicity as Ethnic Identity

The thesis of an “ethnic revival” has been challenged by the contemporary protagonists of assimilation theory, who argue that what looks like an “ethnic revival” is in fact a new stage in the assimilation process. At the same time, they describe the mechanisms on the individual level that render a salient ethnic belonging attractive – even to immigrant groups whose immigration dates back to the early decades of the last century.

Gans’ starting point is one of the few canonical accounts of the concept of an “ethnic revival”: Hansen’s argument that the third generation is more aware of and attached to their ethnic ancestry than the first and the second generation, summarized in his famous statement that “what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember” (quoted in Nahirny and Fishman, 1965:311). According to Hansen, third-generation migrants are no longer forced to repudiate their ethnic roots since they are successfully assimilated and do not experience discrimination any longer. Gans does not only criticize that the empirical evidence that Hansen presented to support his hypothesis was rather limited (Gans, 1979:4). He argues that *just because* of their successful assimilation, Europeans have become more visible for instance in the media and in academics (ibid.:5). Besides, he emphasizes that ethnicity changed its character fundamentally: “[...] it is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt

without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior” (ebd:9). Gans labels this new form of ethnicity among European immigrants “symbolic ethnicity” (see also Nahirny and Fishman, 1965:322).

A similar idea has been theoretically elaborated and empirically tested by Alba (1981; 1990) and Waters (Waters, 1990). With regard to the European-Americans, Alba describes that an attachment to their European ancestry is quite compatible with structural assimilation on the group level, for instance ethnic heterogamy and educational success. His empirical work demonstrates that ethnic identifications are widespread but that they are freely chosen and neither interfere with nor manifest themselves in people’s everyday life: Only a fifth does not identify at all with their ancestors’ countries. This identification is, however, limited to the private sphere and the family. In this individualized form it serves as a modern cultural trait of distinction (Alba, 1990:300; see also Hirschman, 1983:416). Waters makes a similar argument and stresses that ethnicity is a trait that suits the needs of many well assimilated European ancestry groups in belonging to a community on the one hand and choosing one’s identity voluntarily on the other hand: “It is the best of all worlds: they can claim to be unique and special while simultaneously finding the community and conformity with others that they also crave” (Waters, 1990:151).

These authors do not deny that ethnicity continues to play a visible role among Americans of European ancestry, but claim that this is fully compatible with assimilation theory since ethnicity has fundamentally changed its character. It is now a cultural, private, and freely chosen trait that is no longer structurally or socially grounded. It has thus little to do with the role ethnicity plays among structurally disadvantaged immigrants. Therefore, it enjoys an ongoing popularity that does not contradict but in fact supports assimilation theory.

Ethnicity as a Cure for Anomie and Disadvantage

A third line of argument attributes a crucial role to ethnicity as a cure for alienation and isolation that individuals often experience in modern societies. Especially newcomers find it easier to vitalize their identification with ethnically based communities because they are more effective in producing a sense of belonging than interest based groups: “[...] ethnicity is reaffirmed as a cure: One might declare: I

do, in fact, know who I am – I am a Pole, a Jew, a Turk, an African American. I have meaningful attachments; my ethnic group has standards and shared values and agreed-upon norms that reduce the burden of anomie in the large society” (Yinger, 1994:46).

An early version of this argument has been formulated by Eisenstadt in the fifties who stressed that migrants live in an unstructured surrounding and thus withdraw to small groups with institutionalized role expectations (Eisenstadt, 1952:225f). In Thomas and Znaniecki’s classic account of the emergence of mutual-help associations among immigrants, a very similar argument can be found: Old world institutions and the “old naive and unreflective communal solidarity” (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1996:113) have been left behind by the migrants and the request for a substitute ultimately led to the emergence of new forms of solidarity. The authors did not believe in individual solutions of this dilemma, such as individual assimilation, since this was inhibited by discrimination and by the inability of a modern society such as the US to satisfy the craving for belonging.

In a somewhat different version of this argument, ethnicity is considered to help not only against anomie but also against feelings of inferiority and discrimination. As Alba sums it up: In this line of argument ethnicity is considered to be a “working- and lower class style” that helps people to “identify and understand the nature of their disadvantage” (Alba, 1990:27).

