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Diversity of Family Structure in Europe

- Selected characteristics of partnerships, childhood, parenting, and economic well-being across Europe around the millennium[1]

1. Introduction

The plurality of the demographic processes of European societies, the simultaneous presence of converging, parallel and diverging processes and the incompletion of the process of change in demographic behaviour all render impossible any attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the change of family structure or to track down the forces that are active behind it. For this we would need to have precise knowledge of the emergence and dissolution of partner relationships, on the willingness to have children and the nature of child roles, on the timing of these events in the individual life cycle and the statistical frequency of various types of life cycle as well as their association with different strata. If we are also interested in finding out how far people living in a similar family structure (e.g. those living in a marriage bringing up two children) are in a similar position, we need to know the status of family members in terms of economic activity (pl. Kuijsten, 1996; Saraceno et al.; 2004), the division of tasks within the family, the welfare services the family have access to in monetary form or in kind, and the material well-being of the families.

Despite these numerous obstacles, often almost impossible to overcome, comparative surveys are seeking to identify what is common and what is different in the societies observed, and what sort of factors explain or may explain the similarities and differences. As demography deals with universal phenomena, and has amassed excellent data well suited for comparison, there are numerous comparative surveys available to us. (Below I shall list but a few examples from our sphere of interest, without aiming at a complete inventory: Andersson, 2004; Billari, Wilson, 2001; Billari, et al, 2001; Colerman, 2004; Corijn, Klijzing, ed., 2001; Fahey, Spéder, 2004; Heuveline, Timberlake, 2003; Heuveline et al., 2003; Kiernan, 2002a; 2002b; Kohler et al., 2002; Lesthaeghe, Moors, 2000; Lesthaeghe, Surkyn, 2004; Liefbroer, et.al., 1996, Macura et al., 2000; Mills, 2004; Monnier, Rychtarikova, 1992; NiBhrolchain,

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1993; Philpov, Dorbritz, 2004; Pinelli et al., 2002; Tomka, 2002.) It would be impossible to survey all of these or to provide an inventory of research questions and findings which confirm, contradict or complement each other or are simply in connection with different sub-areas. Still, a work on European family structure must undertake this task, particularly if it has no access to data which would ground new research questions and/or methodology that would enable it to present its new results.[2]

In processing the literature and to clearly outline our thematic field we needed to select continually among the questions, deciding which research findings to present and at what length, which field we have complementary data for and results to present, or in terms of the fields where there is a chance of presenting a new association, or raising a new research question. And although we must do our best, an enterprise of this sort can never be complete or entirely balanced.

No matter how much we emphasise the need for selection and the inevitably resulting unevenness, we cannot evade asking the basic question. This question is: how far do the demographic characteristics of European societies overlap or differ, and are we to expect convergence or divergence in terms of the tendencies? Adjusting to our narrower topic: in terms of family structure do European societies point towards a definite European model or are we (going to be) witnessing the survival or even growth of differences? In other words: do the same forces motivate changes in family structure over the whole of Europe or are there factors related to certain groups of countries which lead to the emergence of diverging models? Even if we must remain sketchy, this question must be touched upon in the introduction to a work on Europe.[3]

In interpreting European demographic changes, the most widely used theoretical frame is the concept of the second demographic transition (SDT),[4] an essential element of which is the transformation of family structure. To use a strongly simplifying paraphrase, the line of thought behind this model can be summed up by saying that Europe is defined by very similar forces (similarities in ideational shifts, changes in social and economic structure, institutional changes), therefore what we need to expect is increasing convergence. (van de Kaa, 1987;

[2] We hope that elements of the 'Generations and Gender Programme' will allow for a paper of this kind at the next conference.

[3] This is at the centre of the debate on the second demographic transition. In this respect the latest contributions have been: Bernhard, 2004; Coleman, 2004; Lesthaeghe, Surkyn, 2004, Micheli, 2004; van de Kaa, 2004. Excellent brief surveys were also provided by Billari and Wilson on this question, focussing on the problem of reaching adulthood (Billari, Wilson, 2001). Tomka examines development in Hungary in the context of European tendencies (Tomka, 2001).

[4] As SDT theory is widely known, I shall not recapitulate it here.

Lesthaeghe, 1996; Lesthaeghe, Surkyn, 2004).[5] Naturally, all other concepts which presuppose the strengthening of globalisation and the mutual interdependence of countries also point, in the first approach, toward homogeneity and convergence. This is how we have to think of the crisis hypothesis, too, which offers an alternative explanation to SDT in understanding the changes in the demographic processes of ex-socialist countries (Macura et al., 2000), and in which the roles of economic recession and unemployment are emphasised, also presupposing the similarity of ongoing processes, at least for the sub-region in question.

Those who expect *the persistence of differences* work on the foundation of the developmental theory of *path dependency* (Zapf, 1996, Mills, Blossfeld, 2005), and point out the probable conservation of the structural elements of the institutional system (welfare regimes) and the long-term influence of the cultural legacy (Mayer, 2001; Reher, 1998). Talking about this question in general and explicit terms, Mayer points out that the inspiring and the hindering effects which flow from global and universal forces such as the market and the media are both mediated by the welfare institutional system. It is also this system that structures the resources on the basis of which individual countries give responses to the universal challenges in ways which are characteristic of the various groups of countries (Mayer, 2001). Billari, on the other hand, points out that the differences in the way in which background factors influence demographic behaviour can be retraced to the differences in their welfare systems (Billari, 2005).

Last of all, let us mention the notions and debates that surround ever newer waves of *individualisation* (Beck, 1986; Beck, Beck-Gernsheim, 1990; Friedrich, 1998), elements of which also form a part of the concept of SDT. The phenomenon of individualisation also plays a significant part in the argumentation of those who assume the persistence of differences (Kuijsten, 1996), however, at the same time, it gives rise to a new consideration. According to these ideas, the loosening of economic pressures in the strict sense and the weakening of communal control mechanisms leads to the disappearance of class boundaries and related prescriptions, which in turn generates new waves of individualisation. This eventually leads to the possibility of giving up ruling forms of living arrangements or manifests in giving up these forms. The question remains, however, whether a new stable reproductive model is going to develop, or whether a new, dominant order of family formation will be seen to develop. Researchers of individualisation do not give an

[5]It would be unfair not to note that Lesthaeghe and Moors established 'destandardisation' and 'growing diversity' in the field of household foundation (Lesthaeghe, Moors, 2000: 153 pp).

unequivocal answer, even though the 'chosen biography' [„Bastelbiographie'] model they worked out suggests that there is not, and there will not be a new ruling model.

Those who assume an inhomogeneity of values (Hakim, 2003), presume that several models can develop in one society at the same time. Mayer's theory leads to the consequence that different welfare regimes lead to different life course models. According to Kuijsten differences can be interpreted as the indicators of different structural conditions, as indicators of different models of family life.[6] According to the ideas of Billari and Wilson a new "script of life" has already developed in Scandinavian countries regarding the stage of leaving home, but in countries characterised by inhomogeneity we certainly cannot talk of a unified model. Perhaps eventually we shall be compelled to agree with Fürstenberg who, writing about the future of the family, said '…the flux in marriage may be partly produced by economic strains or, perhaps, by gender discord resulting from changing expectations of man and woman…', (Fürstenberg, 2003:348), which would mean that the persistence of lasting differences within one country cannot be ruled out.

Naturally, in this paper we cannot presume to concentrate on the question of convergence or divergence, as we have neither the necessary sequential data, nor the courage to take sides in the ongoing debate. At any rate we had to indicate that we kept the dilemma in mind when we compared the demographic behaviour of European societies in one respect or the other. We sought to find out how wide-spread we could call one or other constitutive element of family structures or how far they were limited to just one group of countries. In presenting groups of countries it was particularly important to us to see what characterised ex-socialist countries. The nuptuality model of these countries was very similar directly preceding 1990 (Monnier, Rychtarikova, 1992; NiBhrolchain, 1993). At the same time, the transition of these societies was followed by some radical demographic changes. It is a question whether in the present they form a unified group of countries in terms of family structure.

The criterion of homogeneity or inhomogeneity is significant not only in the comparison between countries: it is also interesting to see whether there are differences within the society of each country in terms of demographic behaviour and family structure. Examining family structure is related at a number of points to the understanding of social structure (level of education, regional position, religion), and of the labour market (its flexibility, family employment profiles), of welfare regimes (education, cash and in-kind

[6] „… one is inclined to interpret them as indicators for different structural conditions, if not constraints, and different models of development of family life in Europe'; op cit.138.

family policies) which we again cannot give detailed attention to here. However, in the last section of our study we shall indicate that various family types in different groups of countries are characterised by different level of well-being and poverty status, which can be seen as a kind of output of the above mentioned characteristics of social and institutional structure.

Tendencies of changes in family structure, as we have indicated, will be presented in a selective fashion. We have singled out two age groups (young people starting a family, the elderly) and we survey some important characteristics of partner relationship with regard to them. As regards family roles, we selected a concrete aspect of experiences gained as a child or parent in the family (areas such as being brought up in a one-parent and a two-parent family, or how long parents share a home with their children). Finally, we shall discuss a few aspects of the connection between demographic processes and material well-being.

