Cumulative Causation, Market Transition, and Emigration from China*

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we report findings from a recent survey of international migration from China's Fujian province. We take advantage of the ethnosurvey approach as used in the Mexican Migration Project. Survey was done in migrant-sending communities in China as well as destination community of New York City. We derive hypotheses from two strands of recent studies in the international migration literature and the market transition debate. Our results are in general consistent with hypotheses derived from cumulative causation of migration. We also find that because of geographical location of China as compared to Mexico, there are some differences between China and Mexico in terms of particular migration patterns to the United States. With respect to market transition theory, we find political power continues to be an important factor in the order of social stratification in the coastal Fujian province.

Introduction

China has a long history of emigration. This legacy has left marks in major parts of the world, from Southeast Asia, Latin America, to North America (Poston et al., 1994). This long history of emigration came to a nearly standstill during the first three decades (from 1949 to roughly late 1970s) of the People's Republic. However, since China's transition to a market-oriented economy in the late 1970s, the historical legacy of emigration began to revive. First came the "going abroad fever" (*chuguo re*), mainly pursued by students and scholars from universities and research institutions. Then, individuals with relatives already abroad are eager to join their families, often through family reunification policies available from the immigrant-receiving countries. Perhaps the largest flow of emigrants from China is characterized by the third category, namely emigrants who left China through clandestine channels. The recent surge in emigration from China's Fujian province (see map 1), located in southeast corner of coastal regions, typifies this kind of emigration. Demographically speaking, this flow of migration is important because by the mid-1990s, Fujian province became the top 1 immigrant-sending province in China, overtaking China's well-known province of emigration Guangdong province by a large margin (Liang, 2001; Liang and Morooka, 2004).

This paper endeavors to examine emigration from China's Fujian province. Much of recent theoretical and empirical studies on international migration are based on the case of Mexico to the US migration (Fussell and Massey, 2004; Massey, 1987; and Massey et al., 1994). The recent rise of international migration from China provides an excellent opportunity to see whether some of the findings and arguments hold true for the case of China. There are reasons that the Chinese case may not duplicate exactly what we observed in the Mexican migration to the United States. China differs from Mexico in several ways. First, of course is the matter of

geography. Mexico is unique in terms of geographic location, sharing a long border with the United States. China, on the other hand, is far away from the United States, the quickest flight from China to the United States (east coast) takes more than 13 hours. This geographic distance is likely to have implications for patterns of migration, different mechanisms of migration networks, and remittance behavior. The second difference lies in the political institution of the two countries. While Mexico is a full-fledged market economy, China was for many years a socialist society. It was only in the late 1970s that China began to move toward a market-oriented economy. As a transitional society, China may present some patterns of migration that are not obvious in the case of Mexico.

In this paper, we use newly collected data from China's Fujian province to study international migration from that province to the United States. Our paper is informed and motivated by theoretical and empirical insights from recent literature on international migration (in particular the idea of cumulative causation) and the market transition debate. We begin by elaborating ideas from these two strands of thought and derive and refine relevant hypotheses. Discussion of the research design and method will then follow. We argue that our research contributes to both lines of research. Although results from this paper are largely consistent with the migration network literature, our paper calls attention to the importance of geographic differences across migrant-sending countries in generating different levels of migration network effects. Further, we argue that for migration theories to be more effective, forms and implications of political economy (i.e. market economy vs. transitional economy) should be taken into account. Our paper also engages the recent debate on market transition by examining how cadres behave and fare in the process of international migration.

Background

This paper draws on theoretical insights from two recent streams of literature: one is on international migration and the other on market transition debate. Below we summarize main ideas from each of them. In doing so, we do not intend to mechanically apply theoretical ideas to the Chinese case. Rather we use these perspectives as guidelines as we generate testable hypotheses to explain patterns of international migration.

Migration Networks and Cumulative Causation of Migration

The thesis of cumulative causation has recently been used to explain the perpetuation of Mexican migration to the United States. As Massey (1999) stated, "causation is cumulative in the sense that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely (p. 45)." Among the mechanisms that are identified are expansion of migration networks, distribution of income, distribution of land, organization of agriculture, culture, and regional distribution of human capital. A significant amount of research efforts have been devoted to demonstrating the role of expansion of network on the probability and perpetuation of migration. The idea of cumulative causation has been tested extensively by Massey and his colleagues over the past two decades or so (Fussell and Massey, 2004; Massey et al., 1994b, Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Polloni et al., 2001).

A central idea underlying many of the studies by Massey and his colleagues is the powerful role played by migration networks that link migrants in destinations and potential migrants in migrant-sending communities. The role of migration networks in the process of

migration is often manifested in the form of having a family member who is a migrant and/or having a friend from the same community who is a migrant. These networks reduce the costs of migration by providing aspiring migrants with information about migration process and about job availability and housing in destinations. According to Fussell and Massey (2004), "other things being equal, people who come from communities from which migration is prevalent are more likely to migrate than people who come from places from which migration is rare (P. 152)." What is powerful about this process is the tendency for migration to alter community structure in such ways that promote additional migration, thus leading to the logic of cumulative causation of migration.