This brief summary of the American debate on “ethnic revival”, “ethnic resurgence”, and “ethnic retention” shows that researchers found evidence that the successors of immigrants who came to the US several generations ago still have some sort of consciousness of their ethnic roots. The nature of this consciousness has been described in different lines of argument that vary substantially in terms of their relevance to the German situation.

The Preconditions for “Ethnic Revival” in Germany

In regard to the first line of argument - the ongoing political importance of ethnicity in the social structure of the US - it seems rather unlikely that Germany is encountering an ethnic revival or will encounter one in the near future. Apart from the fact that Germany is an ethnically much more homogenous society, ethnicity neither plays a prominent role in public life nor is there a cultural division of labor as pronounced as in the United States. Even though migrants occupy a lower strata

of the labor market and political measures that affect working class people thus hit migrants particularly hard, ethnicity has no strong salience in the competition for economic resources and political power. This is partly due to the fact that Germany has never granted minority status to its immigrants, who have been expected to stay only temporarily in Germany and to re-migrate to their country. Only autochthonous minorities enjoy minority status and thus minority rights and public support (vgl. Mäder, 1997:29; Alexy, 1994:49). Ethnic groups as such do not get any rights or resources, apart from local funding for some cultural activities. The same holds true for other political and economic resources. Migrants neither enjoy substantial political power on the group level nor do they have a say as a group in the media, as they do for example in the Netherlands with its established (though increasingly contested, see Rath, 1997) minority policy. Important factors known to promote the salience of ethnicity are therefore lacking in Germany.

Another factor that limits the role of ethnicity in public life is Germany's naturalization law that until recently has been very restrictive. It was only in 2000 that elements of *jus soli* were introduced into German naturalization law, up till then, being German was – apart from exceptions that have been extended since the early 1990s – strictly a matter of descent. Even though the German passport is now substantially easier to obtain, naturalization rates have remained rather low (Diehl and Blohm, 2003). Citizenship is, however, known to be of crucial importance when it comes to interest group formation among migrants and to their struggle for rights and power in the hostland (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996, chapter 4). In fact, studies have shown that Germany's migrants are very reluctant to engage in homeland-oriented political activities in Germany (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Ögelman, 2003). So far, there is thus little reason to expect ethnicity to play a prominent role as a strategic and increasingly important resource in migrants' struggle for economic and political resources given the opportunity- and incentive-structure in Germany. The US experience suggests that ethnicity is most likely to become and remain an important social cleavage under the condition of a strong cultural division of labor, a political system that distributes power and economic resources along ethnic lines, and interest group formation among immigrants who have a substantial say in politics.

Nevertheless, the discussion of the concept of symbolic ethnicity has shown that migrants' identification with their (predecessors') country of origin does not necessarily require ethnicity's

social structural salience. As a private sentiment and folkloric attachment it can live on for generations and even grow stronger. All the authors mentioned above describe one important precondition for that: People's ethnic belonging must no longer be considered an inferior trait that is subject to discrimination. As one can easily imagine, this precondition is not yet given for most labor migrants in Germany. This holds especially true for Turkish migrants who are in the focus of the debate on "ethnic revival". They are the least successfully assimilated group in terms of their cognitive, structural, social, and identificational assimilation: They are less well integrated in the educational system and in the labor market than EU and Yugoslav migrants (Alba et al., 1994; Bender and Seifert, 2000; Granato and Kalter, 2001; Kalter and Granato, 2002; Kristen, 2003; Szydlik, 1996; Seifert, 1992; Seifert, 1991); they are less accepted socially and have fewer contacts with Germans (Haug, 2003; Mehrländer et al., 1996); and they experience discrimination more often (Böltken, 2000). Furthermore, they are considered to be culturally rather distinct from Germans due to the large share of Muslims in the Turkish origin population. The completion of the adaptation process and the absence of discrimination that have been described as a structural precondition for a renewed interest in identifying with one's ethnic roots is thus lacking in Germany.