Compared to other social sciences, demography has been at an advantage so far in terms of comparison between countries, as it could rely on exact and full-ranging vital statistics (and every ten years those of the census). Today, this advantage has dwindled, particularly in terms of partner relationships and the form of cohabitation, and it is no accident that after the success of the FFS programme today the Generation and Gender Programme is also aiming at exploring and describing the dynamics and structural conditions of partner relationships. Our study was not yet able to rely on these new data. The present survey was based mainly on the comparative analysis that we carried out, but, naturally, we also made use of the European census around 2000, some cross-sectional surveys (EB and CC barometers, PPA2 survey, EQLS survey) as well as vital statistics.[7]

2. Emergence and dissolution of partner relationships

Over the past decade practically all elements of demographic behaviour have been transformed, but the most profound changes were certainly those affecting the formation of partner relationships. After the golden age, the (almost) dominance of marriage, we have arrived at an era where being single often appears as a consciously chosen life form, along with 'living apart together,' (LAT) which seeks a balance between independence and partnership, and the most significant change was brought along by the appearance of non-marital cohabitation which works both as a prelude to marriage and as an alternative to marriage. Today it appears that both on the level of intentions (as an ideal way of life) and on

[7] On the data used here, see the Appendix.

the level of practice, the dominance shifts between non-marital cohabitation and marriage are the most significant of all the recent changes.

2.1 Cohabitation and marriage

The dominant majority (75-90%) of young women (between 20 and 34 years of age) considered marriage as preferred living arrangement according to the results of the PPA2 surveys. Cohabitation was seen mostly as a phase of the path leading up to marriage. In terms of the European countries examined, we find a significant difference in the proportion of people who think of cohabitation as an inevitable part of the path leading to marriage: this ratio is lower is Poland, Italy and Slovenia, and very high in Germany and Holland. The rate of those who think of cohabitation as an alternative ideal living arrangement is also significant: in Germany it is close to one fifth of women (17.7%), in Holland and Estonia one tenth and in other countries it is lower than this. Naturally, we know that there is a wide gap between wishes and everyday practice but if we reckon with the growing role of values and ideas, we cannot consider it indifferent to examine them.

Table 1
Distribution of what women aged 20 to 34 consider as preferred living arrangement (2001–2003)

Country	*Single*	*LAT*	*Cohabitation leading to marriage*	*Cohabitation*	*Marriage*	*Other*
Poland	2.9	1.2	14.3	2.2	77.6	1.8
Slovenia	5.8	4.1	23.9	6.6	57.2	2.4
Italy	0.8	2.4	32.8	5.0	58.9	0.1
Czech Republic	5.8	4.5	40.3	7.3	40.9	1.2
Finland	3.3	4.0	42.6	6.8	40.8	2.5
Estonia	0.0	6.0	47.2	10.2	36.6	0.0
Germany	11.3	8.7	50.3	17.7	9.2	2.8
Holland	0.4	7.1	70.0	10.0	9.6	2.9

Source: Own calculations, PPA2.

Because of the appearance of new forms of partner relationship, and particularly the rapid spread of cohabitation, still different from country to country, we can use the annually available vital statistics at a limited manner for examining the tendencies of change in the emergence of partner relationships. Vital statistics (eg. crude marriage rate, TFMR) give clear indications of the drop in the willingness to marry and the postponement of first marriage (cf.

Billari, 2005; Lesthaeghe, Moors, 2000).[8] Research methods, which filter out the effect of postponement (Philipov, Dorbritz 2003:77), however, came to the conclusion that the overall number of marriages is higher than would follow from the annual vital statistical data. At the same time, differences in the rate, length and permanence of cohabitations from country to country make it very difficult to interpret the data of vital statistics. Therefore we need to rely on data collections such as censuses, and surveys including household structure, in order to gain an image of the relationships and family structures of young people.

In Europe roughly two thirds of women between 25 and 34 live in a partner relationship, thus it is with regard to them that we can examine the ratio of cohabitation and marriage.[9] We notice some difference from country to country, but altogether the most noticeable feature is similarity: in the year 2000, between 60 and 70% of women lived in a partner relationship of some sort in 16 of the 27 countries examined;[10] in six countries the rate was somewhat higher (Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Lithuania, Holland, Hungary) and in four countries (Slovenia, Ireland, Italy and Latvia) the rate was somewhat lower (Table M1).

Within all partner relationships, the rate of those living in cohabitation was very widely scattered in the European countries examined (Table 2). In some countries the rate of these people is lower than one twentieth part of all partner relationships. The rate is lowest in Slovakia (3%) and Poland (4%)[11], in four other countries, on the other hand, the rate is at or above 40%. Predictably, the highest rate of cohabitation was found in the Northern European countries and in France. Despite the high degree of variance it can also be lain down that the rate of married people was higher than of those living in cohabitation in all the European countries we examined.[12] It is interesting to examine the former state socialist countries from close up. They do not form a homogeneous block: although in a European comparison most of the ex-socialist countries show a *low* level of cohabitation, Estonia (34,5%) is clearly

[8] Since basic data of vital statistics (crude marriage rate, TFMR, MAFM, TDR, non-marital births, etc.) are widely known, we forego including them here. Data and their interpretations are found annually in 'Recent Demographic Trends in Europe,' a publication of the European Council. At the same time we shall frequently refer to these trends at the relevant points.

[9] We chose this age group following Kiernan's example. We were unable to use narrower age gropus because of the small n used in the surveys. In countries where we were unable to used census data, we carried out the analysis for ages 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 also.

[10] Data and divisions from our calculations which contain information which is not directly relevant to the main stream of the argument but is interesting are to be found in the appendix.

[11] Ratios are even lower than this at Cyprus and Malta, but in these small, recently joined countries CC Barometer had a very low n.

[12] In Sweden the rate of married people would definitely be lower than that of people cohabiting.

among countries that show a very high rate, while Slovenia (21,1%) and Hungary (16,7%) can be said to have medium high rates[13]

Table 2
Rate of people living in a partner relationship as a percent of all men/women, and the rate of people living in cohabitation within all partner relationships, ages between 25 and 34, years 2000-2002

Country	*Women*			*Men*		
	Marriage	*Cohabitation*	*Cohabitation within all partner relationships*	*Marriage*	*Cohabitation*	*Cohabitation within all partner relationships*
Austria*	45.8	20.1	30.5	-	-	-
Belgium*	45.6	18.3	28.6	-	-	-
Czech Republic	57.7	4.5	7.2	43.8	4.3	8.9
Denmark	39.9	30.3	43.1	28.6	30.5	51.6
United Kingdom	41.9	20.3	32.6	33.6	22.0	39.6
Estonia	40.4	21.2	34.4	34.6	23.5	40.4
Finland	40.4	26.7	39.8	30.4	27.1	47.2
France*	37.8	28.3	42.8	-	-	-
Greece	56.7	3.3	5.4	34.0	3.2	8.5
Holland	48.0	24.5	33.7	33.9	25.4	42.8
Ireland*	50.5	12.5	19.8	-	-	-
Poland	60.2	2.1	3.4	49.1	2.0	3.9
Latvia	40.6	4.3	9.6	24.5	5.3	17.9
Liechtenstein	51.0	9.4	15.6	38.6	9.3	19.4
Lithuania	61.0	5.7	8.5	55.6	6.0	9.7
Luxembourg*	51.1	18.1	26.2	-	-	-
Hungary	56.9	11.4	16.8	44.5	11.7	20.8
Germany	52.8	15.2	22.4	37.9	15.4	28.8
Norway	38.2	27.2	41.5	26.3	24.7	48.4
Italy	49.8	4.2	7.8	32.8	3.4	9.3
Portugal	61.0	7.4	10.8	50.8	6.8	11.8
Romania	68.6	7.1	9.4	57.0	7.7	12.0
Slovakia	60.3	2.0	3.2	47.9	1.8	3.6
Slovenia	45.2	12.1	21.1	28.7	9.6	25.1

Source: my own calculations based on the following: Eurostat Census data; *EB and CC Barometer 2000–2002, only for females

Toulemon (Toulemon, 1997), who explored the question in France, and Kiernan (Kiernan, 2002a) who examined several Western European countries were right to point out that cohabitation has become a lasting element among forms of partnership and an important point of reference (‘cohabitation is here to stay’). Heuveline and Timberlake recently formulated six ideal types according to the chance and length of cohabitation, the chance of it developing into marriage and the risk of having children within the cohabitation (Heuveline, Timberlake, 2003.). The types were called: a) marginal; b) „prelude to marriage’; c) „stage in marriage process’; d) „alternative to singleness’; e) „alternative to marriage’; f) „undistinguishable

[13]It must be noted that on the basis of small sample (survey type) data collections the Czech Republic also shows higher rates (cf. Rabusic, 2001). In this paper, however, there is no room for evaluating the different ratios which occur as a result of different data sources (different data recording methods).

from marriage'(op cit. p.1219). The 16 mostly European countries treated in their analysis could be fitted into one or the other of these types. We must note that European countries fell into different categories, which means that at the time of the survey cohabitation was playing a different role in the different countries. The types established by the authors can be seen as consecutive phases of a spreading process, but even the authors themselves consider it possible that cohabitation as a type of partnership forms will fill different roles in the lives of different people within the different countries. If we are testing the first hypothesis, the question is what type of powers inspire and hinder transference from one type to the other; if we are testing the latter, what we have to understand is the type of changes in institutional structure (legal type alike) and in values which shape the relation of the two dominant forms of relationship.[14]

Today the various countries probably do not belong to the same ideal type as the spreading of cohabitation has not stopped in the recent period, as is clearly indicated also by the growing number of non-marital births. This growth rate was particularly high, well over average, in the ex-socialist countries. Naturally, we did not leave out of consideration the fact that this may also go back to the increasing frequency of one-parent families. This is indicated by our estimate, to be described in detail later (cf. 3.2.3.) whereby relationships still play a different role in the willingness to have children in the different countries of Europe.