We argue that the idea of cumulative causation of migration is very useful to explain the emigration from China's Fujian province. Two aspects of the cumulative causation argument are particularly relevant in the case of emigration from Fujian province. First is the importance of networks. The idea of networks is not a new concept in the Chinese context. Bian (1997), for example, used the networks (*guanxi*) approach to study job search to emphasize importance of strong ties (instead of weak ties) in job searches in China. Likewise, in a study of rural industrialization, Peng (2004) argues that kinship networks affect economic growth via enforcing informal institutions.

In both Bian and Peng's research, the network connection is among acquaintances, friends, and family members; in migration studies, we pay more attention to networks formed through the web of family members, friends, and people with shared community of origin (*tongxiang*). As a kind of social capital, this migration network has the feature of enforceable trust (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). This is important because international migration from Fujian to the United States is often orchestrated by a broker (smuggler) that involves some

degree of danger and uncertainty. Aside from the benefits of reducing cost and increasing benefits of migration, this migration network reinforces trust among players in this process.

The second aspect of cumulative causation theory closely related to the case of Fujian is the impact of migration on the migrant-sending communities. As Massey (1999) argues, "as migration grows in prevalence within a community or nation, it changes values and cultural perceptions in ways that increase the probability of future migration (p.46)." At the community level, over time, as information about jobs and life styles in destinations countries becomes more diffused, migration becomes a common household strategy for economic advancement. For young people, migration becomes a "rite of passage", to paraphrase Massey (1999). In Fujian, such changes at the community level are operated through three main mechanisms. One is the fancy houses built by migrant households. Visitors to these migrant-sending communities are often stunned by the luxury houses that built with remittances. Sometimes the houses are built for consumption, but more importantly these houses have a symbolic meaning that these migrants "have made it" abroad. The second mechanism is contribution to the welfare of the migrant-sending communities. The most popular way to contribute to the community is to donate money to establish a school, a cultural center, a senior citizen center, or to build roads. Often the names of theses donors are inscribed on a board along with the amount of money contributed. This significantly elevated the status of these migrant households in these communities. The third mechanism is the reconstruction of ancestral halls (*citang*). Households or clans who have reconstructed ancestral halls with elaborate Chinese calligraphy and paintings often earn high respect and prestige in the migrant-sending communities.

In sum, the literature on international migration would lead us to the following two straightforward hypotheses. One is that individuals with family members already abroad are

more likely to migrate than others. Second, individuals who are from communities with high level of migration prevalence are more likely to migrate than individuals who are from communities where migration is relatively rare. However, in light of the special circumstances involving emigration from Fujian, we need to make some modifications to these "standard" hypotheses. As we noted earlier, one major difference between China and Mexico in the context of migration to the United States is the geography, the distance from China to the U.S. is much longer than the case of Mexico. The implication is that cost will be much higher in the case of China than Mexico. Results from our survey suggest the highest amount paid by migrants is about $67,000 in the early 2000s. What this means is that once a household sends a migrant to the U.S., it would be very difficult to send another one immediately after, simply because the cost is going to be too high for most households. Until the household pays off the fee, the household will not be likely to send another one to the U.S. This suggests having a U.S. migrant from the household does not necessarily increase the chances of U.S. migration for another member immediately. But over time, the family migration network effect will show up.

Market Transition Debate and Emigration

Recent rise in international migration from China's Fujian province is clearly linked to China's transition to a market oriented economy since the late 1970s. Here we discuss some recent studies that examine how market transition changes the order of social stratification in China and elucidate its relevance for the study of international migration. In fact, Fujian province is especially relevant to the market transition debate because Victor Nee (1989) initiated the debate on the consequences of China's market transition based on a survey that he conducted in Fujian province in the mid 1980s. In a series of papers, Nee outlined a theory that

deals with formerly central planned economies that are now in the process of moving to a market-oriented economy (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996). Nee's theory has two central elements: 1) with the emergence of a market, central distributors will lose power and direct producers will have more discretion over the terms of exchanges of goods and services; (2) there are greater incentives for individual effort in market transactions than in socialist economies and a market will reward productivity and credentials instead of political loyalty. Nee has tested his ideas using data from rural Fujian by examining self-employment and entrepreneurship for individuals. There have been many studies testing Nee's theory in the context of urban China and results are inconclusive (Bian and Logan, 1996; Xie and Hunum, 1996; Zhou, 2000). Several recent studies focus on rural China (Guang and Zheng, 2005; Parish et al., 1995; Walder, 2002a; Walder 2002b). These studies in rural China examined whether positional power (as measured by rural cadre status) lost favor in the 1990s, as Nee's theory would imply. Walder's studies (2002a and 2002b) suggest rural cadre households continue to be advantaged in household income. In the context of internal migration in China, Guang and Zheng's research (2005) echoes the spirit from Walder's studies, that marketization does not take away the advantage of traditional power. In contract, using the case of rural China in early 1990s, Parish et al. (1995) found that the role of political power worked differently in different regions. Namely, while in less developed regions, political connections improve one's chance of obtaining non-farm employment, they do not matter in well-developed regions. They argue this is possible because of abundant supply of non-farm employment opportunities in well-developed regions.