Things look different in regard to the somewhat opposite argument that "ethnic revival" is a strategy often chosen by the most alienated and structurally least successfully assimilated immigrant groups. Given the marginal social-structural status especially of Turkish migrants within German society it seems plausible that there is a proneness to maintain their ethnic roots, to remain within a social context that values their homeland-specific resources, and to reject the identification with a country in which they feel rejected. In fact, classical, as well as contemporary accounts of assimilation have shown that identificational and social assimilation processes are partially dependent on migrants' structural assimilation. The latter provides incentives and opportunities for social interaction between majority and minority members that in turn further the feeling of belonging (Esser, 1980:231). Stating that a group lags behind on all – interrelated – dimensions of assimilation is, however, very different from stating an "ethnic revival" as a reaction to structural disadvantage and anomie. These concepts are more suitable to explain an ethnic retention than an "ethnic revival" since the mechanisms that would explain why and how migrants should give up their social and emotional ties to the country of

origin first and reaffirm them later on are not described. Besides, the argument has other logical flaws as well: Yinger warns, for instance, that conflicts and strains within an ethnic group must not be neglected when stressing their potential for warmth and solidarity (1994: 46).

Given the situation in Germany outlined above we assume that Turkish migrants' social, and identificational assimilation lags behind that of structurally more successfully assimilated groups such as migrants from the EU or the former Yugoslavia. But we do not expect to find any indications of an "ethnic revival". Before turning to our own empirical analyses we will now describe what exactly we understand by this phenomenon and how we intend to conceptualize and measure it.

Assessing "Ethnic Revival" in Germany: Concepts, Data, and Methodology

When assessing whether or not migrants' adaptation processes in Germany show any signs of discontinuity, break-off or even reversal we will tackle the conceptual and methodological shortcomings that have so far hampered attempts to answer this question. In detail this means that we will take the theoretically important and empirically relevant differentiation between the different dimensions of a possible "ethnic revival" into account. Not only Alba's analyses of the role of ethnicity among European-Americans have shown that ongoing ethnic identifications are not necessarily consequential for people's behavior and social ties (Alba, 1990). Schnell's analyses, too, have proven that ethnic identifications, ethnic cultural habits, and social ties to the ethnic minority are separate and rather independent dimensions of ethnicity (Schnell, 1990:50f). The societal and political implications of an "ethnic revival" depend heavily on the question of which dimensions – if any – of ethnicity are affected by this process. In order to keep our analytical framework simple, we follow Schnell's differentiation between Weber's perceptible differences in the *conduct of everyday life* on the one hand, and ethnic *classifications and identifications* on the other hand (ibid.:45).

In addition, we will differentiate between a possible slowdown or *decline in "assimilationist"* identifications and behavior, and an *increase in "ethnic"* identifications and behavior. As argued above, this is of crucial importance since an alienation from the hostland by no means implies an increasing identification with the country of origin but can result in marginalization as well.

We will look at migrants' adaptation processes in the field of their identificational, cognitive, and social assimilation⁴ by presenting *trend analyses for the last 15 years*⁵. We will present trend analyses separately for first- and second-generation migrants so that our analyses do not only give insight into the development of the indicators under consideration over time but also in the generational succession.

In our analyses, we will thus look at the development (increase, decrease, stagnation) of four different sets of indicators when assessing the notion of an “ethnic revival” (see Table 1). We differentiate between indicators for a decrease in hostland-related identifications and attitudes (e.g. a decrease in the share of migrants who identify themselves as Germans), indicators for a decrease in hostland-related habits and behavior (e.g. a decrease in the share of migrants who have German friends), indicators for an increase in identifications and attitudes related to the country of origin (e.g. an increase in the share of migrants who identify themselves as members of the homeland), and indicators for an increase in habits and behaviors related to the country of origin (e.g. an increase of the share of migrants who perform ethnic cultural habits). We could accept and confirm the existence of an ethnic revival when the analyses show that there has been an increase (over time or from the first to the second generation) in ethnic cultural identifications and/or habits at the expense of identifications with and ties to German society.

⁴ We use the term assimilation in Alba and Nee's sense “as the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic /racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it” (1997: 863).

