Clique Networks and the "Clique Effect" Among Undocumented Migrants from Mexico to the United States

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ABSTRACT

Recent work has shown that processes of cumulative causation, which derive from the accumulation of social capital within specific places, occurs not only in small villages but in medium-sized urban communities among both documented and undocumented migrants (Fussell and Massey 2004); and rather strong social capital effects have also been documented in urban settings among undocumented Mexican migrants (Flores et al. 2004). These findings are puzzling given that sociological theory suggests that social solidarity weakens with urbanization and industrialization (Durkheim [1933] 1984, Wirth 1938). Drawing upon qualitative and quantitative information I developed in the course of my fieldwork, I offer evidence in support of my theoretical argument that urban-based migrant networks are weak and mostly effective for helping people get to the United States. Once in the country, however, these networks prove fragile and urban migrants therefore gravitate to already- established rural-based networks through a process I call the "clique effect." The clique effect helps to understand how, why, and under what circumstances cumulative causation may occur among migrants from urban places of origin.

It is now well understood that in addition to economic forces that provoke international migration, there are other, more social forces such as migrant networks that facilitate and accelerate international population flows (Massey et al 1987). Indeed, the concept of "social capital" has been developed and applied to represent the benefits, both tangible and intangible, that are acquired by migrants from social connections to facilitate their emigration and settlement at points of destination (Massey et al 1998). Despite evidence in support of these concepts and theories, little research has explored how the forces they describe really operate.

How is it, for example, that people from small rural villages, who have low levels of education, minimal job skills, and lack visas are able to migrate and acquire work in the United States? Likewise, how can urban migrants, also having low levels of education and without prior contacts in the United States, migrate north of the border, settle, and be successful? Recent work has shown that processes of cumulative causation, which derive from the accumulation of

social capital within specific places, occurs not only in small villages but in medium-sized urban communities among both documented and undocumented migrants (Fussell and Massey 2004); and rather strong social capital effects have also been documented in urban settings among undocumented Mexican migrants (Flores et al. 2004). These findings are puzzling given that sociological theory suggests that social solidarity weakens with urbanization and industrialization (Durkheim [1933] 1984, Wirth 1938). Indeed, it is often assumed that urban community migrant networks do not function as well as their rural counterparts in producing cumulative causation.

In this paper I present a theoretical argument for how cumulative causation can and does occur in urban settings. In the case of migration from Mexico to the United States, urban dwellers utilize local ties they encounter within their Mexican neighborhoods to facilitate migration to the United States, but once they arrive in the north these ties prove to be very fragile and are not perpetuated. As this source of social capital disintegrates, urban-origin migrants attempt to diversify their networks by connecting to stronger, rural-based social networks that they encounter at places of work and residence. These "clique networks" consist of interpersonal connections that are perpetuated through relations of solidarity and enforceable trust grounded in rural communities of origin (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Urban migrants, once they learn about these powerful migrant-supporting networks through informal contacts in the United States, incorporate into them through a process that I call the "clique effect."

In the economic realm, clique networks are generally considered to be disadvantageous for workers, since the information they provide about jobs and opportunities tends to be redundant and inefficient (Granovetter 1982). In this paper, however, I argue that strong, closed networks are more effective at producing social capital for undocumented migrants. The dense,

redundant structure of clique networks plays a major role in creating social solidarity and offers an efficient means for the cultivation and sharing of social capital, thus facilitating instrumental actions by undocumented migrants. In order to provide empirical support for this argument, I analyze quantitative and ethnographic data I collected in four communities in the state of Guanajuato, Mexico and in the United States.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The term "clique" refers to an exclusive, isolated group of three or more individuals who share specific characteristics and beliefs that render them homogeneous and cohesive. This cohesiveness stems from the mutual enforcement of shared norms and the constant surveillance and monitoring of behavior by group members. Examples of clique networks include the members of a small rural community, those in a youth street corner gang, a soccer club, a religious congregation, a union hall, or specific neighborhood in the United States.