In sum, studies in rural China point out the continuing importance of rural cadre advantage but less so in well developed regions. To the extent international migration often leads to socio-economic advancement for these immigrants, we will examine the role of cadre

status in the process of international migration. We explore this issue in two ways. One is to investigate the extent to which people with positional power (such as villager leaders/cadres) are likely to migrate internationally. Second we are interested in whether potential migrants from households with rural cadres will enjoy any advantage in the process of migration. Although international migration to the United States can be financially rewarding, it is not risk free. This is especially the case for undocumented migrants from Fujian. Some of the most notorious ill-fated trips have been widely reported by the mass media such as the 1993 Golden Venture trip and the tragic death of 58 migrants in a tomato truck in Dover of England in 2000 (Rosenthal, 2000). Any calculation of risks and benefits must be placed in the context of individual's position in the migrant-sending community. Officially the main role of village leaders is to implement the policies from the central government. Village cadres (such as village director (*cunzhang*) and party secretary (*shuji*) often enjoy some fixed amount of stipend in these Fujian migrant villages (Lu, 2002, p.173). More importantly, in these migrant-sending villages, village cadres are responsible for many important decisions. For example, when donations from abroad come to the village, village leaders are responsible for making sure the money is appropriately spent as the donors intended. There are other benefits as well. Our fieldwork in migration-sending villages inform us that village leaders are often paid handsome amount of money from people who plan to get married or from people whose family just lost love ones, to make sure the wedding ceremony or funeral proceedings run smoothly. Moreover, in these migrant villages, often migrants abroad require some documents (such as birth certificate, non-marital status certificate (*weihun zheng*)). Village leaders are often given some money or gift to facilitate the process of getting the required documents in a timely manner.

In light of these advantages bestowed to village leaders, we do not expect village cadres themselves are more eager to migrate internationally than others. However, individuals from households with village cadres are likely to enjoy advantages for international migration. Village cadres are often the first ones to know the information about any opportunities of going abroad. As the process of migration goes, it often involves many actors: the boss of smuggling organization (who rarely appears in local villages), the recruiters who go to villages to recruit potential migrants, and the potential migrants. In order to recruit migrants for a particular planned trip abroad, recruiters often need to get formal or informal permission from village leaders. This gives the village cadres a special advantage if it is perceived that the opportunity may be a good one for one of the household members of the village cadres. Moreover, because village cadres' role in providing crucial documents for going abroad (such as documents required for obtaing passports), recruiters have a lot of favor to ask from village cadres. Thus village cadres are well positioned to bargain with recruiters regarding fees for sending migrants abroad.[1] The above discussion leads to two additional hypotheses: (1) individuals from households with village cadres are more likely to migrate than others; (2) individuals from households with village cadres are likely to pay a lower fee than those from households with no village cadres.

The Case of Emigration from Fujian, China

Fujian province is located in the southeastern coast of China, across the Taiwan strait (see Map 1). The 2000 Chinese population census shows that Fujian had a population of 34 million (NBS, 2002). Fujian has a long legacy of emigration, especially to Southeast Asian countries historically. However, the recent wave of emigration did not start until the mid-1980s. We

[1] We are very grateful to Yu Xie for making the suggestion of examining smuggling fees for households with cadres.

focus on Fujian province for our empirical studies for several reasons. First, emigration from China's Fujian province has increased significantly and in fact it has become the top international migrant-sending province in China (Liang, 2001). Much of this emigration is clandestine in nature and is difficult to study through national surveys or census. The journeys of Fujian migrants also caught the attention of mass media across the globe. Some of the migration journeys ended in tragedy (such as the ill-fated Golden Venture trip in 1993 and the death of 58 migrants in Dover, England in 2000). As recent as 2005, Fujianese migrants were caught in the fight in Iraq and were taken as hostage by mistake and late released (Wong, 2005; World Journal, 2005). Media sensation is often no equivalent of systematic analysis; clearly more systematic social science analysis of causes and consequences of emigration from Fujian is needed.

The increase of emigration from Fujian province can easily be detected from the destination communities especially in New York City. The injection of new blood in traditional Chinatown has had a major political and economic impact on Chinatown in New York. In New York City alone, there are over 40 Fujianese-led immigrant organizations based in Chinatown. In some sense, to study Chinese immigrants in the United States these days, one cannot ignore the new immigrants from Fujian.

According to the research literature on international migration, much of the recent efforts were on Mexican migration to the United States. As Massey et al. (1994a) stated more than a decade ago "far too much research is centered on Mexico, which because of its unique relationship with the United States may be unrepresentative of broader patterns and trends…More attention needs to be devoted to other prominent sending countries, such as the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador, Korea, and China (p.739)." Since

then, there have been four books published on the study of emigration from Fujian. Based on in-depth interviews with 300 immigrants who were residing in New York City, Ko-lin Chin's study (1999) provided insights into the migration process, and main channels of clandestine immigration to the United States. Also focusing on New York City, Kwong's work (1997) pointed to the demand side of the story and carefully documented the working conditions of Fujianese immigrants in New York City. Peike et al's study (2004) gives us an important comparative perspective by looking at the case of Fujianese immigrants in Europe through the lens of globalization. Finally the work by Guest (2003) shows the importance of religion in the lives of many Fujianese immigrants. One of the common characteristics of these books is that they focus much more on the destination countries than migrant-sending communities. Another feature of these studies is that their data are not based on representative samples of migrant-sending communities, thus making it difficult to make generalizations concerning the patterns of international migration. Our study draws a representative sample from migrant-sending communities and the sample in China is matched by another sample of migrants in New York who are from theses migrant-sending communities. This design matches closely the design by Massey and Durand for their Mexican Migration Project. Thus our data are more appropriate for theory-testing in comparative analysis of international migration.