⁵ In our differentiation of assimilation dimensions we follow Esser who presents a slightly different version of Gordon's (vgl. Gordon, 1964:71) canonical account in differentiating between cognitive assimilation (language, behavioral skills and competencies, knowledge of norms, gestures, and cultural habits, situational identification), identificative assimilation (intention to return to the hostland, intention to naturalize, feelings of ethnic belonging, retention of ethnic customs, political behavior), social assimilation (formal and informal interethnic contacts, friendships, intermarriage, segregation, participation in hostland institutions) and structural assimilation (income, occupational prestige, vertical mobility, positional placement, de-segregation) assimilation (Esser, 1980:221)

Table 1: about here

Our data are based on the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) conducted by the German Institute for Economy (DIW = Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaft) annually since 1984 (see SOEP Group, 2001). The SOEP encompasses several subsamples, one of which is a special foreigner's sample. To be included in this sample, interviewees had to live in a household with an immigrant head of household, and had to be at least 16 years old at the time of the survey. In addition, the head of household had to belong to the 'guestworker' population, who had migrated to Germany during the period of labor recruitment from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. For this reason, only those households having a Turkish, Spanish, Greek, "Yugoslav" or Italian head were interviewed. The foreigner's sample of the SOEP survey thus does not represent all foreigners in Germany. However, labor migrants comprise, in numerical terms, the largest nationalities in the immigrant population. Other foreigners are included in other samples of the SOEP.

We include all those foreigners of the SOEP in our analyses who belong to the foreigner's sample and who had at least in one wave the code of the nationalities mentioned above. People who changed their nationality due to naturalization are included in our analyses. Those few cases who changed their nationality to another than German nationality (e.g. from Turkish to Spanish) were excluded. Based on this, we differentiate between first- and second-generation migrants – second-generation migrants being those who were born in Germany or immigrated before the age of 6⁶ – and three nationality groups: Turks, migrants from former Yugoslavia, and EU migrants. A further differentiation by nationality is not possible due to small case numbers.

We will describe the indicators outlined above cross-sectionally, this means we measure the distribution for each year (1984 till 2001) the respective indicator was measured⁷. So it is not a

⁶ In those cases in which information on immigration age was lacking, people were either classified according to their country of school visit, or (if this information was lacking as well) were excluded from the analyses.

⁷ Some indicators are only measured every other year or even less frequently. We include each year an indicator was measured in our analyses (up till 2001). For several indicators, the wording of the questions and answering categories changes slightly over time (for details, see full questionnaires under <http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2001/soepinfo2001.html>).

longitudinal analysis but a trend-study based on the same persons. The composition of the groups under consideration is not the same for each year due to panel attrition and children of families in the foreigner's sample who reached the minimum age to be included in the survey⁸. Table 2 shows the years in which they joined the SOEP by generational status and nationality.

Table 2: about here

People who migrated to Germany since 1984 are not included in the analysis, unless they joined a household already in the foreigner's sample (e.g. due to marriage). In the time period under consideration, about 3.500 first-generation and about 1.000 second-generation migrants answered the questionnaire at least once.

Hostland- and Homeland-Related Attitudes and Habits of First- and Second-Generation Migrants in Germany: Evidence from the Mid-Eighties till Today

First we will examine migrants' identificational, cognitive, and social assimilation in Germany from the mid-eighties till today and then we will describe the changes in their identification with the country of origin and their ethnic-cultural habits in the time period under consideration.

Migrants' Identificational, Cognitive, and Social Assimilation in Germany from the Mid-Eighties till Today

As mentioned above, it has been explicitly and repeatedly stated that migrants' identification with Germany has decreased. As clearly as this statement has been formulated as clearly do trend analyses based on SOEP data disconfirm it (see Figures 1a – 1c).

⁸ Statistically adequate would be full-scale panel analysis. Due to panel attrition, missing data, and selective out-migration, an adequate statistical analysis of this data requires severe non-response adjustments. To be more precise, multiple imputations via chained equations (mice) seem to be the proper method of analysis (see for example for an introduction Schafer 1997, Buuren und Oudshoorn 1999, for associated software see <http://www.multipleimputation.com>). The technical descriptions of the required methodology demands separate publications. We will publish this soon in a more appropriate setting.