The concept of the clique network arises from sociological theories that focus on the cohesion experienced by members of a closed-boundary community who enforce norms among themselves and engage in strong relations of mutual support. Drawing on the work of Granovetter (1985) and others, Coleman (1988:S107) refers to the concept of "closure" and argues that "even in the new institutional economics, there is a failure to recognize the importance of concrete personal relations and networks of relations-what he calls 'embeddedness' – in generating trust, in establishing expectations, and in creating and enforcing norms." Coleman then uses the concept of 'embeddedness' to emphasize the importance of network closure in generating social capital. In his words, "[c]losure of social structure is important not only for the existence of effective norms but also for another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the proliferation of obligations and

expectations. Defection from an obligation is a form of imposing a negative externality on another" (Coleman 1988: S107). He then describes how, in the case of an open structure, such obligations cannot develop.

In essence, Coleman (1988) adapts to the current era Durkheim's (1933 [1984]) older concept of "mechanical solidarity." In *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim described how members of pre-agricultural societies developed a cohesion (which he called *collective conscience*) and moral sentiments based on likeness and similarity within small groups. Those who transgressed the norms of the group were subject to punishment from other group members. Sociologists such as Gans (1962) observed this phenomenon within "urban villages," where common ethnicity, class and culture among Italian immigrants in a Boston slum caused them to think of themselves as a distinct "peer-group society" wherein all were dependent on one other for survival and validation. Other researchers have also found similar relations of social support among migrants recently arrived in urban settings (Lomnitz 1977; Hernandez-Leon 2001; Flores et al 2004).

Undocumented Mexicans typically rely on social networks to cross the border illegally, settle, find work, and generally prosper in the United States (Espinosa and Massey, 1997). Undocumented migrants typically lack access to the human capital conducive to success in the U.S. labor market, having low levels of education, agricultural working skills, and a limited knowledge of English. Strict enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border and this lack of human capital would seem to render it very difficult to migrate and advance in the United States, especially in the absence of legal documents. How is it, then, that undocumented migrants do cross the border illegally in large numbers, unobtrusively settle, find jobs, and begin to improve their welfare in the United States?

The answer is that they take advantage of the social capital accessible through clique networks that are perpetuated through relations of solidarity. My prior research (Flores, 1999) in two rural villages in Guanajuato, Mexico and similar studies completed by others (Massey et al. 1987; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Wilson 1998; Zahniser 1999), reveal that migrant networks allow people to acquire the information and resources they need to cross the border, settle, and find a job. Resources provided by members of a migrant network include the money to travel to the border, information about how to hire a coyote (a border smuggler), funds to pay the coyote's crossing fee, food and lodging upon arrival, transportation and help looking for a job, and money and clothes to get by while looking for a job.

The dense structure of clique networks is perhaps not the only mechanism facilitating the production of social capital. Another mechanism that operates in the course of international migration process is captured by the term *paisano* (which refers to shared origins in a common community). Massey et al. (1987) argue that *paisanaje* only becomes relevant when two migrants encounter each other in the United States. While still living at their place of origin, the term *paisano* has no meaning. It does not matter that the come from the same community unless they know or are related to one another. Once in the United States, the fact that they identify themselves as *paisanos*---people from the same community---is sufficient reason for them to become supportive of one other.

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) refer to the concept of "enforceable trust" in their theoretical discussion of immigration. Their main argument is that, given the daunting challenges and common barriers that all immigrants share, when *paisanos* encounter one another in the United States they tend to sympathize with and support each other, even if they have never met. In the course of living and working together in the United States, moreover, migrants tend

also to develop a set of common norms and expectations that are maintained through social surveillance and sanctions within the migrant community. In this way, parallel mechanisms of social solidarity among migrants from both rural and urban areas, but for different reasons and in different ways.

Generalizing across all these theories, I argue that solidarity among migrants tends to increase strongly in the course of the migratory career. Undocumented migration to the United States is an emotional, life-changing event that necessarily carries risks to life and well-being and inevitably involves estrangement from family and friends, not to mention potentially great material rewards. While crossing the border surreptitiously, undocumented migrants are exposed to robbery and assault, abandonment inside locked trailers, being left without oxygen inside sealed containers, drowning in rivers, and, among women, the possibility of rape. Thousands of undocumented immigrants have died in the past decade while attempting an undocumented border crossing, and the rate of death and injury has risen markedly with the steady militarization of the border that began in 1993 (Massey et al 2002).