Data and Methods

This project is modeled on the successful experiences of Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) directed by Douglas Massey and Jorge Durand. We adopted the ethnosurvey approach used in the MMP and LAMP (Massey, 1987). From February to June 2002, we were engaged in designing three questionnaires to be used in

the ethnosurvey: household questionnaire used in China, household questionnaire used in the United States, and community level questionnaire for migrant-sending communities in China. We used the questionnaires for MMP and LAMP as a model and modified naturally the questionnaires to take into account the Chinese context. The household level questionnaire contains basic information on socio-demographic characteristics of each member of the household (including these who are abroad), basic information on internal and international migration history for all household members. Because of the importance of religion, as illustrated from the work of Guest (2003), we include information on religion for each person. For household heads and spouses, we gathered marriage history, fertility history, labor history, and consumption patterns. At the household level, we have information on remittances in the year of survey and cumulative remittances, business formation, land ownership and other property ownership, housing conditions and tenure status.

We made some modifications to the questionnaire from Mexican Migration Project. For example, unlike the case of Mexico, we also include question items on cadre status (ever been a cadre and year of acquiring that position) in order to test our hypothesis derived from the market transition theory. We also made another modification in gathering information on migration trip characteristics. Because undocumented migration is still relatively sensitive in migrant-sending communities in China, we decided to ask more details questions on the actual migration trip for the U.S. sample. Thus for U.S. sample, we ask about the date of travel/migration, duration of the trip, number and names of each country stayed on the way to the U.S., smuggling fees paid, knowledge of snakehead, and number of people on the trip. There is another reason for asking these detailed questions on trip characteristics for the U.S. sample. Because of the low rate of return migration, in the survey, more often than not, we interviewed household members who

remain in China (not the immigrants themselves). Household members usually know the basic information about their migrant members, but not detailed information about the migration trip itself. Thus we believe our strategy is likely to increase the quality of data on trip characteristics. Finally, our sampling strategy is somewhat different from the case of MMP. Because of low rate of return migration, we have increased the sample size of immigrants in the United States (more discussion on this later).

Our community (at the village level) questionnaire covers a wide spectrum of information: demographic background (population figures for major census years, immigration history), agriculture sown, industrial infrastructure, educational infrastructure, public services, financial infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, and medical infrastructure.

After some modifications, we finalized the questionnaires in early July 2002 . Within eastern Fujian province, we decided to survey three major regions: Changle City, Mawei district (a suburban district under jurisdiction of Fuzhou city), and Lianjiang county. All three regions send large number of migrants to the United States, New York City region in particular. For Changle city (with a population of 670,000), we selected four towns out of 17 towns. For Mawei district (with a population of 44,000), we selected two towns out of three. For Lianjiang county (with population of 610,000), we selected two towns out of 22 towns. With each selected town/township (a total of 8 towns), we interviewed about 100-200 households for interviews. In choosing these particular towns for our survey, we first interviewed some major Fujianese immigrant organizations in New York City.[2] The idea is to find out what towns Fujianese immigrants in New York came from. Our design is to maximize the possibility that we can find enough immigrants who are from these towns in Fujian province. This design ultimately

[2] It is usually the case that towns that send a lot of immigrants to the United States often establish their town based hometown association once the number of immigrants reach a certain level of threshold.

yielded a sample size of about 1300 households in eastern part of Fujian. Non-response rate was around 5-15%. The survey team conducted the survey during October 2002-March 2003. This sample in Fujian province is supplemented by a non-random sample of immigrants who are from these eight communities/towns. For each of the eight towns, we interviewed about 30-40 immigrants in NYC who are from one of these towns. Our sample size of immigrants in the destination communities is larger than what Massey and Durand have in their Mexican Migration Project. The main reason is that in the Chinese case, return migration is much more difficult than in the case of Mexico. In other words, our sample will contain a smaller number of actual immigrants if we follow exact sampling strategy as used by Massey and his collaborators. [3] The fieldwork in New York City was conducted in the months of June-August 2003. Following Massey (1987), the sample in New York City was drawn using a snow-ball sampling strategy.

To test our hypotheses specified in earlier sections, we created event history-type data. There are several advantages with the event history analysis method. One is that we can make clear causal inferences because timing order of events can be clearly specified. Second, time-varying covariates can be incorporated so that more precise information at different time points is used to make predictions about individual behavior. Third, event history method can handle censoring issue so that no information on individuals is wasted (Allison, 1984; 1995; Yamaguich, 1991).

The first set of models is to estimate the probability of making first international migration trip using event history analysis technique. To conduct event history analysis of international migration, for each household we randomly select one person who is 18 years old and above. For these selected individuals from all households, for each year since age 15, we

[3] For samples at destinations, Massey and his colleagues select about 10% of the corresponding community samples (Massey et al., 1994).

record migration events along with individual and household characteristics at that year. To test the cumulative causation theory, following Massy et al. (1994b), we also created a migration prevalence ratio variable. These ratios are calculated using every respondent's year of birth and the date of his or her first US trip. The denominator of the ratio is the number of people 15 years old or older alive in a given year, and the numerator is the number of such people who have ever been to the United States up to that year.