Difference in the prevalence of cohabitation and its various types can occur between various social groups as well as between countries. Although it is often difficult to find distinguishing traits between married and cohabiting people, certain analyses were able to identify groups which preferred cohabitation (Kieman, 2002; Carlson, Klinger, 1987; Spéder, 2004, Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1991). Ethnicity, religious commitment and the highest level of education often appear as possible distinguishing factors. Even if their effect is not overwhelming, it can no way be considered insubstantial!

In terms of the spreading of cohabitation, two rival hypotheses have emerged: one speaks of 'college graduates as trend-setters' the other calls it a „working class phenomenon'.[15] After surveying the analyses the picture emerges that we cannot rely merely on the thesis, whereby cohabiting relationships have spread as a new, fashionable type of relationship 'from top downwards.' There are two considerations that need particular attention here. One is that in such widely different countries as the USA and Hungary cohabitation first gained predominance among the disadvantaged strata of society (cf. Cherlin, 1992; Spéder,

[14] Since they analyse FFS data, their typology mainly reflects the characteristics of the 1980's and early 1990's.
[15] In certain cases we might even be talking about an underclass-type phenomenon.

2004), and that in Hungary in the second phase of the diffusion process, the leading role is still played by the lowest social strata (cf. Figure 1). The other remarkable consideration is a characteristic of childbirths within cohabitations. Examining this question, Kiernan pointed out that apart from Nordic countries and East Germany several countries of Europe are characterised by the predominance of the lowest classes among those who have children in cohabiting arrangements (cf. Kiernan, 2002a: p.9). We, too, have found that cohabitation is present, to varying extents, at all levels of society, but children born to cohabiting couples mainly occur among those with a low level of education (cf. Table M2). All of the above leads us to the conclusion that cohabitation can have different motives even in a given country and the resulting divergent types may persist parallelly with each other, precisely as they are tied in with different parts of the social structure. Cohabitation can be an alternative to loneliness, a prelude to marriage or indistinguishable from marriage at the same historical time and within the same country.



Mother's level of education and diffusion of cohabitation in Hungary
The ratio of women in first cohabitation at age 25, by level of education (%)
Figure 1

2.2. Singlehood and LAT

Although at one time the life styles of being single and LAT were seen as a future alternative to marriage and lasting cohabitation, by now it has transpired that these forms do not

represent a serious rival to marriage-type forms. At the same time it is known that these types of relationship constitute a phase of varying length in the life cycle of many people, and we can also suspect that the precise practice and the appraisal these forms of life also varies from country to country. Of the dozen European countries which carried out a PPA2 survey, in Germany more than one tenth of young people consider a singlehood as ideal while in other countries is popularity is far lower (cf. Table 1). Naturally, most people gain some experience during their lives of not having a partner for a certain period of time, but this is not necessarily interpreted at the time as a consciously chosen life form as opposed to living in a partner relationship (cf: Utasi, 2003). There are also very few European young women who consider LAT, a form of relationship which seeks a balance between independence and partnership, as an ideal form of life. Of the countries chosen for PPA, Germany, Holland and Estonia show a low but not insignificant rate of people who consider this life form the ideal version (cf. Table 1).

According to Kiernan's analysis based on FFS data, a certain number (30-40%) of people who never had a partner have had an intimate partnership at some stage of their lives but not all of them characterised this as an ideal and voluntarily chosen situation (Kiernan, 2002b). Naturally, the rate of people whose relationship could be interpreted as LAT varied from country to country (op. cit. 63). On the basis of PPA data we were able to identify people who have an intimate partner relationship and who do not live with their parents (any longer). In Germany (16%) and in Finland (12%) we found significant portions (cf. Table 3), but we also know that our above distinction is not able to discriminate with full exactitude between dating and LAT relationships.

Table 3

Estimated ratio of persons living in LAT relationships in some European countries, among women of 20 to 34 (2001–2002)

Country	percent
Belgium	0.5
Hungary	1.0
Italy	1.3
Czech Republic	3.1
Romania	3.2
Lithuania	4.9
Holland	5.8
Austria	6.1
Slovenia	6.1
Finland	11.9
Germany	16.6

Source: my own calculations, PPA-2.

2.3. The fragility of relationships: divorce, separation, duration

Representatives of the theory of the second demographic transition hold that one of the significant feature of the changes that started and persisted over the last few decades in Europe is that the quality of relationships has become far more highly valued than previously. The growth in divorce rates, an indicator could be interpreted as measure for quality of partnership on societal level, showed an unbroken growth in all European countries. This increase did not even stop when the prevalence of cohabitation started to grow – in fact total divorce rate (TDR) grew incessantly between 1980 and 2000.[16] The spreading of cohabitation brought along a fragility or instability of relationships as cohabiting couples break up more easily than married couples (Kiernan, 2002a). We cannot rule out the possibility that as cohabiting becomes widespread and its duration grows it will become a more stable form of relationship, but at the moment there are few signs of such a development. At the same time, as we have pointed out, Europeans do not show a preference of singlehood and a lasting abnegation of close-knit relationships – they tend to look for a new partner. While in earlier times they used to re-marry, today they usually choose to cohabit with their new partner.[17] It is no accident that Billari, relying on research by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al (2003) emphasises that 'an expansion of unions of higher order has taken place during the 1990s and is likely to continue' (Billari, 2005:71). A cardinal question, however, is whether we are approaching a stage when all long-term partnerships are to break up at some point and not because of the death of one of the partners. Coleman highlights the fact that TDR is no higher than 0.50 in any of the countries, which means that as far as we know more than a half of marriages still persist (Coleman, 2004). If this rate is to prove lasting, we will see the emergence of a scene where the population breaks into at least two large factions in terms of relationships – those who live their lives with a permanent partner and those whose life is made up of phases spent with several long term (and short term) partners and varying periods of solitude. Should this come to be the case, research will need to clarify the structural pressures and incentives that inspire people to move in one or other of these directions and what types of values and attitudes support the choice of one or other of these life courses.

3. Experiences gained as children and parents

[16] TDR only dropped radically in two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia.
[17] On this see Carlson and Klinger's pioneering work (1987).

3.1. Leaving home and/or adult children „locked' into the parental home

Billari and his associates used FFS data of 16 countries to compare the appearance and timing of various elements of leaving the parental home (moving out, first relationship, marriage) and the order in which they relate to each other (Billari et al., 2001). They found significant differences both in terms of timing and their sequences. On the basis of the different behaviour forms existing in the various countries he concluded that while in certain, mainly Scandinavian, countries the process of detachment is homogeneous and standardised and these societies can be considered age graded, in a different group of countries, particularly in Southern Europe and in Central and Eastern European countries both the timing and the sequence of leaving home is rather homogeneous. We shall only touch on this group of questions from one point of view: that of seeing what ratio of young people continue to live in the parental house and what sort of role this fact plays in the home.

Similarly to Billari and his associates, Saraceno et al also highlight the differences between European countries which also manifest in the length of time young people spend with their parents, without their parents and alone (as well as the rates of young people attached to each category) (Saraceno et al., 2004). It is commonly known that different welfare regimes, the different ways of acquiring an independent home, the different structure of the labour markets of each country and diverging cultural norms lead to young people leaving home at an earlier age in Northern Europe than in Southern Europe ((Billari et al. 2001; Mayer, 2001; Saraceno et al., 2004). Before the 1990's ex-socialist countries were largely dominated by late detachment similarly to South European countries (Billari et al. 2001). According to the data of 2003's European Quality of Life Survey the difference between North and South persists and the ex-socialist countries also saw the re-emergence of long gone phenomena.

As we are performing the secondary analysis of a survey with a small sample, we formulated country groups because of the low number of elements (Table 4). In 2003 in the ex-socialist countries a great proportion of young people still live in the parental home, approaching the rates characteristic of Southern Europe. What is new, however, is a persisting or re-appearing phenomenon whereby young people stay in the parental home together with their own partner or spouse and even with their own children. In one time state socialist countries, both in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Baltic states, more than 10% of women between 25 and 34 live in extended households. (According to the detailed figures this

rate is one in five in Poland and Bulgaria.) In these households, young people must face new conflicts of family roles. Young adults living with their parents as their children also have to act in the roles of spouse and mother, and thus have to find a balance between different family roles. The spouse moving into the family partly has to learn the roles of partner and parent and partly also needs to develop the behavioural repertoire of the role of the daughter-in-law or son-in-law. At the same time, the position of the parents also becomes modified: they remain parents and yet must accept that they have to (or at least ought to) find totally novel ways of fulfilling their parental role.

Table 4
Young adults' living arrangements: Living with and without parents, alone or with partner and/or child, ages 25-34, 2003 (%)

Country groups	Without parents		With parents	
	Alone	With partner and/or child	Alone	With partner and/or child
Females				
Nordic countries	25.7	73.1	1.2	0
Western Europe	20.9	73.7	4.0	1.4
Southern Europe	10.4	63.1	22.0	4.5
Central and Eastern (former state-socialist) countries	6.7	63.5	11.2	15.6
Baltic countries	12.4	70.1	7.7	9.8
Males				
Nordic countries	37.2	57.5	4.9	0.4
continental and islands	35.5	52.1	11.6	0.8
Southern Europe	17.8	42.7	36.3	3.2
Central and Eastern (former state-socialist) countries	9.7	48.6	29.3	12.4
Baltic countries	15.1	55.2	18.5	11.2

Country-groupings: *Nordic*: Denmark, Finland, Sweden; *Western-Europe*: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands*; Southern countries:* Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta *Central-Eastern Europe*: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
Source: own calculation, European Quality of Life Survey, European Foundation, Dublin
Forrás: Saraceno, et.al., 2005.