Once migrants run the gauntlet at the border and get into the United States, they would not be able to survive without social support, and they obtain this support from networks. Undocumented migrants typically arrive with little more than the clothes on their back and desperately need to find a place to stay and a job to pay back their coyote costs. Lacking documents to work legally in the United States and without any knowledge of English or experience in the U.S. labor market, they find themselves truly strangers in a foreign country where everything is new to them. Although Granovetter (1973), in his classic paper on the "strength of weak ties," argued that weak network ties were more efficient for finding a job, he nonetheless later pointed out (Granovetter 1982:113) weak ties are not always optimal and that

there are "circumstances under which different types of ties are of instrumental use to individuals" and that at times those linked by strong ties "have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available. I believe that these two facts point the way to understanding when strong ties play their unique role."

Strong ties are especially useful when a job seeker faces a high degree of uncertainty and is in great need of employment and Granovetter (1982) notes that poor people, especially, tend to make heavy use of strong ties to secure work and other resources for survival. I argue that undocumented migrants, like the poor generally, rely heavily on trusted sources of information. Given the inherent uncertainty and risk involved in undocumented migration, closed networks and strong ties offer a more valuable resource to migrants than diffuse networks and weak ties. The clique thus constitutes a specific network structure that yields effective social capital for undocumented migration. Among rural origin migrants, in particular, *paisanaje* and its mechanisms of enforceable trust increase social solidarity in powerful ways, yielding an ample supply of social capital for success in American society.

Migrant networks reproduce themselves through processes of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957; Massey et al 1994; Massey and Zenteno, 1999). Once someone from a community has migrated, other community members gain access to a valuable source of social capital that did not exist before---a social tie to someone with knowledge and resources about how to cross the border, arrive at a point of destination, and find a job. Those who are socially connected to a U.S. migrant thus find that the costs and risks of undocumented migration have declined significantly, greatly increasing the odds that they leave for *el norte*. Thus, the more people from a community that have been to the United States, the greater the access to network to facilitate additional migration and the more people leave, generating still more social capital in

a cumulative fashion. The self-feeding effects of social capital accumulation are reinforced by changes in cultural expectations that also favor migration to provide yet another means by which migration perpetuates itself (Kandel and Massey, 2002).

The nature of the solidarity extended to people who are able to tap into clique networks is illustrated by the case of Martin, a respondent from a mid-sized town in Mexico who migrated to Indiana and arrived with next to nothing:

"When I got here I was surprised because a guy (*un vato*) who lived in this house and who I'd never met before told me, let's go to Wal-Mart. When we got there he told me, get a cart; then when we got to the pants section he said, 'what is your size?' I said, I don't know--32 in Mexico, here I don't know. He looked at me closely and grabbed a pair of pants. Then he asked me, 'what size underwear do you wear? Then he asked me about socks and he also asked me if I needed a jacket; and he even got me a jacket (*Y hasta una chamarrita me compró*). That impressed me a lot and I felt very good about it. I did the same thing for others who arrived later on. I took them to Wal-Mart like they did to me when I arrived. I did not return the favor directly, but I returned it by helping others like I was once helped."

Martin's experience exemplifies the way that social capital is perpetuated as members of a clique network support new arrivals and don't expect anything back in return, at least directly.

In my interviews I found evidence of many kinds of help provided to newly arriving migrants: money for traveling to the border and living until a successful crossing; information about how to find a reliable *coyote* (this information is crucial and must come from a trustworthy source); assistance in meeting *coyote* fees (which range from \$300 to \$2000 and are always payable in U.S. dollars); food and lodging upon arrival; money for clothes and transportation at the new location; help in finding a job; guidance about obtaining false documents; how to interact with U.S. public schools; and where to go to for medical treatment.

Urban-origin migrants generally have a better sense of how to get along in urban places of destination and also greater access to tourist visas, enabling them to cross "legally" and then overstay rather than risking life and limb crossing clandestinely in deserted terrain. Despite

these general advantages over rural migrants, however, those originating in urban areas have less access to specific information and resources necessary to survive and prosper within U.S. destination areas, for these come from the strong social ties and high level of solidarity that characterize rural-based networks.

QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE CLIQUE EFFECT

Clique networks are composed of very close social ties. When they arrive in urban settings, migrants rely on both weak and strong ties, but the functionality of the two differs. The main argument of the "clique effect" is that a clique network composed of strong, resilient ties serves as a powerful magnet to undocumented migrants outside the network who are looking for ways to improve their situation in the United States. Urban origin migrants, who generally lack access to strong ties within the United States, and whose own, more fragile social networks often disintegrate before they are firmly established, find it to be very much in their interests to seek out and join stronger rural-based cliques. By befriending rural origin migrants, who are typically enmeshed in dense webs of close social ties rooted in small Mexican villages, they gain access to relations of social support that would be almost impossible for them to replicate on their own.

The question then becomes why the clique network accepts new members from the outside, as organizational research generally suggests that cohesive cliques are not particularly open to outsiders (see Tichy 1973). Among undocumented migrants, however, common experiences and origins---summed up in the concept of *paisanaje*---enable them to accept new members into the group as long as they conform to ongoing mechanisms of enforceable trust, thus yielding the powerful "clique effect." Migrants from well-integrated rural areas feel compassion for fellow Mexican migrants, even those from urban areas, because they know they are experiencing the same hardships and trials. People from small rural communities typically

settle in the same destination U.S. neighborhoods, usually as neighbors but also sharing apartments in order to pay less rent. As neighbors, rural origin migrants find it easy to cooperate in organizing transportation to work, taking turns watching children and bringing them to school, and going shopping together.

Urban-origin migrants living in the same neighborhoods with rural-origin migrants quickly become aware of these dense relations and the social supports they offer, and they cultivate relationships with their rural-origin neighbors as a way of entering into the clique and accessing the social capital it provides. In the next few paragraphs I document the operation of the "clique effect" using ethnographic data from four communities in the state of Guanajuato, Mexico---two small villages, a town, and a working class neighborhood of a large, metropolitan-rank city.

Across the four locations, I used ethnoseruvey methods to interview a total of 560 households, to which I added a snowball sample of 56 out-migrant households currently living in north of the border in the states of Illinois, Indiana, Texas, and California (i.e. comprising 10% of the Mexican base sample). While in the field administering the quantitative ethnosurveys, I also engaged in extensive ethnographic data collection, conversing with key informants in openended interviews, taking notes based on field observations, and interacting with subjects as a participant-observer.

I assume that migrants originating in the two rural villages automatically belong to clique networks by virtue of growing up within small, closed communities (see Flores 2000).

Urban dwellers are attracted to these clique networks because they increase the odds of successful migration and settlement. My ethnographic research revealed that even those born in a Mexican city, at some point in their migratory careers, are likely to meet someone from a rural

village, putting them into a position to tap into the rural person's contacts to migrate to the U.S. Luis, who migrated from a medium-sized town to Indiana, exemplifies this scenario:

I was able to get the help to migrate from the family of a friend who used to work with me in Mexico. His family is from a rancho in Jalisco. He told me all about who to contact at the border so I could get a coyote. Also when I arrived I stayed with his cousin who lives in this house. The next day after I arrived I was already working.

The clique effect also plays out north of the border. Consider the case of Jose, who migrated directly from a Mexican city to the U.S. using a tourist visa, which he then violated by taking a job in California. Although he could achieve initial entry to the United States without much difficulty, navigating American society was more difficult as his urban-based contacts proved to be unreliable and insecure. At work, however, he met someone who belonged to a rural clique. He quickly noticed the social benefits of clique membership and through friendship with workmates was able to enter the rural-origin network on his own, eventually becoming an accepted member of the village's out-migrant community. In his own words:

"When I arrived in the U.S., I stayed first with a friend from León; after one week, his wife got tired of me being there sleeping on the sofa in their living room. She told me that I had to leave. I didn't know what to do. At work, I told my friend Alfredo and he invited me to come and live at his house. He said, 'come to my house and we will accommodate ourselves' (vente a la casa y ahí nos acomodamos). He is from a rural village in Guanajuato Mexico and he lives with other paisanos from the same village. I have been living with them for the last five years. I am very glad I met them."