The second set of models is to estimate the trip cost (smuggling fees) among individuals who have made first migration trip to the United States. This information on trip cost was asked differently in the New York City region and China. In migrant-sending communities in China, undocumented migration and smuggling fees are still somewhat sensitive issues for people to talk about openly. To reduce the level of potential threat, we decided to use a set of categories rather than the actual amount of money paid. For respondents in New York City, since trip cost is not as sensitive as in China, we ask about the exact amount of cost for coming to the United States. For respondents in China, trip cost is classified into several categories: 1= less than 9,999 RMB, 2=10,000-19,999 RMB, 3=20,000-29,999 RMB, 4=30,000-39,999 RMB, 5=40,000-49,999 RMB, and 6=50,000 RMB+.[4] This classification scheme certainly loses some accuracy for the sake of high response rate in the immigrant-sending communities, but it still allows us to identify individuals who made undocumented trips, which is our major research interest.

To estimate the model for the impact of individual characteristics on the amount of fees paid, for each category of the trip cost, we take a middle point. For individuals who choose the last category, the variation can be enormous depending on which year individuals made their migration trips. Thus we substituted it with average trip cost reported by our respondents in New York City for the corresponding year.

[4] 1 US dollar roughly equals 8.2 Yuan (RMB) in 2004.

Descriptive Results

We now turn to discussion of the results. Map 2 shows the location of U.S. bound immigrant-sending communities, located in the eastern part of Fujian province. The map identifies three places: Fuzhou City, Changle city, and Lianjiang county. In fact Changle is a county-level city and both Changle and Lianjiang are under the jurisdiction of Fuzhou city. International migrants do not come from Fuzhou city itself, but rather from rural towns/counties that are under the jurisdiction of Fuzhou city. Once in the United States, immigrants from these rural towns/counties usually identify themselves as from Fuzhou . One important ethnic marker is the fact that all of them speak Fuzhou dialect.

Map 3 shows the per capita income by county in Fujian province in 2002. We should note international migrant-sending counties in our sample are primarily located in southeast part of Fujian province. Compared to other parts of Fujian, these migrant-sending counties are clearly above average. For example, the average net per capita income for the three major immigrant-sending counties/cities is around 4000-6900 Yuan, some of the highest in Fujian province. To put these numbers in perspective. In 2002, the per capita net income in Fujian province overall was 3538 yuan. For China as a whole, the corresponding statistic was 2475 yuan (NBS, 2003). Clearly, the message here is that immigrants from this part of Fujian province are not fleeing poverty.

Figure 1 depicts the trend of emigration over time as captured by our data. The new arrival of immigrants from Fujian can clearly be identified from the places of destinations such as New York City, but regorious analysis of this trend over time is lacking. In Figure 1, we counted number of people who left in each year from 1980 to 2002. It shows clearly that

emigration from Fujian started in the early 1980s right after the economic reform began. It accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It experienced a slight decline after the 1993 Golden Venture fiasco and increased again in late 1990s. It appears there was a drop in 2001 and 2002[5]. Similar to the trend of increasing emigration from Fujian, cost of migration trip has increased steadily as well, as revealed in Figure 2. In the early 1980s the cost of smuggling someone from Fujian to the United States was about $18,000. This is consistent with stories about "wan ba ger" (the $18,000 brother, if translated literately) (Cao, 2005; Chin, 1999). It follows the path of shooting up over the years as the smuggling process gets more sophisticated and demand for going abroad increases. The going price in the early 2000s was in the mid-$60,000.

In Table 1, we compare the immigrants with non-immigrants on major sociodemographic characteristics. The immigrant population shows a classic demographic profile: nearly three quarters of immigrants are in the age group of 20-40 years old and men are much more likely to be immigrants than women. There is some evidence that immigrants are better educated than non-immigrants. Among immigrants, nearly half of them finished junior high school, compared to 34% for non-immigrants.

Initiation of Migration

Our analysis of initiation of international migration is by following respondents year by year since age 15 to the date of first U.S. trip or survey date whichever comes first. Once an individual makes an international migration, the person years after this are eliminated. This procedure yields a total of 28,876 person-years lived by 1312 individuals.

[5] The drop in emigration may also be caused by the fact that some of our interviews were conducted in November 2002, so people who left in December 2002 were not reflected in our data.

Table 2 presents results from discrete time event-history analysis predicting first overseas trip. We estimated two models: one with only individual level and selected household characteristics, another model (Model B) with emigration prevalence ratio added. We focus on model B for interpretation. Consistent with other studies on international migration, men and younger people (especially people in the age group of 20-34 years old) are more likely to migrate internationally. The relationship between education and international migration is not linear, only individuals with junior and senior high school level of education are more likely to migrate than people with no formal education.