Figure 1a- 1c: about here

The percentage of migrants who consider themselves totally German – a rather conservative indicator of identificational assimilation – has never been as high as today, as long as one considers Turkish and EU migrants⁹. In 2001, about thirty percent of second-generation migrants with Turkish origin and forty percent of second-generation migrants from the EU state that they “feel totally German”. In both groups, this percentage is – respectively – twice to three times as high as for first-generation migrants. The graphs show increasing percentages in the time period under consideration, too – especially for second-generation Turkish origin migrants in the last decade. A slightly different development can be observed for the migrants from the former Yugoslavia. They feel “totally German” much more often than the other groups, but their identification with Germany experienced a decrease in the early nineties. This change might be explained by the war and a subsequent raise in ethnic identifications. With regard to migrants’ cognitive assimilation in Germany measured by language skills, the “good news” is that the differences between the generations are substantial for all groups¹⁰. Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents who claim to speak German “very well”.

Figure 2a-2c: about here

While the second generation knows German much better than the first generation, language skills overall stagnate – albeit on different levels – for the nationality groups under consideration. About 40% of second-generation Turks, about 65% of second-generation EU migrants, and about 80% of second-generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia claim to speak German very well. Second-generation migrants in our sample have similar language skills today than they had in the eighties and nineties. Thus, unlike their identification with Germany, these skills did not change a great deal over time. The crucial determinant of language skills seems to be generational status rather than duration of

⁹ Self-identification was measured with a five point scale from “I feel totally German ” to “I don’t feel at all German” (full questionnaires under <http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2001/soepinfo2001.html>).

¹⁰ German language skills were measured based on respondent’s self-assessment with a five-point scale from “very well” to “not at all”.

stay in Germany. Language skills of first-generation migrants stagnate altogether and are thus almost independent of respondents' duration of stay. An important finding is that this pattern of stagnation is not typical for Turkish migrants but is more or less the same for all three groups under consideration. This suggests that it is primarily due to the "general logic" of language acquisition, rather than an alleged interruption in the assimilation process of Turkish migrants caused by an increasing separation of the Turkish community. As expected, Turkish migrants' cognitive assimilation progresses substantially slower in terms of the improvement of language skills from the first to the second generation.

This does not hold true for migrants' social assimilation measured by the nationality of three close friends or relatives. However, this type of assimilation shows a similar pattern in terms of no substantial variation over time for all groups except second-generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia (see Figure 3)¹¹.

Figure 3a-3c: about here

The generational gap is rather large with regard to this indicator, especially for Turkish migrants. The percentage of those Turkish migrants who have a German person among their three important acquaintances is twice as big for second-generation Turks, than for first-generation Turks (about 60% and 30% respectively). The slight decrease after 1996 is not statistically significant. First-generation EU migrants are more likely to have German friends or relatives than first-generation Turks. This means that for EU migrants, the generational gap is smaller and ranges from about 55% for first-generation migrants to 75% for second-generation migrants. There is only one group that reports in fact fewer Germans as close friends or relatives today than a decade ago – albeit on a rather high level: Second generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia. 90% reported to have a close German friend or relative in 1988, this percentage declined to about 70% in 2001.

Another suggested indicator for an ethnicization process (see for instance Hoffmann-Novotny et al. 2001) is the development of migrants' intention to stay in the hostland permanently.

¹¹ Respondents were asked about the nationality of three friends, relatives, or other people they go out with or meet often.

Figure 4a-4c: about here

According to our data, almost all groups under consideration show an increasing intention to stay in Germany over time. This does not hold true for second-generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia whose intention to stay in Germany permanently decreased substantially from the early to the mid-nineties but increases again since then. This process parallels their temporarily decreasing identification with Germany in this period. In 2001, about 80% of all second-generation Turks, 70% of all second-generation migrants from former Yugoslavia, and 75% of all second-generation migrants from the EU intend to stay in Germany permanently. The figures for the first generation are about 50 to 60% for all groups.