Likewise, another migrant from urban Guanajuato who was interviewed in Texas reported a very similar experience:

"When my husband and I arrived, we stayed with my brother in law. His wife was very mean though. She only wanted to have me as a maid (*sirvienta*). When I cooked, my sister in law used to tell me, 'don't tell my husband that you were the one who cooked.' My husband did not notice because he came too late from work. She pretended that she needed to use the room where we were staying in for something else and we had to sleep in the living room. My son is the one who suffered the most. So they had these men, who came to play pool and I had to be there sitting down with my son on the arms, till three or four in the morning without being able to lay down on the floor. The worst part was when I wanted to look for a job, she (the sister in law) told me that I was not going to find anything because I did not

know any English. It was not until my husband met a friend from his job and we moved in with him. He is from a rancho in Guanajuato and his wife helped me to find a job. She also took care of my son for me while I worked." After a while, we were able to rent our own place, but we stayed here, in this neighborhood where all the people from that rancho live. "

In both of these scenarios we see how urban ties, even those that originally seemed quite strong, tended to become weak and fragile in the U.S. and broke at an early stage of the migration process. Urban-origin migrants then found themselves forced to locate social support from other sources. In both cases, they turned to rural-based clique networks and through an intermediary were accepted as members and able to access social capital benefits on their own.

The next case of the "clique effect" pertains to a migrant named Juan, again born in a city located in Guanajuato. Juan's case is distinctive in that he was able link to a workplace-based clique network not in the United States, but within his urban community of origin; and through it he gained access to social capital that enabled him to migrate northward successfully and then integrate within members of that clique who lived in a common branch community in California:

"We worked driving a taxi together for the same taxi stand (*sitio*). We all used to hang around together. One of my taxi driver friends helped me to migrate. He let me borrow the money for the coyote and when I arrived I stayed at his house. After one week, he also found me a job. After that, I helped another taxi driver to come in the same way I was helped."

This scenario is unusual only in that it constitutes a clique network formed within an urban community of origin. In most instances, acquaintances made in urban settings provide little in the way of social capital, but in this case a tight-knit group of taxi drivers working from the same stand were enmeshed in a dense web of interpersonal connections and mutual obligation that yielded mechanisms of enforceable trust similar to those characteristic of rural areas, enabling a mechanism of cumulative causation to take hold and perpetuate network migration by Juan and others, despite their urban origins.

QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE CLIQUE EFFECT

Using the ethnosurvey data, I also looked at quantitative survey data for evidence of the "clique effect." The ethnosurvey instrument was applied to household heads or the oldest child with migrant experience in the United States. As part of a special module on social capital administered to U.S. migrants, I developed a name generator to identify those contacts that had helped them to migrate and compiled information about the contact's characteristics and the frequency of interaction. Here I focus on responses illustrative of the "clique effect," although several other interesting things will be pointed out in future work.

The maximum number of lifetime contacts that respondents reported to have helped them in migrating to the United States was five. Most of the help was provided during the course of the first trip (79% among migrants from the town and 86% from the city). Some 122 migrants (56%) from the town reported at least one contact using the name generator, and among those from the city 82 (41%) did so. Because some respondents reported multiple people helping them, the total number of contacts was 160 among migrants from the town and 117 among those from the city. In both settings, 90% of the migrants were undocumented at the time they received assistance.

The order in which the respondent provided the name of the contact provides additional evidence of the "clique effect." For each contact listed on the name generator, I asked whether the person was raised in a village, town, or city. Table 1 shows the percentage of first- and second-named contacts by the origin of both the respondent and the contact. Among migrants from the town, 14% of first-named contacts were from a rural village, compared with 21% of second-named contacts. Among migrants from the city, some 9% of first contacts and 17% of second contacts were from a rural village. In both communities, therefore, the frequency of rural origins rises from first to second contact, suggesting that the latter are made later in the