As discussed earlier, we measure the impact of network migration in three ways. At the individual level, one variable is to indicate if there was a family member who migrated before. Unlike many other studies, we also created a new variable to measure the number of years elapsed since the earliest emigrant family member migrated. At the village level, we follow Massey et al. (1994b) to measure the village emigration prevalence ratio, a measure of the extent of emigration in a particular year during an individual's life. Our results show that having a family member who migrated previously has a negative impact on individual's propensity to migrate a finding that contradicts most of the studies on international migration from Mexico to the United States. However, this finding must be placed in the Chinese context. The escalating smuggling fees makes it impossible for a family to send more than one person abroad in a short period of time. We also note the variable "number of years elapsed since the earliest family member migrated" has a positive sign. This suggests that it is not that migration networks with the family are not important, it just takes time for this effect to emerge. Very likely what this means is that once a migrant pays off the debt, he/she will be in a position to bring another member from the family to the migration process.

Consistent with Massey et al. (1994b), the community/village emigration prevalence ratio has a very strong and positive impact on migration. In fact, for all the variables in the model, this is by far the most important variable in predicting the probability of migration. As earlier work by Massey and others suggest, this migration network ties between earlier migrants who came from the same village and potential migrants in these communities provide important channel of information on potential migrant destinations and support for settlement at destination. We also suggest that in the case of emigrants from Fujian, it is often the case that earlier immigrants from the same village (*tongxiang or laoxiang*) loan the money to the newly arrived individuals. Then the newly arrived immigrants will pay their loan to the tongxian over time. Borrowing money from hometown people often has low interest or in some cases bears no interest, which is a much better alternative than shark loans. This interpretation is also corroborated by out in-depth interviews with immigrants in New York City. Mr. Lin, who is very active in immigrant community affairs and came to the United States from Changle in the early 1980s told us that he personally helped about 15-20 immigrants from Changle. Mr. Lin never worries about the possibility that these newly arrived immigrants do not pay back the money because these migrants often work for bosses who are from the same village or same county. Overall, migration networks have a major impact on future patterns of emigration from Fujian, but it is mainly through spreading information to the community and promoting migration of fellow villagers.

Concerning the impact of cadre status, we see that cadres are less likely to emigrate compared to non-cadres. Relating back to the market transition literature, this could mean that cadres in rural areas still hold a lot of power, even in this coastal province. The likely scenario is that cadres continue to enjoy advantages in rural areas and have fewer incentives to migrate. Our

fieldwork experience suggests that cadres are important players in village life. They make decisions that have impact on the life and well being of other villagers and some of them even have monthly salaries. Under these circumstances, they have fewer incentives to migrate. However, as we hypothesized, individuals from households with cadres are more likely to migrate. This is because village cadres are often the first to know about good opportunities for going aboard and are likely to pass along this information to their household members. In addition, as we will show later, individuals from households with cadres tend to enjoy better price on the cost of migration, which provides further incentives for migration.

To have a good appreciation of the trend of emigration over time, we generated predicted probability of emigration for individuals who are 20-24 years old. In doing so, we assume that individuals are rural origin, male and married, junior high school level of education, religious, no cadre in the household, and with a household member being a prior emigrant. As Figure 3 shows, the predicted probability was low (.01) in the 1980s, increased to about .06 in the 1990s, and peaked at about .10 in the 2000s. This again illustrates the idea that for many young men in these villages, international migration is the thing to do in the 2000s.

Analysis of Trip Costs

Migration has benefits and costs. Undocumented migration costs a lot more than documented migration. Neo-classical economics suggests a necessary condition for migration to occur is that its benefits are larger than the costs. One of the major differences between China and other countries such as Mexico is the cost of migration is much higher for potential immigrants from China than from Mexico. This in large part reflects the distance between China and the United States and consequently the difficulty of making international trips without legal

document. Thus we are interested in the determinants of trip cost. To do this, we focus on individuals who have made at least one trip to the United States, the results are summarized in Table 3. Here again, there is some support for the hypothesis that village cadres continue to be important actors in the village. Individuals from households with village cadres pay significantly lower fees for the migration trip. As in the case for the persistence of power for cadres in urban China, as reported by Bian and Logan (1996) and Walder (2002b), we too find the persistence of power for rural cadres in the process of international migration. In addition, the more years passed since the first migrant in the household, the cheaper the fees for the migration trip. This suggests that migration merchants (smugglers) may be willing to give some discount if a household already sent one migrant, underscoring the business nature of their operation.

Summary and Conclusion

Although emigration from China's Fujian province has drawn world wide attention in recent years (Rothenthal, 2000; Wong, 2005), systematic studies of this emigration are still lacking. This paper provides, to our knowledge, the first survey-based study of international migration from China's Fujian province. Several major findings are worth highlighting here. We begin with a discussion of broad patterns of migration. Clearly poverty is not the explanation for the rise of emigration from Fujian. As we show in this paper, Fujian province has particularly benefited from China's market transition, as reflected in per capita income growth. Likewise, within Fujian province, these communities/regions that have sent thousands of migrants abroad are also communities that enjoy relatively high level of income. Our survey data also confirm the general perception about the trend of emigration from Fujian province.

This trend of increase in emigration is also consistent with reports and observations from migrant destination communities such as New York City's Chinatown.