To sum up: Second-generation migrants feel German more often, speak German better, have more German friends, and are more likely to intent to stay in Germany than first-generation migrants. Additionally, their self-identification as Germans increases over time, insofar as second-generation Turkish and EU migrants feel more German today than a decade ago. This does not hold true for second-generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia. However, the fact that this group experienced a decrease in identification with Germany in the 90s suggests that this development has more to do with the situation in the countries of origin than with the situation in Germany. Second-generation migrants from the former Yugoslavia are also an exception when it comes to migrants' intention to stay. For all groups, migrants' cognitive and social assimilation progresses in the generational succession, but shows little increase in time.

Migrants' Ethnic Identifications and Cultural Habits from the Mid-Eighties till Today

The trend analyses presented so far tell only part of the story since they do not give any information about migrants' homeland-oriented attitudes and behavior. In terms of these, we will now assess whether they decreased complementary to the described increase in migrants' assimilation in Germany and if so, whether they decreased from the first to the second generation, or over time, or both.

The percentage of migrants who feel exclusively as a member of their country of origin develops in fact almost complementary to the generational and temporal increase in the percentage of migrants' who feel totally German (see Figure 5):

Figure 5a-5c: about here

The percentage of second-generation Turks who “feel totally Turkish” dropped from about 40% in 1989 to about 10% in 2001. For EU migrants, the respective figures are about 25% to 15%. Second-generation migrants of these nationality groups identify with their country of origin substantially less often than first-generation migrants, though this gap seems to diminish over time. The graph for second-generation Yugoslavs shows less clearly a tendency, their identification having been very low in the mid-eighties and again today with a slight increase in between. This temporary increase in identifications with their countries of origin, that might have been caused by the war in former Yugoslavia, was obviously only experienced by second-generation migrants¹². The graph for the first generation resembles the steady decline that first and second-generation migrants from Turkey and the EU display.

As outlined above, ethnic attitudes/ identifications and ethnic habits/ behavior are two independent dimensions of ethnicity. The SOEP provides three indicators for ethnic cultural habits: cooking of ethnic dishes, listening to music of the country of origin, and reading newspapers of the country of origin¹³. Our trend analyses show the percentages of those migrants who read only newspapers from their country of origin, who always cook meals traditional to their country of origin, and who always listen to music from their country of origin (see Figure 6 to 8).

Figure 6a-6c about here

Figure 7a-7c about here

Figure 8a-8c about here

¹² Since the number of cases in this subgroup of second-generation migrants from former Yugoslavia is really small this increase may also be simply due to sampling error.

¹³ Cultural habits were measured with five point scales from “reading only newspapers from country of origin/ only cooking meals traditional to country of origin/ only listening to music from country of origin” to “reading only German newspapers/ never cooking traditional meals/ never listening to music from country of origin”.

Basically, the percentages of migrants from the former Yugoslavia and from EU countries who report on these points do not rise above 10%; only first-generation EU migrants come close to 20% in some years for cooking dishes and reading newspapers from the country of origin. With this exception, this holds true for all observation years, among first and second-generation migrants, and for all three indicators under consideration. The remaining fluctuations are rather marginal. Concerning first-generation Turkish migrants, the graphs show that between 20 and 30% of this group listen to Turkish music only and read exclusively Turkish newspapers, and between 40 and 50% cook only Turkish dishes. This last mentioned habit is the only one that is still performed by more than 10% of second-generation Turks.

Reading only Turkish newspapers is an indicator that might be considered to be the most important when it comes to assessing Turkish migrants' often stated interest in homeland issues. Interestingly, this indicator points clearly in a different direction as the statements listed above (e.g. the "widespread and intensive" reception of Turkish media) would suggest: A very small percentage of Turkish second-generation migrants read only Turkish newspapers (less than 3% in 2000) and the percentage of first-generation migrants who do so declined steadily between 1988 (34%) and 2000 (18%). Of all homeland-related indicators, listening exclusively to music of the country of origin is the only one that could be interpreted as indicating a slightly increasing "ethnic orientation" for second-generation Turkish migrants (from 3% in 1988 to 9% in 2000).