migratory process. If we assume that contacts from rural villages are de facto members of a clique network, then these data suggest that both rural and urban origin migrants are attracted preferentially to clique networks after arrival.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 2 shows the relational composition of people who were named as first and second contacts by origin of the respondent. As can be seen, among migrants from the town 67% of the first contacts named were family members, compared with only 45% of second contacts. Among migrants from the city, the percentage of contacts who were family members remained at around 50% in both cases. Among family members, the most frequent sources of help were: brothers or sisters (19 % of all contacts made by town-origin migrants and 14 % of all those made by migrants from the city); aunts, uncles, nieces, or nephews (18% among migrants from both origins); and friends (21% among migrants from the town and 32% from the city). Among migrants from both town and city, around 3% of all contacts were relationships from work. Interestingly, however, among city-origin migrants more than 6% of first contacts were from work, suggesting the possibility that the clique network began at the place of origin.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Table 3.3 shows the relative closeness of the relationship between migrants and their contacts before and after help was provided, breaking patterns down by whether the contact was from a rural village or a small town. As can be seen, if the contact was from a rural village and provided help to someone in the town, the percentage of contacts that were very close increased from 38% before assistance to 54% afterward. The same pattern is displayed among migrants originating in cities, where if the contact was from a village the frequency of very close ties

14

¹ This was the first relationship with the contact mentioned by the respondent. Some respondents indicated up to three possible different relationships with the same contact (multiplex ties).

increased from 63% before assistance to 81% afterward. These data once again suggest that the migrants who receive help in the United States are invited to join clique networks and participate in relations of solidarity with others, thus strengthening ties between newcomers and long-time clique members. Consistent with my ethnographic data, Table 3 also reveals a decrease in the frequency of close relationships before and after assistance when both the migrant and the contact are from the city. Indeed, the share of very close relationships drops from 54% before assistance to 46% afterward, confirming the fragility of ties in urban-based networks.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Finally, Table 4 shows the types of help provided by the contacts to migrants from different kinds of origin communities. As suggested by the "clique effect" argument, most of the help provided to city origin migrants by contacts from rural villages is for settlement. Of those migrants from the city who reported contacts with rural villagers, 56% said they received help getting settled alone and 19% said they were assisted in settling and finding a job. Thus, three quarters of city-origin migrants who received assistance from rural origin contacts in the United States did so only after arriving, not during the process of migration itself. In contrast, the assistance they received from fellow city-origin migrants was focused more on the process of migration---72% of the assistance involved help with the trip itself, either alone or in combination with assistance in settling and finding work. Likewise, rural origin migrants tapping into rural origin networks receive considerable help making the trip, with 77% reporting assistance to migrate either alone or in combination with help for settlement and employment. Survey evidence is thus consistent with ethnographic fieldwork in suggesting that migrants use local contacts from communities of origin to get to the United States, and then turn to strong clique networks to settle in and find work. Whereas rural origin migrants rely on local networks

for all services, those of city origin must shift from urban-origin to village-origin networks, diversifying their networks in order to gain access to the social capital necessary for advancing within the United States.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued and shown using both qualitative and quantitative data that urban-origin migrants limited social capital, mostly drawn from family members and friends at the place of origin that deteriorates rapidly in the United States. As a result, city-origin migrants are typically able to use their social networks to get to the United States, but not to advance their interests after arrival. Their networks, even though they contain both strong and weak ties, tend to be frail because they are not reinforced by norms of mutual support and enforceable trust that characterize the networks emanating from rural villages, thereby yield greater social solidarity and higher levels of social capital. This rural-based clique networks constitute an important resource toward which urban-origin migrants gravitate within places of destination in the United States.

The relative weakness and fragility of urban-based networks means they cannot easily perpetuate themselves over time in cumulative fashion---unless the migrant originates in an urban niche yielding solidarity relations more characteristic of rural settings, such as urban taxi drivers who belong to the same union shop and congregate around the same taxi stand to interact and converse on an ongoing basis. In most cases, however, urban-based networks cannot perpetuate themselves over time and tend to disintegrate within a short time of arrival in the United States.

The only practical way that processes of cumulative causation can occur among cityorigin migrants is if they diversify their networks after arrival by integrating within rural-origin
networks, a strategy I call the clique effect. Thus urban-origin migrants draw first upon the
social capital in their local networks of support (mostly composed of family members) to get to
the United States, but after arrival they quickly discover that these ties do not function very
effectively to get them settled and employed. As a result, they turn increasingly for assistance to
village-based networks by making connections to other, rural-origin migrants they meet at work
and in their neighborhoods. They seek out migrants who already belong to an established clique
network, people who in most cases live in U.S. branches of Mexican rural villages, thereby
yielding the "clique effect." The "clique effect" offers a means by which socioeconomic
advancement can take place among migrants from urban places of origin.