We have good reason to believe that young adults co-habiting with their parents is a temporary phenomenon and that, similarly to Western Europe, as the economy gains impetus, there will be a decrease in the number of young people who start their own family within the household of their parents. This, however, may be limited by a number of factors. Primary of these in our judgement is that after the transition a new situation has arisen in the housing market of the ex-socialist countries: home-owning has become almost exclusively predominant (Table M3), the rental sector is almost totally absent and municipal housing has become severely marginalized (cf.: Domanski et al., 2004). At the same time, it is in the ex-socialist countries that we find the lowest average number of rooms per home (op. cit p. 15). A predominantly home-owning market requires buyers to amass considerable financial resources. Naturally, persons who have the means or whose family can provide them with the 'starting capital' can easily enter the housing market. Those, however, who wish to start a family but do not have the necessary funds have to choose either to postpone starting a family for a long time or decide to live with one of the two parental families. This is the dilemma reflected in the opinions found in the PPA surveys according to which people of ex-socialist countries find the main cause for postponement of starting a family in the inadequacies of the housing situation and their unsuitable financial position. As the structural transformation of the housing market or the appearance of affordable rented homes is a long process in a market economy, we need to assume that the ways of household formation in harmony with structural position will not alter in Eastern European ex-socialist countries in the foreseeable future.[18] This means that reconciliation of roles within the extended family will continue to constitute a part of the family life of young adults and their parents who are affected by this situation.

3.2. Single parent families

Changes in partnership forms discussed in section 2 also concern the family demographic position of children. It is obvious that the alternation of relationships, divorce and re-marriage and varying periods of solitude affect the lives of children once born into the family. Of the family demographic conditions of children we here highlight the single parent type of the family as it is well known that these live under harsher circumstances than average[19] and children growing up this way struggle with several social problems both in youth and

[18] To clarify the connection between the home sector and family formation naturally requires further investigations.
[19] For more detail on this see point 4.

adulthood (poor school performance, early childbirth, poverty, etc). It is important to investigate whether the prevalence of single parent families is dominated by similarities or differences.

In examining this problem we need to give more attention than is perhaps customary to the fact that a single-parent family structure is not a static characteristic as it may come about through different processes and its resolution is also possible in a number of ways. A single parent family can emerge through the end of cohabitation or through divorce, through the death of the other parent or the decision of the mother to bring up a baby alone. The condition may end through re-marriage (or emergence of new cohabitation), the previous partner may move back, the child may grow up and even start a new family, or the death of the parent can also bring the end of a single-parent family. Data measuring the prevalence of single-parent families are to be understood as referential to an aggregate of all the variants listed above.

3.2.1. The position of children in single-parent and two-parent families

Data of censuses carried out around 2000 enable us to examine, at least in a static way, how far the family demographic situation of children differs in Europe, if they are brought up by one or two parents, by biological or step-parents, if the parents are married or cohabiting. We examined the position of children broken down into three age groups (0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years).

Data show considerable differences (Table 5). In the southern countries of Europe, the rate of single parent families is extremely low. In Cyprus, for example, only 3% of children under 4 live in single parent families, in Greece this figure is 6%. In some other European countries, however, this rate is more than one in five, approaching one in four (23% in Estonia and the Czech republic). The rate of single-parent families is generally high in ex-socialist countries, reaching 20% in five out of the seven countries. Significantly lower rates are only found in two countries, Romania (9%) and Hungary (12%). In other European countries the average value of this indicator is around 10%. It is considerably lower in the southern countries already referred to, and considerably higher in the United Kingdom and Austria. The extremely high rate (21%) characteristic of the UK has long been known in Western Europe and is mainly explained by the resolution of single women to have children. If, however, we involve ex-socialist countries in this comparison, the phenomenon can no longer be called unique.

Table 5
Division of children age 0–14 according to parental situation, 2000-2001

Country	*Two parents*		*Single parent*	*Two parents*		*Single parent*	*Two parent*		*Single parent*
	Marriage	*Cohabitation*		*Marriage*	*Cohabitation*		*Marriage*	*Cohabitation*	
	0–4 years			*5–9 years*			*10–14 years*		
Cyprus	96,77	0,39	2,84	94,10	0,33	5,58	93,07	0,33	6,60
Czech Republic	71,28	5,43	23,29	75,72	4,06	20,21	76,69	3,31	20,00
Denmark	63,65	25,28	11,07	68,56	15,34	16,10	69,55	12,14	18,31
Estonia	47,46	29,52	23,01	56,09	19,07	24,84	60,94	12,69	26,37
Finland	66,28	22,49	11,23	70,06	13,96	15,98	71,11	10,13	18,76
France	89,57	0,00	10,43	86,11	0,00	13,89	84,15	0,00	15,85
Germany	81,19	8,22	10,59	81,67	4,58	13,74	79,78	4,63	15,58
Greece	92,84	1,62	5,53	90,58	1,39	8,02	88,73	1,30	9,97
Hungary	72,51	15,20	12,28	76,07	9,40	14,52	75,90	7,05	17,05
Italy	87,02	4,76	8,22	88,36	2,67	8,97	87,41	2,12	10,47
Liechtenstein	86,91	5,10	7,99	86,89	2,11	11,00	82,90	3,04	14,05
Lithuania	74,21	7,70	18,09	76,32	5,07	18,61	75,62	4,92	19,46
Netherlands	79,33	12,83	7,84	82,30	6,47	11,22	81,81	4,68	13,51
Norway	58,78	29,49	11,73	65,49	18,31	16,20	68,62	13,28	18,10
Poland	78,38	2,75	18,88	82,95	1,98	15,06	84,28	1,42	14,30
Portugal	81,42	10,71	7,87	81,85	7,98	10,17	81,41	6,68	11,92
Romania	77,58	13,34	9,08	81,01	8,54	10,45	80,35	6,40	13,26
Slovak Republic	78,29	3,96	17,76	83,90	2,74	13,36	84,95	1,94	13,11
Slovenia	65,32	15,37	19,30	74,36	10,97	14,67	78,40	7,76	13,85
United Kingdom	62,68	16,31	21,02	65,69	10,51	23,80	66,63	8,53	24,84

Source: own calculations, European censuses 2000-2001

The prevalence of single-parent status can also vary according to age group. However, the rate of young and older children affected could only be compared as data characterising the life cycle if we considered chances of inflow into the single-parent status and outflow from that status as stable in time. Earlier, however, we discussed in detail that the instability of relationships, which is the main source of the emergence of single parent situations, is on the increase. However, we must certainly pay attentin to the fact that on the basis of the cross-section data the portion of single-parent families is higher among children of 10 to 14 than among those under the age of 4, with the exception of 4 countries. Conscious of the growing instability of partnerships we expect that today's young children will live in single-parent families to a higher proportion than those who are between 10 and 14 today.

Looking at the data we can also see, and this is in harmony with our earlier results, that among children who live with both parents, the rate of cohabiting parents is higher within the younger age groups (Table 5). From the point of view of the child's development, upbringing, life conditions and future prospects the essential factor is probably not whether the partnership of the parents is 'legitimate' but whether the child had to experience separation between the two parents and if so, then at what age and for what duration; whether they had to undergo the final separation of the parents or the emergence of a new partnership which would mean that the child's relationship with the detached parent becomes questionable and they need to redefine their position as a child in the family (cf. McLanahan, 1985, Thomson et al., 2002).

The census data of Hungary are able to give us a static picture on this question. We can not only know whether the child lived with one or two parents – it also tells us whether they were the biological or step parents of the child. We present four age groups (babies under 1 year of age, children of 5, 10 and 14 years) with a view to the situation of children within the parental union (Table 6). We have already pointed out that as the number of divorces is not decreasing and cohabitations are more fragile than marriages, the number of children who experience life in a single parent family is probably on the increase.[20] A structural transformation of two-parent families is that the number of children living with two biological parents is decreasing and the rate of situations involving a step-parent is on the increase, which also refers to the fact that even some of those children who live in two-parent families had some experience of a one-parent situation for a certain, varying extent of time. On the other hand we have to point out that a growing number of children have to learn new child

[20] Here we cannot analyse in detail the commonly known fact that a single parent family almost exclusively means life with the mother.

roles. They have to adapt to new partners (spouses) and have to shape a relationship with the biological parent who moved out of the partnership, and possibly even with that parent's new partner. While among babies under 12 months the rate of those facing these challenges is 2.7%, for five-year-olds the rate is 7.1% and for children of 14 it is one in ten (9.7%). On the final balance, without passing any value judgement, we can point out that barely more than two thirds (68.8%) of 14-year-old children live with their blood parents.[21]

Table 6.
Division of children of different ages in Hungary according to the number of parents, the type of partnership and the parental situation, 2000

Parental situation	Age of child in years			
	Under 1	5	10	14
Two-parent families				
Both are biological parants				
Married	67.1	68.6	68.5	66.8
cohabiting	18.0	7.1	3.2	2.0
One is a biological parent				
married	1.7	4.1	5.5	5.7
Cohabiting	1.0	3.0	3.8	4.0
Two step-parents	1.0	3.4	3.2	4.1
One-parent families				
Biological parent				
Mother	10.4	11.9	13.2	14.9
Father	0.4	0.9	1.4	2.0
Step-parent	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.5
Ttal (%)	100	100	100	100
N=	96 128	108 475	122 401	119 360

Source: own calculations based on census data for 2001

As regards the chances of the different children ending up in various family types and the durability of the position we can only gain a comprehensive picture after a detailed analysis of the children's life course. (Andersson, 2004; Bumpass, Lu, 2000; Heuveline, Timberlake, Fürstenberg, 2003; Heuveline, Timberlake, 2004). These works calculate and compare according to cohorts and countries the likelihood and the probability of the child spending time in each of the possible family demographic situations. According to the data, variance is extremely high in Europe in terms of the risk of falling into a one-parent family, and differences in terms of the length of time spent in single-parent family, if smaller, are still significant (cf. Andersson, 2004; Table M4). Andersson showed that the risk of a child gaining experience of single-parent families before the age of 15 was lowest in Italy (9%) and highest in one-time East Germany and Latvia (46% and 44% respectively). If, on the other

[21] We may assume that for a certain period in their lives they, too, gained experience of a single-parent family.

hand, we aim to establish the length of time a child spent in a single-parent family, on average, before the age of 14, in Italy the result of 3% of the time of childhood years and in Latvia it is 15% of the duration of childhood. We must not be led to rash conclusions by the fact that children spend the majority of their childhood not in a single-parent family: from the point of view of predictable social problems the simple fact of the event ever taking place can have far-reaching consequences (cf. McLanahan, 1985).