Our last indicator – attendance of church or religious services – is problematic as one could argue that it is only indirectly related to the salience of ethnicity in attitudes and behavior. Since the proponents of the "ethnic revival" thesis often refer to the allegedly increasing role of religion for Turkish migrants' identity we incorporate it in our analyses nonetheless.

Figure 9: about here

The trend shows an increasing secularization between the generations for all groups. Today, the percentages of those who report to attend church or religious events "rarely" or "never"¹⁴ range from about 60% to 80% (for Turks and Yugoslavs respectively with EU migrants lying in-between those

¹⁴ Attendance of church or religious events was measured with a four point scale from "every week" to "never".

groups) for first-generation migrants and from about 80% (Turks, EU migrants) to 90% (Yugoslavs) for second-generation migrants. In addition, an increasing secularization over time (about a 10% increase of those who never attend religious services between the mid-nineties till today) is observable for Turkish and Yugoslav second-generation migrants.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our empirical results disconfirm the above-outlined statements about an “ethnicization” process among labor migrants in Germany in almost all points. Albeit thorough longitudinal analysis is needed to finally settle these issues, several conclusions can be drawn already: As well known, Turkish migrants lag behind other groups in terms of their language skills. Even among the second generation, less than half of the respondents of Turkish origin have very good German language skills according to their self-assessment. With regard to their social assimilation, the second generation has kept up so that the huge nationality gap for the first generation diminished substantially for the second generation. There is no evidence for the thesis that interethnic relationships withered. While migrants’ cognitive and social assimilation stagnates in time, the number of those second-generation migrants who feel totally German increased – not only from the first to the second generation but also in time. Today, the differences between the groups under consideration are no longer substantial in terms of this indicator. The above mentioned peculiarity that today, migrants from the former Yugoslavia have fewer contacts with Germans and feel German less often than they used to needs closer inspection with regard to its causes and further development.

While the stagnation in all groups’ social and cognitive assimilation patterns in time may be considered as an ambivalent result, the findings are more straightforward when it comes to their *ethnic* identifications and habits. The results by no means suggest that Turkish migrants’ less-progressed structural assimilation is accompanied by a tendency to compensate their comparatively disadvantaged social status by revitalizing ethnic cultural habits and homeland-oriented attitudes. Turkish migrants neither want to return to their country of origin more often than the other groups, nor do they identify themselves as one of its members more often. Looking at the number of those who never visit religious services, second-generation Turks are as secular as EU migrants, and they follow homeland

issues by reading newspapers from their country of origin as infrequently as other second-generation migrants. They still listen to Turkish music and cook Turkish dishes a little more often than EU and migrants from the former Yugoslavia. This, however, may have to do with the fact that a distinct Turkish music and cooking style might exist more clearly for this group than for migrants from the EU or from the former Yugoslavia.

While not all assimilation related indicators change a great deal over time, all indicators show a substantial increase from the first to the second generation. The inclusion of homeland-related indicators in our analyses allows us to rebut the thesis of a growing ethnic self-confidence among second-generation labor migrants. In sum, the results confirm the predictions of assimilation theory rather than those of an “ethnic revival”. Given the factors known to trigger this phenomenon, this is not much of a surprise.

However, the scope of our article has its limits: The number of available indicators is restricted, we did not control for panel attrition, which can be expected to affect the less well assimilated migrants in particular since they are more likely to re-migrate, and our analysis is so far just descriptive in focus. We do not presume to have rejected the argument that a small subgroup of Turkish migrants whose structural assimilation has failed or who have even assimilated downwards (see Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:44ff) might have become more homeland-oriented or even more radical in their attitudes. This was neither the research question of this paper nor do our data give any information on these questions. Our analyses are the first step in analyzing identificational, social, and cognitive assimilation patterns in time and further analyses are needed to validate the picture that we began to sketch. They will mainly have to prove that the developments outlined here are not due to group composition effects, and to start looking into explanations for the causal relationship between the different dimensions of assimilation. So far, however, existing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence give little reason to doubt in contrast to the often-stated, “labor migrants” and their children are adapting to Germany – slowly in some areas, but certainly for the better.

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