In this chapter I have sought to show that network structure is important in understanding the quantity and quality of the social capital exchanged among migrants, especially those without documents. Among undocumented migrants from Mexico, either urban or rural, the exchange of social capital through clique networks is most effective because they consist of homogeneous individuals connected by strong ties that generate strong relations of social solidarity and informal social control. Ties that are not part of clique networks are not as effective as those within them in generating the social capital essential for successful undocumented migration. Clique networks can develop in both urban and rural settings, but conditions within small villages are normally conducive to strong solidarity relations while those in large cities are not. As a result, urban-based networks tend not to perpetuate themselves, and the cumulative perpetuation of solidarity relations is a necessary condition for migrant networks to persist in

time and o	continue to offe	er support to m	nigrants se	eking to a	dvance thei	r status and	interests	in the
United Sta	ates.							

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Table 1 Percentage of first and second contacts named on name generator from each type of place of origin							
Origin of Respondent							
Town City							
	1st	2nd	1st	2nd			
Origin of Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact			
Rural village	13.89	20.69	9.23	16.67			
Town	78.70	75.86	13.85	20.83			
City	7.41	3.45	76.92	62.50			
n	108	29	65	24			

Table 2	Percentages of times relationship was named first and second
	in name generator by respondent's place of origin

			Second			
	First Named		Named		All Contacts	
	Town	City	Town	City	Town	City
Relatives						
Husband or Wife	5.50	3.08	0.00	0.00	3.75	1.71
Mother or Father	5.50	1.54	12.12	0.00	6.88	1.71
Brother or Sister	21.10	13.85	9.09	15.38	18.75	13.68
Son or Daughter	1.83	0.00	3.03	3.85	2.50	0.85
Uncle/Aunt/Nephew /Niece	18.35	20.00	12.12	23.08	17.50	18.80
Other Blood Relative	3.67	3.08	3.03	11.54	3.13	5.13
In-Law	11.01	9.23	6.06	0.00	8.75	8.55
Any Relative	66.97	50.77	45.45	53.85	61.25	50.43
Other Social Relations						
Paisano	3.67	1.54	9.09	7.69	5.00	4.27
Friend from Work	3.67	6.15	0.00	0.00	2.50	3.42
Neighbor	1.83	0.00	9.09	0.00	3.13	0.00
Friend	21.10	33.85	18.18	26.92	21.25	32.48
Godfather or Godmother	0.00	0.00	3.03	0.00	1.25	0.00
Acquaintance	0.00	4.62	6.06	3.85	1.25	4.27
Other	2.75	3.08	9.09	7.69	4.38	5.13
n	109	65	33	26	160	117

Table 3. Percentages of closeness by place of origin of the contact before and after the help

	If Contact	is from	If Contact is		
	a Rural Vi	llage	from a Town		
Town	Before	After	Before	After	
Very close	38.46	53.85	57.26	68.38	
Medium	34.62	34.62	40.17	29.06	
No relationship	26.92	11.54	2.56	2.56	
n	26	26	117	117	
	If Contact	is from	If contact is		
	a Rural Village		from a City		
City	Before	After	Before	After	
Very close	62.5	81.25	54.32	45.68	
Medium	18.75	6.25	34.57	45.68	
No relationship	18.75	12.5	11.11	8.64	
n	16	16	81	81	

Table 4	Percentages of types of help to migrate by
	Place of origin of contact and respondent

	Rural	Rural		
Contact from:	Village	Village	Town	City
Respondent from:	Town	City	Town	City
Helped to:				
Migrate Only	23.08	0.0	11.97	17.28
Get Settled Only	7.69	56.25	4.27	13.58
Find Job Only	3.85	6.25	1.71	2.47
Migrate and Find Job	3.85	0.0	10.26	4.94
Migrate and Get Settled	11.54	6.25	25.64	23.46
Get Settled and Find Job	11.54	18.75	6.84	12.35
Migrate, Settle, and Find Job	38.46	12.5	39.32	25.93
n	26	16	117	81