Theoretically, this paper is motivated by two strands of research literature: one on cumulative causation from international migration and the other on market transition debate. Our research has provided fresh evidence and contribution to each of them. The international migration literature in the past two decades has provided strong evidence on the utility of cumulative causation to understand the perpetuation of interatnaionl migration, especially in the case of Mexican migration to the United States. Like in the case of Mexico, our study suggests the importance of migration networks and its feedback effect on migrant-sending communities. We argue that in the Chinese case, the power of migration networks is not only reflected in feeding information about potential migrant destination and providing assistance in housing and jobs, but perhaps more importantly in "financing" the trip by loaning money to new migrants from the same villages or towns. This step is crucial because of the expensive nature of this migration experience. This financial guarantee from "tongxiang" immigrants in the migrant destination locations makes migration much more accessible to a broad spectrum of individuals, and ultimately increases the probability of future migration from these villages. Within migrant households, the migration networks operate somewhat differently in the Chinese context than the Mexico case. Because of the large sum of money demanded for international migration with a far away destination, it is usually not possible to send another household member within short period of time. However, once the debt for the first migrant in the household is paid off, it is likely that another member of the household will migrate. This is a new household strategy not commonly found in the case of Mexican migration to the United States (Massey, 1990).

It is well-known that China has been experiencing a major transformation from a planned economy to market economy. This transformation has captivated the attention of many sociological studies in recent years. The core of this line of research has been to identify the winners and losers in this transition to a market economy (Nee, 1989). We join in this debate by providing new evidence from the early 2000s on the role of village cadres in the international migration in Fujian province. Our work also moves the current literature on market transition debate into a new direction by focusing on non-income variables (i.e. migration) (Zhou, 2000). In a far-changing society such as China, benefits and rewards go far beyond income alone.

Consistent with earlier studies by Bian and Logan (1996) and Walder (2002a and 2002b), our results show that households with village cadres seem to enjoy advantages in this process of international migration. This advantage works in two ways. One is that individuals from households with village cadres are more likely to make international migration. Further, migrants from households with cadres pay a reduced fee than migrants from households with no village cadres. This reflects the continued advantage for village cadres in getting access to crucial information about migration opportunities and to bargain for the price of migration trip using their privileged position in exchange for other favors that smugglers/recruiters may seek. This endured advantage for village cadres in Fujian province, a province that has experienced remarkable marketization, deserves some further thought. As we mentioned earlier, Nee's survey (which his 1989 seminar paper was based on) in 1985 was also done in Fujian province. Fujian province is the vanguard of China's economic reform. If Nee's hypothesis is correct, we should be most likely to observe this declined significance of cadre status in Fujian province. The fact that more than 17 years after Nee's original survey in Fujian, cadre advantage continues

in one of the most marketized provinces in China suggests at least that rural Fujian has not changed in such a way as Nee predicted.

Finally, as we noted earlier emigration from China's Fujian province has been on the rise since the later 1980s and continued to be so in the 1990s and early 2000s. It is ironic this was also a time when the governments of the United States and China stepped out policies to stop this flow of mostly undocumented migration. In the United States, billions of dollars have been spent on high-tech equipment to monitor human movement and on border control. On the Chinese side, the government has imposed huge fines for individuals who are caught in undocumented border crossing or for migrants who were deported from the United States. The Chinese government has especially increased the penalty for smugglers. Despite the tough measures from both governments, not only did the emigration continue to increase, it has also expanded to other countries especially to countries such as Italy, England, and France (Li, 1999; Pieke et al., 2004). This is another case to illustrate the idea that migration, once started, will become a self-feeding process and keep its own momentum. This self-feeding process will be further facilitated by China's entry into the world economy. As Massey and Espinosa (1997) argued, this process "create new links of transportation, telecommunication, and interpersonal acquaintance, connections that are necessary for the efficient movement of goods, information, and capital but also encourage and promote the movement of people-students, business executives, tourists, and ultimately, undocumented workers (p. 992)." We look forward to study other aspects of this international migration in the age of globalization.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics about the Fujian Survey Sample

Variables		Emigrant (%)	Non-Emigrant (%)
Age			
15-19		1.76	4.24
20-24		14.09	10.36
25-29		21.72	10.61
30-34		20.55	10.86
35-39		17.42	11.86
40-44		7.24	8.49
45-49		8.41	12.23
50-54		3.52	11.11
55-59		2.15	6.37
60 +		3.13	13.86
Sex			
Male		66.34	38.58
Female		33.66	61.42
Marital status			
Ever married		74.61	83.88
Never married		25.39	16.13
Education			
No formal education		3.16	12.78
Elementary school		24.51	35.59
Junior high school		48.42	34.71
Senior high school		19.17	10.90
Vocational high school		2.17	2.63
College or above		2.57	3.38
Religious			
Yes		54.08	53.70
No		45.92	46.30
Cadre			
Yes		1.58	8.54
No		98.42	91.46
Any other household member is a cadre			
Yes		22.70	19.60
No		77.30	80.40
Any other household member is a prior emigrant			
Yes		50.88	84.27
No		49.12	15.73
Place of Origin			
Rural		92.95	94.76
Urban		7.05	5.24
Total	**1312**	**511**	**801**

Table 2. Coefficients of Discreet-Time Event-History Analysis Predicting First Overseas Trip