Anderson points out that countries cannot be readily classified on the basis of the family demographic experiences of children unless we take into account that 'Some European counties are characterised by a particularly stable family pattern from the point of view of children. These countries are found in different areas of Europe, but all have the trait in common of being strongly dominated by the Catholic confession' (op. cit. p. 321).

We know that chances of ending up in a single-parent set-up are much higher, as far as children born within a partnership are concerned, within cohabiting partnerships than in marriages (vö. Andersson, 2004; Kiernan, 2002a.). Bumpass and Lu used American data to examine whether social factors played a role in determining the length of time children spent in one-parent or two-parent families (cohabitations or marriages). Beyond the already known relationship, whereby those born in cohabitations are likely to spend more time in a single-parent family, they also point out that the mother's level of education and ethnic identity is also related to the length of time the child spends in various family types and, within that, in a single-parent family (op. cit. p. 38). We know that the rate of single-parent families is particularly high in the USA compared to European countries. However, the question occurs whether there are countries in Europe where children's family demographic experiences are tied in with particular social positions. Kiernan pointed out that in the UK most single mothers who decide to have a baby alone come from the disadvantaged classes (Kiernan, 2002a). In Hungary, too, we found that single-parent families are usually recruited from among those with a low level of education (Spéder, 2004). Thinking along these lines it is worth asking the question whether social structure does not play a part in the family demographic experience of children. If it does, do we find these connections in all countries or do diverging state welfare programmes and cultural traditions lead to diverging patterns in Europe? At the same time we may also suspect that the classic pattern will persist whereby children are born into marriages and brought up by parents in a lasting partnership. Can these paths be associated with certain social groups? Is it possible that this 'traditional' kind of life cycle will become a form of 'privileged childhood' in the future?

3.2.2. Estimating the ratio of single-parent childbirth

Over the past few decades the rate of non-marital births increased in almost all countries of Europe.[22] It was quite inherent to assume, as followed from the age-group analyses of surveys (Kiernan, 2002b), that the spreading of cohabitations was partly responsible for this phenomenon. The reason why cohabitations show a correlation with single parent families is that the women in question either consciously decide to have the baby alone or their partnership breaks up before the birth of the child. At the same time we know that in different countries there are widely different rates for children born outside of marriage to a single mother or into cohabiting unions. In the USA and the UK these rates are quite high, in Italy rather low. What proportion of children are born into single-parent families and cohabitations in the different countries of Europe?

To give a detailed answer is difficult for several reasons. The gravest difficulty is to do with defining the limit between cohabiting and living alone. We do not know whether different countries follow the same methods in deciding whether a person is cohabiting with another person or not; when to call a person independent and how to define an intimate relationship as cohabitation. How do we classify those living in an LAT relationship even if their rate does little to influence the overall image? What's more: the project "Fragile Families" pointed out that a considerable number of women who decide to have their baby alone still maintain a relationship with the father and the father has a kind of 'visiting' relationship with the mother and the children. A Hungarian survey, carried out in 1996 showed that more than half of the women deciding to have their baby alone were in a 'close but non-cohabiting' relationship with the father (S.Molnár, Pongrácz, 71).

Another grave difficulty is that unions show considerable dynamics around the time of childbirth. On the basis of Anderson's FFA analysis we can see that some mothers who decide to have their baby alone had some form of a union within a year of having the baby[23] (op. cit. Andersson, 2004. p.327), while a small but not negligible number of cohabiting mothers also gained some experience of the single-parent situation within a year after childbirth. [24] The above mentioned Hungarian survey on extramarital births revealed that 11% of people who had babies in a cohabiting partnership were already living alone within one year and 7-8% of those who had the baby alone were already cohabiting (op. cit. 72.)

[22] Growth rates were only small in Italy, Croatia and Slovenia.
[23] Sweden 19%, USA 18%, Hungary 23%, Slovenia 42% (Andersson, 2004: 327.).
[24] Sweden 4%, USA 18%, Hungary 7%, Slovenia 3% (Andersson, 2004: 329.).

All of the above needs to be taken into account when we compare the rates of extra-marital births derived from vital statistics with the data of censuses conducted around 2000 regarding women bringing up a baby under twelve months alone. We must stress strongly and clearly that when we compare the results of these two data systems, we are providing estimation.

Surveying the data of the 17 countries in question we get realistic data except for two countries (Table 7). In Poland and the Czech Republic, but particularly in the former, the rate of children under twelve months living in a single-parent family is far higher than the rate of extra-marital births. It is almost unimaginable for such a number of unions to have broken up within one year. Thus we assume that in these two countries different concepts were used when recording the vital statistics and for the purposes of the census.

In some cases it is possible to compare our results with the rates calculated from FFS data (the rate of conscious single-parent births with the total of extra-marital births) (cf. Table M5). In terms of the seven countries that proved comparable, significant differences occur once more with regard to Czech and Polish data. While, however, in Poland extra-marital births, in so far as they existed at all, took place in single-parent families according to the testimony of FFS data, in the Czech Republic the rate of children born into cohabiting unions is higher than children born to single mothers. In the remaining five countries rates calculated from FFA and from census data agree.

If we take all of this into account, we have to go carefully about drawing conclusions (Table 7). Our data clearly reveal that *the rate of childbirth to single mothers within the total of extra-marital births varies widely within Europe.* In some countries childbirth to single mothers constitutes a small rate, less than a quarter, of extra-marital births. This group includes northern countries (Finland, Denmark, Norway) as well as Lichtenstein, France and Holland. A further group can be created of countries where single-mother births constitute 30-40% of all extra-marital births; this group includes Romania, Portugal, Hungary, Ireland, Estonia and Germany. The corresponding proportion is high, around 50%, in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom, while there are countries (Cyprus, Slovakia and even Poland might be listed here) where single-mother births show an even higher rate. Thus Europe is characterised by a plurality of patterns in the type of union that forms the contexts of childbirth, in other words the family demographic position of the expected child, and not only as in terms of extra-marital births.

Table 7.
Fate of extra-marital births and single-parent families among women bringing up babies under 1 and among children of 0-4 years, in the various countries of Europe.

Countries	Ratio of extra-marital births according to the vital statistics	Ratio of single parents among women with a baby below 1 year	Ratio of children aged 0-4 years with a single parent
Cyprus	2.3	1.9	2.8
Lichtenstein	10.1	6.2	5.5
Greece	3.9	7.3	ND
Italy	9.7	ND	8.2
Poland	12.1	20.7	18.9
Slovakia	18.3	19.3	17.7
Czech Republic	21.8	25.5	23.0
Portugal	22.2	6.6	6.6
Lithuania	22.6	17.7	18.1
Germany	23.4	9.4	10.6
Holland	24.9	6.3	7.9
Romania	25.5	8.1	9.0
Hungary	29.0	10.3	12.3
Austria	31.3	ND	16
Ireland	31.8	12.2	14
Slovenia	37.1	ND	19.3
Bulgaria	38.4	20.3	ND
Finland	39.2	7.0	11.2
United Kingdom	39.5	ND	21.0
France	42.6	ND	10.4
Denmark	44.6	8.4	11.0
Norway	49.6	11.4	11.7
Estonia	54.5	20.9	23.3

Soure: Recent Demographic Trends 2001, own calculations based on Censuses in Europe, various summary tables. ND=no data)

4. A rapid glance at the elderly: life alone, with a partner or with children at the age 65-69

The censuses of 1990/91 and even of 1980 have shown clearly that changes in family structure experienced after the middle of the 20th century are partly generated by the elderly generation. The decrease in average household size, for example, was largely due to a growth in the number and rate of old people living alone and by an increase in the length of time spent in a family consisting solely of the aging couple. Individualisation and the striving for independence and autonomy can be captured in the behaviour of cohorts born in the first third to first half of the 20th century. By comparing the data of Finland, the United Kingdom, Holland and, from the other side, Italy and Hungary for 1990 has shown that new, so-called 'chosen biography' as opposed to traditional, standard life courses appear more characteristically in northern and western European countries than in southern or eastern

Europe (Jong Gierveld et al, 2001). The situation of the ageing generations as we have seen in part 3.1 is not independent of their children's strivings to become independent. In this way the aging generations are directly and indirectly affected by several phenomena of the 'Second Demographic Transition.' What we have in mind here are phenomena such as the postponement of moving out of the parental home, young people postponing and foregoing marriage, divorce and the need to tackle situations that arise.

Papers analysing tendencies of household structure of the elderly concentrate on the shift of emphasis between various family and household constellations and all of them examine the changes in the rate of old people living alone or in a marriage. These two family types, with the latter also comprising cohabiting unions, is the embodiment of the individualisation process of the elderly. The process seems to characterise the whole of Europe in a unified fashion, although, naturally, there are differences among country groups. Rates are lower in Central and Eastern Europe than in Northern or Western Europe (Grundy, 1998; Jong Giervald, 2003). The family structure of men and women shows considerable differences mainly because of their differences in mortality and for other reasons.