	Model A		Model B	
Independent Variables	***B***	**SE**	***B***	**SE**
Age				
15-19	1.803 **	0.451	1.764 **	0.449
20-24	2.284 **	0.431	2.269 **	0.429
25-29	2.014 **	0.415	1.979 **	0.413
30-34	1.816 **	0.417	1.771 **	0.415
35-39	1.490 **	0.425	1.465 **	0.423
40-44	1.210 **	0.437	1.228 **	0.436
45-49	-0.949	0.698	-0.955	0.697
50-54	0.340	0.527	0.322	0.526
55-59	-0.328	0.695	-0.303	0.695
60+ (reference)	----	----	----	----
Male	1.106 **	0.101	1.125 **	0.102
Ever married	0.073	0.168	0.049	0.168
Education				
No formal education (reference)	----	----	----	----
Elementary school	0.305	0.277	0.328	0.276
Junior high school	0.600 *	0.279	0.647 *	0.278
Senior high school	0.792 **	0.292	0.931 **	0.291
Vocational high school	0.081	0.429	0.309	0.428
College or above	-0.009	0.399	0.085	0.401
Religious	0.082	0.095	0.107	0.096
Cadre	-1.062 **	0.393	-1.167 **	0.393
Cadre in the family	0.293 *	0.117	0.327 **	0.117
Prior emigrant in the family	-0.103	0.125	-0.260 *	0.129
Number of years elapsed since the earliest emigrant family member left	0.045 **	0.012	0.029 *	0.012
Village emigration-prevalence ratio			3.989 **	0.614
Rural area	-0.150	0.187	-0.152	0.188
Year				
Before 1985 (reference)	----	----	----	----
1985	1.723 **	0.482	1.647 **	0.482
1986	0.995	0.632	0.911	0.632
1987	1.269 *	0.562	1.164 *	0.562
1988	1.908 **	0.437	1.746 **	0.438
1989	2.673 **	0.354	2.448 **	0.355
1990	2.778 **	0.345	2.464 **	0.349
1991	2.525 **	0.365	2.137 **	0.371
1992	3.127 **	0.323	2.634 **	0.333

1993	3.461	**	0.309	2.876	**	0.323
1994	3.305	**	0.318	2.637	**	0.336
1995	3.283	**	0.320	2.539	**	0.343
1996	3.649	**	0.305	2.810	**	0.335
1997	3.667	**	0.306	2.736	**	0.342
1998	3.555	**	0.314	2.541	**	0.355
1999	3.871	**	0.305	2.759	**	0.355
2000	3.863	**	0.310	2.646	**	0.368
2001	3.991	**	0.313	2.700	**	0.376
2002	3.395	**	0.345	2.065	**	0.406
2003	0.898		0.761	-0.413		0.790
Intercept	-9.515	**	0.564	-9.588	**	0.566
-2 Log Likelihood	4045.601			4002.004		
Chi-Square	993.769	**		1037.367	**	
df	41			42		
Number of Person-Years	28876			28876		

Note: ** P < 0.01 and * P < 0.05.

Table 3. Coefficients of OLS Predicting Logged Smuggling Fee

	OLS		
Independent Variables	***B***		**SE**
Age (reference. 60+)			
1 if 15-19	1.608	*	0.641
1 if 20-24	1.838	**	0.621
1 if 25-29	1.968	**	0.589
1 if 30-34	1.834	**	0.599
1 if 35-39	2.100	**	0.603
1 if 40-44	1.491	*	0.630
1 if 45-49	-0.268		0.940
1 if 50-54	0.943		0.744
1 if 55-59	-0.799		0.958
1 if male	0.287		0.149
1 if ever married	-0.533	*	0.226
Education (reference. No formal education)			
1 if elementary school	0.116		0.382
1 if junior high school	0.299		0.381
1 if senior high school	-0.145		0.396
1 if vocational high school	0.436		0.568
1 if college or above	-0.688		0.558
1 if a cadre	-0.461		0.585
1 if any other family member was a cadre	-0.317	*	0.152
1 if there was a prior emigrant in the family	-0.061		0.178
Number of years elapsed since the earliest emigrant family member left	-0.055	**	0.020
Village emigration-prevalence ratio	-0.488		0.856
1 if rural area	-0.266		0.250
Year (reference. 1980)			
1 if 1981	0.973		1.565
1 if 1982	-0.147		1.542
1 if 1984	0.270		1.249
1 if 1985	0.298		0.989
1 if 1986	0.097		1.546
1 if 1987	0.096		1.126
1 if 1988	-0.286		0.912
1 if 1989	-0.472		0.848
1 if 1990	-0.294		0.847
1 if 1991	-0.172		0.863
1 if 1992	-0.343		0.827
1 if 1993	-0.242		0.818
1 if 1994	-0.504		0.828

1 if 1995	-0.154		0.828
1 if 1996	-0.806		0.831
1 if 1997	0.009		0.838
1 if 1998	0.598		0.847
1 if 1999	0.975		0.848
1 if 2000	1.399		0.851
1 if 2001	1.000		0.852
1 if 2002	0.921		0.872
1 if 2003	0.114		1.255
Intercept	7.542	**	1.049
Root MSE	1.308		
R-Square	0.343		
Adj R-Square	0.275		
Number of Observations	470		

Note: ** P < 0.01 and * P < 0.05.

Figure 1. Trend of Emigration by Year



Figure 2. Emigration Fees by Year



Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of First Overseas Trip by Year (For Age Group 20-24 Only)



Map 1. Location of Fujian Province in China



Map 2. Major Immigrant-sending Regions in Fujian Province, China



Map 3. Rural Per Capita Net Income
Fujian Province, 2002