We shall review the data of censuses in 2000 and 2001 regarding the elderly mainly with a view to establishing the rate of old persons living alone or with their partner but without their children in the various countries of Europe. From the point of view of extended parental roles mentioned in section 3 it is also an important question just what rate of people between 65 and 69 still live with their children. We can accept Verdon and Jong Giervald's theory whereby the cohabitation of the elderly with their children is a forced necessity (Jong Giervald, 2003) which either takes place because the child cannot move out or because the parent, mainly for health reasons, cannot live alone. What is more, we also need to add that on the society level the rate of two-person families, consisting of (married) partners, is the best measure of the possibility of realising a relatively individualised lifestyle free of unwanted necessities which even offer a wide range of opportunities.

On the basis of European censuses conducted in 2000/2001 we can now examine several countries in order to identify to what extent Europe presents a unified picture. The data seems to support Jong Gierveld's statement that she made after comparing two countries which represented Western and Eastern Europe, Holland and Hungary (Jong Gierveld, 2003). In Holland the rate of one-person households and two-person households of two partners was higher in every age group than in Hungary. Among women, the rate of those who still live with their partner but not with their children is highest in Germany, Cyprus, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. The same is true of men, except in France. The lowest rates were

found in the ex-socialist countries: in Estonia, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia. Highest rates for women living alone were found in Estonia, Finland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, while the rate of men living alone was highest, besides Estonia, in Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom. In Germany, for example, 95% of men and women in this age group live in the above mentioned two types of households. In other words, what we see is that the rate of the elderly persons living in individualised households is highest in Western and Northern Europe.

Unfortunately, we were not able to examine temporal tendencies, thus we can only refer to a finding by Jong Gierveld whereby individualisation has gained impetus in both countries among the elderly, as shown by the data of the two last censuses. We could also observe, however, that in Hungary, contrary to expectations, the proportion of households consisting of the 'youthful elderly' (ages 50 - 65) decreased. She believes that one possible explanation is that, compared to Holland, Hungarian young people leave home at a later time than they used to ten years ago (cf. earlier sections). Although we are unable to examine tendencies here, it is worthwhile reviewing the proportion of people aged 65-69 living with their children. This age group is also interesting because the state of health of its members does not render them dependent upon their children (yet), so cohabitation with the parents is not likely to have this explanation. There are two country groups where the rate of elderly parents living with their children is high: southern Europe and the ex-socialist countries. In Italy, Greece and Portugal more than one quarter of women of this age live with their children, and rates are equally high in Slovenia and Poland.

Table 7
Division of men and women aged 65-69 according to chosen household type, 2000/2001

Countries	Living alone	Living with spouse, without children	Living without partner, with child(ren)	Living with partner and child(ren)
Females				
Cyprus	21,5	60,2	5,8	18,4
Portugal	20,22	53,62	9,69	16,48
Greece	21,49	51,63	9,53	17,35
Holland	30,36	61,24	2,84	5,55
Italy	23,54	46,59	10,44	19,43
Germany	31,22	64,70	3,16	0,81
France	29,48	58,17	5,02	7,33
United Kingdom	29,80	56,27	5,71	8,21
Slovenia	27,75	44,60	12,24	15,38
Denmark	40,01	59,82	0,06	0,12
Finland	36,74	52,78	4,37	6,12
Poland	29,42	44,39	13,42	12,77
Czech Republic	35,63	50,40	7,48	6,49
Hungary	37,50	49,58	7,39	5,52
Slovakia	40,30	41,01	9,75	8,94
Estonia	43,05	41,29	9,64	6,01
Males				
Cyprus	5,60	72,28	1,27	20,85
Portugal	7,31	63,82	2,03	26,84
Greece	7,45	56,85	2,29	33,41
Slovenia	10,07	57,74	3,07	29,04
Italy	10,13	51,40	3,27	35,20
Germany	13,18	82,02	0,89	3,68
Hungary	12,35	72,01	2,04	13,60
Holland	13,93	75,31	1,02	9,74
Poland	11,77	60,10	3,19	24,94
France	13,99	70,90	1,59	13,53
Czech Republic	14,40	68,62	2,14	14,84
Slovakia	14,19	62,48	2,68	20,66
United Kingdom	16,84	67,35	2,06	13,74
Finland	19,54	68,48	1,39	10,59
Estonia	18,99	66,04	2,53	12,44
Denmark	23,04	75,09	0,17	1,70

Source: own calculations, European censuses 2000/2001, Eurostat

What can be the reasons behind the differences found in Europe? Observing northern and western European tendencies it may be assumed that divorced and, more emphatically, widowed people's choice to forego another close partnership (and not enter more than a loose relationship), together with a preference for living alone, with the partner, i.e. in a child free home is more than a mere concatenation of external circumstances in Western Europe. It may reflects that, similarly to the aspirations of the younger generations, striving for an independent life and autonomy, individualisation and the modern transformation of traditional

family values and norms is becoming a characteristic of elderly people. After the children leave home, the parent(s) can become similar to persons living independently or with a partner but without children, like the members of the younger generation who have not yet had children. This is also helped by the extension of the period of economic activity. As people retire around the age of 65, their environment can easily accept that these elderly men and women make themselves independent of family ties and concentrate their efforts on realising their own objectives.

The contrast which appears in the family composition of the elderly in Western (and northern) European as opposed to eastern (and partly southern) European countries also has reasons which arise from the differences of economic and welfare regimes. Because of the difficulties of starting an independent life (home acquisition, finding employment) most parents do not shut their doors irrevocably on the child who has left the family home. This alone is enough to cause the detachment to be delayed in the eastern and southern regions. In ex-socialist countries, which are characterised by a high divorce rate, there is also a chance of returning: of the young adult moving back to the parental home after his or her divorce. These are also the causes behind the fact that grandparents have to make serious financial contributions to the upbringing of their grandchildren.

5. Is material well-being related to family structure in Europe?

In this last chapter of our paper we shall extend this comparison to what is perhaps the most frequently used indicator of material well-being: poverty rates. Naturally, we are not interested here in poverty itself, but in its associations with family structure. In other words we are seeking to answer the question whether social structure (the extent of poverty) and demographic structure (demographic position and family structure) have any connection and if they do, whether its character is the same for all European countries? With this question we are touching upon the essence of differentiation within individual societies, since we can only talk about differentiation if we can tie it in to some social structure. Naturally, it would be more beneficial if we could compare several indicators of social structure (socio-economic status, level of education, position in the labour market, etc.) with characteristics of family structure. We are not in a position to do this, as the examination of even a single indicator requires a separate research project. To select material well-being, and within that the position in terms of poverty, is a fortuitous choice perhaps in that this can be seen as a sum total, an output of all structural forces. Not to mention the fact that the joint research of family structure and poverty have a long tradition (Rowntree, 1901) and today this field has once

more come to be at the centre of many examinations (Avramov, 2002; Kiernan, 2002c; Leibfried, at.al., 1995; McLanahan, 1985, 2004). A further important criterion is that social politics is also becoming increasingly sensitive to this question. On March 8th this year, for example, UNICEF's Research Card No. 6 alarmed the European public with the title „*Child Poverty in Rich Countries 2005*'. But the title and topic of the European Demographic Conference held recently, on 7-8 April, 2005 is also revealing: „*Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion*'.

5.1. Generational profile of poverty

Around the middle of the 1990's several UNICEF reports were written about the topic of the political transition which spoke of children as the great losers of the transition process (cf. UNICEF, 1997). The poverty research of the 1990's also found its most surprising and saddest result in finding that the financial position of children and families with children has worsened more powerfully than average in the early 1990's (Andorka, Spéder, 1996). Obviously, Rowntree had indicated a century earlier that poverty was structured along the human life cycle (also). But how far is Europe characterised by the poverty of children today? And can we afford to forget the examination of the elderly, whose impoverishment is often the subject of debate?

We are examining the extent of poverty among children and the elderly, but we have diverged from the logic of UNICEF's 2005 Research Card as we are not (only) interested in the proportion of the poor within these age groups in the various countries but also whether the rate of poverty within these age groups is high compared to the poverty rate of the entire population in each country.[25] In this respect the 7.3% poverty rate of children in the Czech Republic requires more attention than that of 15.7% in Ireland as this rate, when projected to the entire population of the Czech Republic, is 4.3% whereas in Ireland it is 15.4%, in other words the relative situation of children only in the Czech Republic is disadvantaged. Table 8, borrowed from the report by Förster—d'Ercole compares the poverty rates of children and old people for 22 European OECD countries and the USA with the poverty rates of the entire population (Förster, d'Ercole, 2005).

Even at first glance we can see that the poverty rate of children is greatly varied all over Europe. After some brief calculations we can also find out that in Belgium, Finland and Denmark this only accounts for barely more than half of the poverty rate of the entire

[25] Poverty rate shows the ratio of poor people within a certain group of the population.

population, while in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland it is more than one and a half times higher. Examining those over 75 years of age we find even greater differences. Their poverty rate in Holland is one third of the average, in Poland and Hungary it is half, while in Norway it is three times higher. This means that the financial well-being of the old is very different over Europe. Our table also shows a younger age group of the elderly, and makes clear that variance is far smaller in this age group, as among older elderly.

Table 9.
The rate of poor people in various European countries in selected age groups

Countries	Age groups in years			Entire population
	0-17	66-75	Over 75	
Denmark (2000)	2,4	2,3	9,0	4,3
Finland (2000)	3,4	7,0	16,1	6,4
Norway (2000)	3,6	5,5	19,9	6,3
Sweden (2000)	3,6	4,6	11,5	5,3
Belgium (1995)	4,1	10,7	18,6	7,8
Switzerland (2000)	6,8	10,4	12,7	6,7
Czech Republic (2000)	7,2	1,3	3,5	4,3
France (2000)	7,3	9,9	11,3	7,0
Luxemburg (2001)	7,8	3,8	9,0	5,5
Holland (2000)	9,0	1,5	1,8	6,0
Germany (2001)	10,9	9,7	10,7	8,9
Greece (1999)	12,4	22,2	28,0	13,5
Hungary (2000)	13,1	5,5	4,8	8,1
Austria (1999)	13,3	7,6	11,6	9,3
Spain (1995)	13,3	14,8	9,3	11,5
Poland (2000)	14,5	4,0	5,0	9,8
Portugal (2000)	15,6	25,4	35,4	13,7
Ireland (2000)	15,7	31,1	42,6	15,4
Italy (2000)	15,7	14,6	16,4	12,9
Anglia (2000)	16,2	11,4	19,2	11,4
Turkey (2002)	21,1	16,7	15,3	15,9
USA (2000)	21,7	20,3	29,6	17,1

Source: Förster, d'Ercole, 2005:72-74.

In order to examine their poverty profile we divided the countries in this examination into three groups on the basis of poverty among children and among the elderly. The middle group includes always countries where the risk of poverty in the mentioned age groups is not widely different from the average poverty risk of the total population, moving within a band of 0.75-1.25 times the average figure. We considered the poverty risk of children or old people high in countries where this figure exceeded the national average by more than 25% and low if it was under 75% of that figure. The classification of figure 3 was done using this system, making it clear that the material well-being of the various generations differed widely in various countries of Europe. Examining children (and thus their families) we notice that they

are in a relatively positive situation in the Nordic countries (and Belgium), while in ex-socialist countries (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and in some other European countries (e.g. Austria, UK and Holland) they are in a clearly disadvantaged situation compared to the total population.[26] A more detailed breakdown of the infant population by age could shed light on the situation of young children compared to all children (cf. Table M6). This reveals that the position of small children is deprived even within the child population and a radical worsening took place in the early 1990's at the time of the political transition.

The categorisation of the individual countries, as we have mentioned, was carried out with regard to two groups of the elderly. The position of the very old (over 75) is extremely deprived in most European countries (cf. Table 8). Those between 66 and 75, however, are in an average situation in most countries: this is the case in 14 of the 23 countries examined. In some countries their relative position is positive, but in some countries they were at a disadvantage compared to the average.

As far as ex-socialist countries are concerned (unfortunately, comparative data are only available with regard to three), they certainly form a unique group characterised by a typical generational profile of poverty. Children (and their families) are in a more deprived, the old in a relatively more affluent situation. Economic and political transition has brought along a redistribution of poverty risks among generations (cf. Förster, Tóth, 1999; Spéder, 2000; Stanovnik et al., 2000, Szulc, 2000).

There are some European countries which show a reverse poverty profile, where the position of children is good and that of the elderly relatively deprived (one example is Belgium or, if we only look at the two extreme age groups, the Scandinavian countries). In some further countries there is no significant difference between the relative poverty of the two farthest generations (eg. Germany, Austria, Italy).

[26]It is remarkable that in the majority of countries with a high fertility the position of children seems relatively better.

Figure 2
Poverty risk profiles of generations in Europe, around 2000

Difference from the average poverty rate of the country	Children (0-18 years)	Youthful elderly (66-75 years)	Very old (over 75)
Poverty risk considerably higher than national average (125%<)	Czech Republic Hungary Poland Holland Luxemburg United Kingdom Austria Turkey USA	Belgium Switzerland Greece Portugal	Sweden Norway Denmark Finland Belgium Portugal France Switzerland Greece United Kingdom USA Ireland Luxemburg Italy
Poverty risk similar to the national average (75-125%)	Germany Italy Portugal Spain France Switzerland Greece Ireland	Sweden Norway Denmark Finland France United Kingdom USA Ireland Luxemburg Italy Austria Germany Turkey Spain	Austria Germany Turkey Spain Czech Republic
Poverty risk considerably lower than national average (< 75%)	Sweden Norway Denmark Finland Belgium	Czech Republic Poland Hungary Luxemburg Holland	Hungary Poland Holland

5.2. Family structure and poverty

It is commonly known that certain family types have a rather higher risk of poverty than others. This consideration drew the attention of scholars of social structure to re-examine demographic characteristics more thoroughly as factors influencing life prospects (Cf. Hradil, 1987; Zapf, 1987.) In the section 3 of the present paper we gave detailed attention to *single-parent families* and this is also the family type which requires particular attention with regard to poverty (Avramov, 2002; Förster, d'Ercole, 2005; Kiernan, 2002c; McLanahan, Garfinkel, 1996). Single parent families, as was expected, are materially deprived and show a considerable disadvantage even compared to families bringing up children (cf. Figure 4). Their financial position, however, as the figure by Förster and d'Ercole reveals, mainly

depends on whether or not the parent, (usually the mother, as we have seen) has a job. This consideration leads us on to the question of employment structure within the family, which was examined by Kuijsten, proposing the possibility of divergence, approximately a decade ago, of divergence among European family patterns. Naturally, this was then only a possibility and was used in the context of mature two-parent families.

The key events of the emergence of a single parent family, divorce or childbirth to a single-mother, often form the subject of dynamic analyses of the process of impoverishment. Divorce plays a significant role (Duncan, 1984; Jarvis, Jenkins, 1999), while birth to a single mother is a likely track of passing poverty down to the next generation (McLanahan, Garfinkel, 1996; Kiernan, 2002c). However, the change of demographic status also explains outflow from poverty: marriage has been shown, among other things, by empirical studies to be a frequent method of leaving a status of poverty (Duncan, 1984). Thus it is no accident that among the Hungarian divorced population the rate of poor persons is higher than average and, particularly, higher than among married persons. This is true not only when the divorced persons are living alone but also if they start a new, cohabiting union (cf. M7 table).

The *number of children* is rarely in the focus of examination, even though Hungarian surveys repeatedly reflect that a higher number of children increases the risk of poverty. Families with three or more children are particularly affected: their poverty rate is several times higher than average (cf. Table M15).

As far as the elderly are concerned, there is again a consideration regarding family structure that we must draw attention to. Analysing the Hungarian society we have found that the elderly population is highly inhomogeneous, their position of material well-being is structured by a number of different factors and they form a differentiated sub-society (Spéder, 2000). Among these differentiating factors an outstanding role is played by family structure: if we filter out all other effects, we find that elderly people living with their partner are in far the best financial status. Elderly women who live alone are in a deprived situation (widows) and the same is true of those who ‘return’ to live in an extended family (Dobossy et al.; 2003).

Figure 3
Relative poverty rates in households with children and single-parent households, 2000



Source: Föster, d'Ercole, 2005. p. 35. Fig.18.

5.3. Family structure, relationship status and poverty – a multi-variant analysis

It is quite natural, that demographic characteristics tie in with socio-economic markers. In order to separate these, we examined in detail the factors that determine the process of impoverishment using five concepts of poverty simultaneously[27] and their mutual relationships (Kapitány, Spéder, 2004). We gave particular attention to traits of family structure. Here we present our logistical regression created for this purpose purely as an example (cf. Table 10). The variables we included in our model were the following: sex, age group, position in terms of township and region, ethnicity, education, number of children, partnership status. We give no detailed interpretation of the results of the model only highlight a few statements that are important from the point of view of demographic characteristics.

Contrary to the thesis voicing 'the feminisation of poverty,' women are not poorer than men. The elderly showed a significantly lower risk of poverty in the multi-variate model.

Using the number of children for analysis: people without children stand the lowest chance of being affected by poverty and the risk increases parallelly with the number of children. In terms of the partnership status what we see that married people have a far smaller risk of experiencing poverty than either divorced or single persons living alone or even cohabiting couples. This means that characteristics of family structure, along with level of education, ethnicity and residential position, act as independent factors influencing the poverty situation of people and families.

It would be important to know how far these characteristics exist in other countries of Europe or whether they manifest their effect in a different fashion. Connections we have identified above regarding child poverty indicate that various welfare regimes offer different degrees of protection to the different generations. Mayer also points out that in different groups of countries we probably find different motivations behind social exclusion (Mayer, 2001. p. 102).

Naturally, we are aware that our present model does not clarify causal relationships, as only a dynamic analysis offers success in the precise exploration of those connections (e.g. Duncan, 1984; Jarvis, Jenkins, 1999; Kiernan, 2002c). This way we cannot answer questions of the 'chicken or the egg' (Kiernan) type, even if we made some obvious assumptions in this regard. At any rate, the results of our analysis serve to stress that it is important to invest some energy in exploring the connections of social structure and family structure and to making European comparisons in the future.

[27] Beyond income status (income poverty), referred to above, we also examined deprived housing situation, absolute and relative deprivation (the latter meaning that it also contains some subjective elements), and beneficiary status.

Table 10.
Odds ratios of relative income poverty; logistic regression, bivariate and multivariate results, Hungary, 2001/2002.

Factores	Bivariate risks		Multivariate model	
	Exp. (B)		Exp. (B)	
GENDER: female	*1,026*		,991	
AGE GROUPS		***		***
18-29	*,846*	**	,988	
40-49	*1,062*		1,307	***
50-59	*,810*	**	1,238	**
60-69	*,513*	***	,597	***
70-75	*,412*	***	,424	***
TYPE OF TOWNSHIP AND REGIONAL STATUS		***		***
Town in Middle and West Hungary	*1,070*		,894	
Town in South and East Hungary	*2,323*	***	1,702	***
Village in Middle and West Hungary	*1,845*	***	1,292	***
Village in South and East Hungary	*3,637*	***	2,241	***
ETHNICITY: Roma	*8,565*	***	3,236	***
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION		***		***
Basic	*2,243*	***	2,645	***
Low	*1,804*	***	1,777	***
Secondary	*,530*	***	,617	***
College	*,114*	***	,146	***
NUMBER OF CHILDREN		***		***
No children	*,576*	***	,597	***
2 children	*1,099*		1,233	**
3 children	*1,839*	***	1,473	***
4+ children	*4,018*	***	1,757	***
PARTNERSHIP STATUS		***		***
Single, no partner	*1,069*		1,467	***
Divorced, alone	*2,265*	***	2,896	***
Widowed, alone	*,984*		1,205	
Cohabiting	*1,799*	***	1,552	***
Nagelkerke R2			**0,21**	

Reference categories: male, 30-39 years, living in the capital or large cities, non-Roma, vocational training (secondary level), married, 1 child in the household.
Level of significance: *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01.

Appendices

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Appendices

1. Data sources

European population censuses 2000-2001

The results of the censuses in 2000 and 2001 were organised into a thematically organised comparative data set by the Eurostat. The integrated data set used in this paper was made available by the Census Department of the Hungarian Bureau of Statistics

EB Barometer and CC Barometer 2000-2001

In 2002 a special Eurobarometer Survey was organised for the Candidate Countries, where several former questions from the Eurobarometer were incorporated. The integrated dataset of the EB and CC barometer was organised by the department of Social Structure at the Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung Berlin (WZB) in a joint project of the WZB, ESRI (Dublin) and the DRI (Budapest).

Population Policy Acceptance Survey 2 (PPA2)

The second round of the Population Policy Acceptance Survey is a result of an international cooperation led by the Bundesinstitute für Befölkerunsforschung (BiB) in Wiesbaden. The survey was carried out and financed by the participating countries. The comparative data-set was produced in the project 'DIALOG - Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS): The Viewpoint of Citizens and Policy Actors Regarding the Management of Population Related Change' funded by the European Commission under the 5th Framework Program, Contract No. HPSE-CT-2002-00153.' The sample size is between 1500 and 3000 per country.

European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS)

The EQLS, a survey of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dublin), covers 28 countries (25 new and old member states, and 3 candidate countries). The survey examines the relation of quality of life in core domains in European Countries on the one side and several independent variables (among them the demographic characteristics of the respondents) on the other side. The sample size is around 1000 per country (600 for the 3 small countries), therefore we grouped the countries in order to use information for the age group 25-34. In the construction of Table 4 each respondent had the same weight.

Turning points of the life course

The project "Turning points in the life-course" (cf. Spéder, 2001) was developed and carried out by the Demographic Research Institute Budapest under the umbrella of the "Generations and Gender Program (GGP)", an international collaborative research project launched by PAU in Geneva. The research questions, devised along the lines of the GGP, cover a broad range of demographic problems and are geared to gain a deeper understanding of changing demographic behavior in Europe. The follow-up design, the parallel application the objective and subjective variables, and the strong prevalence of attitudinal variables all make for a special feature of the GGP and the Hungarian survey. The "Turning points in the life-course" is a representative survey of the Hungarian population aged 18-74 in 2001. There were 16 394 persons interviewed at the turn of 2001 and 2002 about the social, economic, demographic, and ideational components of their life. The fieldwork was concluded in mid-2002 and the cleaned-up data-set was made available in 2003. www.dpa.demografia.hu

Tables

Table M1
Division of women and man aged 25-34 living alone or in a partnership in Europe, 2000-2001

Country	*Women*		*Men*	
	Single	*Living in partnership*	*Living alone*	*Living in partnership*
Austria*	34.10	65.90	-	-
Belgium*	36.04	63.96	-	-
Cyprus	21.58	78.42	35.24	64.76
Czech Republic	36.51	63.49	49.95	50.05
Denmark	29.80	70.20	40.88	59.12
United Kingdom	33.13	66.87	37.09	62.91
Estonia	36.01	63.99	37.77	62.23
Finland	29.76	70.24	37.73	62.27
France*	32.97	67.03	36.51	63.49
Greece	33.67	66.33	56.18	43.82
Holland	26.13	73.87	38.85	61.15
Ireland*	43.26	56.74	-	-
Poland	36.19	63.81	47.18	52.82
Latvia	48.07	51.93	57.20	42.80
Liechtenstein	34.11	65.89	45.02	54.98
Lithuania	24.90	75.10	15.05	84.95
Luxemburg*	30.72	69.28	-	-
Hungary	28.98	71.02	38.98	61.02
Malta*	22.08	77.92	-	-
Germany	30.90	69.10	45.43	54.57
Norway	33.30	66.70	47.28	52.72
Italy	43.61	56.39	61.44	38.56
Portugal	29.69	70.31	39.74	60.26
Romania	22.29	77.71	32.20	67.80
Slovakia	36.33	63.67	48.89	51.11
Slovenia	40.82	59.18	58.99	41.01

Source: own calculations. Eurostat Census data; *EB and CC Barometer 1998–2002.

Table M2
Division of women giving birth in different types of partnership according to level of education. 1990-2001.

Level of education	Partnership form			*Total*
	Marriage	Cohabitation	Single mother	
Less than 8 years' primary	2.5	15.5	8.9	4.5
8 years' primary	19.2	36.2	28.6	21.8
Vocational	28.1	22.7	35.5	28.8
Secondary grammar	32.3	19.7	18.2	29.7
Tertiary	18.0	5.9	8.9	15.9
Total	100	100	100	100
(N=)	2177	304	203	2687

Source: my own calculations: 'Turning points of life course.' 2001/2002.

Table M3
Distribution of home ownership by countries

Country	*Own without mortgage*	*Own with mortgage*	*Tenant paying rent to private landlord*	*Tenant, paying rent for social / voluntary / municipal housing*	*Accommodation is provided rent free*	*Other*
EU-15	37.5	22.3	21.9	14.7	2.6	1.0
AC-10	66.4	5.2	4.4	19.4	3.0	1.6
EU-25	45.9	16.7	18.9	13.3	4.1	1.1
CC3	66.0	1.3	18.5	1.5	11.8	1.0

Source: Domanski et al. (2004) p. 18.

Table M4
Selected indicators of children's family demography, using the FFS data

Countries	Cumulative percent ever out of a union by age 15 (%)	Percent of time spent in single mother families at ages 0-14 (%)
Italy	9	3
Spain	13	4
Slovenia	15	6
Belgium (Flanders)	17	5
Poland	18	9
Finland	22	8
Hungary	24	8
Norway	26	7
Czech Republic	29	8
Lithuania	29	10
France	31	11
W Germany	34	12
Sweden	34	12
Austria	34	12
Latvia	44	15
USA	50	22

Source: Andersson, 2004:330., 332.

Table M5
Rate of children born to single mothers within total of extra-marital births

Countries	FFS data (Around 1990)	Estimated data from censuses around 2000
Norway	24	23
Finland	20	18
W-Germany	35	
E Germany	54	
Germany		40
Hungary	33	35
Czech Republic	36	(100)
Lithuania	71	78
Poland	82	(100)

Source: Andersson, 2004:326, own calculations

Table M6
Rate of poor children in the various age groups between 1992 and 2000 (%)
(equivalent income under 50% of average)

Age groups	Rate of poor people (those living under 50% of average equivalent income)				
	1992	1994	1996	1997	2000
0–2	15.1	22.8	29.7	33.7	20.7
3–6	13.7	11.7	24.7	26.0	19.2
7–14	12.0	16.4	21.6	22.3	19.5
15–19	13.0	15.9	19.1	18.2	18.9
20–29	11.3	9.5	13.2	15.2	11.1
30–39	7.7	13.4	13.6	12.1	12.2
40–29	7.3	9.3	15.5	12.1	12.5
50–59	7.4	11.3	7.3	8.6	8.8
60–69	10.5	7.4	4.3	2.7	6.1
70–	11.1	9.1	8.9	4.3	5.3
Average poverty rate characteristic of entire population	10.1	11.6	14.9	12.3	11.9

Source: own calculations, MHP 1–6. waves (1992-1997), Szívós-Tóth: 54 (2000)

Table M7

Poverty rates of people living in different family structures who have an individual demographic status, in Hungary, in 2001-2002

Individual and family demographic status	(Income) poverty	Absolute deprivation
Family type		
single ‹50	21.6	28.4
single 50›	9.0	31.8
couple ‹50	11.0	11.6
couple 50›	6.3	12.4
Nuclear family with minor	15.3	15.4
Nuclear family with over-18	7.1	10.7
Single parent with minor	28.7	26.6
Single parent with over-18	14.9	21.8
Three-generational with minor	18.5	18.2
Three-generational with over-18	8.4	10.8
Other	16.8	21.2
Number of minors in the family		
0	9.4	16.4
1	15.3	14.2
2	16.5	16.6
3	24.9	28.4
4+	41.9	53.2
Partnership status		
Single	11.5	18.0
Single with cohabiting partner	20.4	24.6
Married. living in a marriage	10.8	12.0
Divorced with no partner	15.0	22.4
Divorced with a partner	21.1	26.3
Widowed. alone	15.0	30.6
Widowed. with partner	10.7	27.3
Total	12.4	16.8

Source: own calculations, Turning points of the life course, DRI, 2001-2002